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ABSTRACT
In attempting ~Q explain the causes of famine, the literature on famine points to different
factors. This list of causes includes: drought; neo-Malthusian population growth;
environmental degradation; limited technology; capitalist development, or the lack of it;
the nature of the state, blamed either for lack of intervention or, on the contrary, for too
much intervention; and, war.
However, to attempt to determine how causation of famine might be quantitatively
apportioned between the different factors listed in the debates on causes of famine is of
limited value, precisely because the different factors that promote famine - drought,
environmental degradation, economic decline, war - are inextricably intertwined and
interact with one another. Moreover, famine is not simply predetermined by the factors
that the debate on causes itemizes. People's own actions and what people choose to do
also shapes the outcome and future strategies for survival.
The concern of this thesis is with famine in the case study areas, but our concern is not
with debating the causes of famine as much as ~ith identifying consequences. We
examine the effects of the array of forces on people's strategies for survival in. the
research areas during and after the drought and famine of the mid-1980's. We describe
the different strategies pursued by people in the study areas in the circumstances that
existed during the drought and famine of the mid-1980's; and then discuss the
consequences of those actions for people's ability to recover and for people's future
survival strategies.
The empirical data are based on two case studies carried out over a 6 month period from
late October 1991 to end April 1992 in the Kallu area of southern Wollo. Wallo is the
province that was hit hardest by famine during 1984/5 and in 1972/4. In documenting
the resource base in which people in the study areas sought to survive, our findings
challenge commonly held assumptions about the effects of the 1975 Land Reform, the
nature of Peasant Associations, and the nature of gender relations. The findings on the
consequences of people's responses during the drought and famine of the mid-1980's
indicate that we need to reconsider the issue of what is meant by the notion of 'coping',
so central to much of the literature on famine survival strategies.
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1CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACK6ROUND
INTRODUCTION
The Ethiopian famine of 1984/85 did not start in 1984, it
was only discovered by the international media in that
year. Documents from the Ethiopian Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) show clearly enough that
':
in the northeast of the country, including Wollo, Tigray,
Eritrea, Gondar, and parts of northern Shoa, famine was
building up force and momentum throughout the latter part
of the 1970s (See Chronology of the 1984-5 Ethiopian
famine in Appendix I).
Other than appealing for international aid, the Ethiopian
government made no attempt to avert the brewing crisis.
Indeed, it was only in October 1984, after the media
discovery of the famine and after the government had
dispensed with the celebrations held in the previous
month to mark the 10th anniversary of the 1974 Ethiopian
revolution, that the Mengistu government declared the
famine an official priority. When the relief effor.:
finally got underway, domestic politics i. e.
secessionist wars in the north of the country
the
took
precedence over the needs of the famine victims. Despite
pressure from the international donor community, the
government followed a deliberate policy of withholding
food aid from the rebel-held, and contested,
Tigray. Eritrea, and parts of northern Wallo.
areas of
The international humanitarian relief effort set in
motion from late October 1984 and throughout most of 1985
WF.lS unprecedented but, again, the respon~~e of western
governments and the main U.N. donor ag eric t es the U. N.
Food and Agricul t ural Organisat ion and the World Food
2Programme - was tardy and was also clouded both by super
power geopolitics and by political and bureaucratic
wranglings within and among the main donor agencies.
(For account s of the Et hiopi an famine of 1984-1985 see,
(RRC)
Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commisssion
Reports, October 1984 and October 1985; He.nc o ck ,
e. g. ,
1985; Clay and Holcombe, 1985; Gill 1986;
Janssen, 1987i Penrose, 1987; Smith, 1987;
Goyder, 1988; Rahmato, 1988, and 1991.)
King, 1986;
Goyder and
"
In October 1984 the RRC estimate of the number of people
seriou~ly suffering from starvation was put at 7.7
million; 2.6 million, or more than' one-third, of those at
risk were Wallo peasants (Rahmato, 1991). Although it
is unlikely that the human (or aIlimal) death toll will
ever be known, estimates of the human death toll during
1984 and 19~5 vary trom 400,000 <Rahmato,
500,000 (Janssen, 198i: 74), to 1,000,000 <King,
see also Gill, 1986; and World Bank. 1985).
1991: 108),
1986: 36;
During
decade
the Ethiopian famine of
earlier, the world
1972-74, less than a
was shocked by the
international television coverage of the starving masses
at Korem feeding centre in northern Wallo, and by the
revelation of the deliberate attempt by Emperor Haile
Selassie to conceal the famine from both the Ethiopian
peopl e and the int ernat i anal communi t y al ike. Est imates
of the human death toll during the famine which
affected the northern provinces of Wallo, Tigray, Gondar,
and northern Shoa during 1972/73 and the southeastern
province ot Harerghe in 1973/74 - vary between 40,000 and
(For accounts of the Ethiopian famine of 1972-
e. g., Cliffe, 1974; Shepherd, 1975; Miller and
Hal t, 1975; Hussein, 1976; Sen, 1981.) The famine was a
200,000. 1
1974 see,
significant contributory factor in the revolutionary
upheaval that overtook the country in 1974 and the
eubssequent coli apse of the absol ut i st rul e of Emperor
3Haile Selassie that had spanned a period of almost fifty
years.
In attempting to explain the causes of famine, the
literature on famine points to different factors. This
1i st of
growth;
causes includes: neo-Malthusian population
drought; environmental degradation; limited
technol ogy; poor savings and invest ment
capitalist development, or the lack of it;
nature of the state, blamed either
infrastruct uree;
war; and the
for lack ot
t nt er-ven t ion
intervention.
or. on the contrary, for too much
However, to attempt to determine how causation of famine
might ·be quantitatively apportioned between the different
factors listed in the debates on causes of tamine is of
limi ted val ue, precisely because the tactors that
drought. environment eI degradat ion,
war are so inextricably intertwined.
is not s1mply predetermined by the
promote famine
economic decline,
Moreover. famine
factors that the debate on causes items.
actions and what people choose to do also
outcome and tuture strategies for survival,
People's
shapes
own
the
Our concern is with famine in the case st udy areas, but
our concern is not with debating the causes of famine as
much as with identifying consequences. The purpose of
our research was to seek answers to the following
questions:
at work on
aft et'. the
What were the effects of the array of forces
people's strategies for survival during. and
1984/5 famine? What strategies did people
pursue in the circumst ances that exist ed during the
famine of the mid-1980's? What was the end resul t of
those act ions, and what were the consequences for
And, f inaIl y. "what
changing a situation
people's ability to recover?
feasible opportunities eKist for
where inordinately large numbers of people go hungry'?"
(J ayawardena, 1990: vi t >
4-
In the rest of this chapter we establish the historical
context for the empirical studies. In the following
istics of the country, The remainder of
character-
the chapter
sect ion we briefly describe the geophysical
discusses the changing historical nature of the state and
what these changes meant f or the broad peasant masses.
Chapters II and III are the empirical chapters. In
Chapter II we document the resource base in which people
sought to survive at the time of the survey. The Chapter
disc"usses th e following themes: access to, control over,
and U,?8 of resourceSj and, the social relationships that
condition these, including. state-peasant relations, the
r eLetL onshi ps between the Peasant Associ at ion (PA)
leaders and PA members, inter-household relations, and
the relationships bet ween men and women. This then
provides the context for the discussion in Chapter III
which describes the strategies pursued by people in the
study areas during the 1984-/5 famine, and the outcome
of those actions. In the aftermath of the famine, and in
contradistinction to the automatic notions of recovery -
falsely posed in much of the literature on famine
'coping' mechanisms, many people in the st udy areas
found themselves in situations that were wholly new to
them and we discuss the new options ~ facing people in
this wholly new situation. This means inventing a
methodology whereby we go back and forth in time to
describe the overall effects of the array of forces on
people's future strategies for survival. These themes are
brought together in Chapter IV, the concluding chapter,
in which we summarize our findings and conclude with a
brief discussion on the policy implications of these
findings.
1.1 PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY
Ethiopia2 is situated in the hinterland of the Horn of
Africa, bordered to the north and west by Sudan, to the
5northeast by Eritrea, and to the south by Kenya and
Somalia. To the east it faces Djibouti and Somalia.
Elevations vary from 100 metres below sea level in the
Dallal Depression to 4620 metres on the peak of Ras
Dashen in the Simien Mountains. The country consists of
two highl and massi fs, bordered by lowl ands on the east
and west. In the south, the highlands are bisected by
the East Africa Rift Valley, within which lie a series at
lakes.
i~ located in the tropicS. Differences in
altitude produce considerable regional variations in both
climate and vegetation. Vegetation varies from thornbush
and savannah grasslands in the lowlands to tropical
montane torest in the highlands. Deforestation is
estimated to have reduced tree cover from around 40 per
cent at the surt ace area in t he early 1900s to at-ound
5.6 per cent in 198ts (FAO, 1985, cited in Wood 1992:
its!>. A consequence of deforestation - whl.ch f s ssa i.d to
be especially severe in the nor~hern and eastern
highlands is shortage of tuelwood and an increased
dependence on the use of crop residue and dung for fuel
rather than for soil fertilization. According to the
World Bank <1984, cited in Wood, 1992: 187-188) dung and
crop residues, together, provide up to 55 per cent of
domestic energy and are the dominant fuel source for one
third of the population.
The main (kerempt) rainy season occurs between mid-June
and late September; the less predictable I small (belg)
rains' fall some time between February and April. Webb
(1993: 34).
in Ethiopia,
decline in
in his recent assessment of rainfall trends
estimates that there has been only a small
overall rainf all trend during t he past 25
years, but fluctuations around the mean between years and
bet 'Neen regions have been I arge. During the f amine year
of 1984, for example, annual rainf all was 22 per cent
6below the long-term mean at the national level and most
regions suffered <ibid.).
Traditionally, Ethiopians classify the land into three
major zones: dega, the highlands, which begin at
approximately 2300 met reSj woyna dega.
1600 and 2300 metres; and
the lower
highl ands, bet ween k' alIa, the
lowlands, below 1600 metres. The great majority of the
population live in the woyna dega zone. In the lowlands,
the dominant systems of production are pastoralism and
agro;-pastoralism, whilst, in the middle and higher
regions, agriculture and agropastoralism predominate.~ .
According to the 1984 Ethiopian Censusi the population
was then estimated at 42 rm Ll dorr" and was ex.pected to
reach 50 mi 11i on by 1990. (Et hi opi a. Popul at ion Census,
1984) Under the Transitional Government that took
power tram 'the Mengistu regime in
administrative
May 1991,
boundaries
the
c::ountry's regional were
redrawn on the basis of ethnicity. Eritrea's claimed (de
facto) independence from Ethiopia, following the collapse
of the Mengistu government, became de jure on the 23rd of
May, 1993.
There are
diversity
said to
characterize much ofCultural and ethnic
Ethiopia. be at least 80 ethnic
groups, and nearl y a hundred I anguages spoken,
additional regional or other dialects.
languages can be di vided int a f our groups, the
many wi th
The main
Cushi tic, Omotic and Na Lo t f c . Amharic, a
Semi t t c ,
Semitic
language, has functioned as the official language of the
Ethiopian state.
The centralisation of power within Ethiopia and Amhara
dominance have been caUses of social and political
unrest and t he •nationalities' problem is a major
consideration in domestic policies. It has resulted in
crippling human and financial costs, including civil war,
7maj or mil it er y expendi t ure. years of aggravat ed famine
conditions and the loss of government control over large
tracts of the country.
Since the conversion to Coptic Christianity in 333 A. D.
(Semere Haile, 1988: 12; Tedesse T'arnr e t , 1972) by the
ancient kindom ofAxum, founded in the highlands of
Tigray, Orthodox Christianity has functioned as the
official religion. However, the Islamic religion is
widely practiced, with an estimated one-third of the
popu~ation thought to be Muslim. Other religious groups
incl ude,
Felasha
Census,
animist s, Prot est ant s,
or • Ethiopian Jews' .
1984. )
Roman Catholics and
(Ethiopia. Population
The changing historical nature of the state, the forms
whereby it incorporated different nat ional i ties,'
religions and cultures provide a backcloth to
understanding the politics of food security and famine.
But in sketching in that background it is important to
try to divine what changing state forms meant to the
peasant mass and their prospects for food security.
1.2 HISTORYOF STATEFORMATIONANDCONSOLIDATION
Et hr op t e ' can t r ece its origins back to the ancient
Axsumite Kingdom which emerged in the highland plateBu
of Tigray over two thousand years ago; and to the
Abyssinian Kingdom, the political entity that emerged in
the northern highland areas of Ethiopia in the 13th
century following the decline of the Axsumite kingdom in
the 10th cent ur y,
<1135-1270). Yet,
Tareke (1991: xi)
and the collapse of the Zagwe Dynasty
as the following observation by Gebru
shows, the chronicles of this history
concentrate on kings and powerful men.
is the wars of survival of the maSses.
What is obscured
8"The affinity between the warlords who created
dynasties and built kingdoms and the theologians
who constructed dynastic legends and ideological
precepts to validate kingly authority is quite
striking. It is no surprise, then, that what we
know about Ethiopia since the thirteenth century,
when the manuscripts known as the "royal chronicles"
began to be written, is almost exclusively the record
of the thoughts and activi-ties of these two
privileged groups. In the back-ground there have
~lways been the multitude of toiling peasants of
whomwe have had only tantalising glimpses. "
The ~6th century marked a major turning point in the
history of the Abyssinian kingdom. The empire began to
disintegrate under the tWl.n assaults of a Muslim jihad
(c. 1506-1543) and the Oromo diaspore which began at the
turn of the 16th century and cont1nued in~o the late 18th
century. (Levine, i974i Ullendorf, 1973.) There t h en
followed a period of almost three cent ur ies 'The Era
of the Princes' (zemene mesafint) unt.il the reign of
Menelik in the late 19th early 20th century, during which
there was little or no effective central authority. At
first local and later regional warlords established their
own kingdoms and engaged -'in incessant warfare wi th each
other for overall dominance of the northern highlands.
(Abir, 1968; Pankhurst, 1968.)
By the mid-19th century three major kingdoms had emerged,
T1gray, Shoa,
incl uding most
and a north western kingdom based on Gondar
of highland Begemder. With the accession
of Menelik to the throne in 1896 the dominance of the
northern Amhara-Tigray was shifted to the southern Amhara
of Shoa. During his reign as King of Shoa, and later as
Emperor combining the three kingdoms, Mene1ik, through
military conquest of the south and south-eastern areas of
Ethiopia during the late 19th century more than doubled
the area of the Ethiopian empire. At the famous battle
9of Adwa in 1896 Menelik's army defeated an Italian
invasionary force and succeeded in preserving the empire
<although Eritrea became an Italian colony in 1890) from
western colonialism until the Italian occupation of the
country during the period 1935-1941. (Marcus, 1975;
Hiwet, 1975; Markakis, 1974: Alemayehu Bezabih, 1981.)
For the most part Menelik's
territories of Ethiopia were
c cn qu ee t e " of the southern
brutal with much destruction
of life and property,
rulers were gi ven the
although in some cases local
opportunity to submi t peacefully.
in the southernConsolidation of imperial authority
conquest a,reas was achieved through a variety of means
and included a major redistribution of land from the
indigenous peasantry to the conquering northern
settlers, the establishment and control of provincial
bureaucracies, and the ·construct ion 0-;- garrison towns
(Ketemas) whI ch were manned by Amhara-Tigrean soldiers
(nei t egna). These Ket emas lat er became administ rat i ve
centres, housing delegates of the crown, their families
and at her set tIers. (Perham, 1969; Hiwet, 1975 i JVlarkakis,
1974: Donham, 1985.)
Those who benefi ted from these southern conquest s were
soldiers, from the rank of privates to _,generals, royal
retainers, the church, and 1oc al rulers (balabbat s), who
were rewarded for their services and loyalty with grants
of land and/or the right to collect and retain tributes
(gul t) from the conquered peasantry. The eff ect of
Menelik's imperial rule on land relations is discussed in
greater detail below, for it was this dimension which was
most determinant of peoples fate.
Menelik's reign also led .t o the introduc'tion of a modest
modernization programme (e. g. the construction of the
Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, the opening of postal and
banking (Bank of Abyssinia xn 1905) services, and the
establishment of a few manufacturing enterprises). Other
10
developments included the establishment of a professional
and salaried army.
I.3 LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Analysts of Ethiopia' a prerevolutionary landholding
systems differentiate between the rist, kinship, tenures
that pertained in the northern highlands of Ethiopia
(i. e. , those areas of predominantly Amhara-Tigrean
set t lement, Tigray, Gondar, Goj j am, northern Wollo,
nor\hern Shoa, and parts of highland Eritrea); the diesa,
village based, tenures t ound in parts of Eritrea; and the
'fuedal' land reiations introduced by the imperial state
in the southern, conquest, r.egions of the country around
the the turn or the century. To understand better the
importance of landholding and access to land for survival
and toad security it is necessary to consider briefly
these historical pattern~ of landholding.
pattern of
r i st syst em, t he predominant
landholding that pertained in the northern
were two basic types of rights to
gul t right s. 7 Rist right s were
rights which were shared by ausufruct
Under the traditional
highland areas, there
land, rist rights and
hereditary
'descent corporation' (Hoben, 1973: 98-129). Rist rights
could be transferred through both parents and through
marriage. Anyone who could establish his/her position in
the descent group had inalienable rights to a segment of
the group's land. Not only was there a built-in
security mechanism in this type of system; it was also an
integral part of the traditional social and economic
structures of society. (Hoben, 1973; Markakis, 1974;
Cohen and Weintraub, 1975; Stahl, 1974). As such,
peasants have historically resisted government attempts
to alter the system significantly.
In contrast to rist, gult refers to land from which one
can collect tribute and taxes. Gult rights were granted
1 1
by the emperor,
empowered to make
of the nobility
or by provincial rulers who were
such grants, and were given to members
as a reward for loyal service to the
crown and to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as endowment.
In return for these privileges, the s,yl_i_ holder provided
judicial and administrative services on behalf of the
crown or the provincial governor. Gult land normally
encompassed rist land. The size of the ~ area, which
theoretically was held at the emperor's pleasure and was
non-heredi tary, coul d vary substant iall y according to
the holder's importance. In practice, some gul t areas
were virtually hereditary (rist gult) or would remain
within the extended family (Hoben, 1973l 188j Pankhurst,
19 : 135), The most valuable rist ggli. land was that
which was arable and under intense cultivation. The gult
system imposed heavy burdens on the peasantry and was
open to corruption. John Markakis <1974: 80) describes
the process of tribute extraction as it existed in the
rist landholding areas before the tax and admin~strat1ve
reforms described below were introduced in the early
1940' s:
HThe tribute extracted from the peasantry in the form
of taxes, fees, and labour was appropriated by the
various levels of the r ul f rig' hierarchy, both secular
and eccl esiast tc eL, Each level ret ained a share and
passed on a fixed amount to the higher level., .. ,the
process of determination and collection of the
tribute was left in the hands of the local governors,
who also appropriated the largest portion of the
tribute. This arrangement affected the peasantry
adversel y, for it put it at the mercy of t hose whose
income depended on the amount of tribute they
collected. It was customary for the officials to
exploit their advantage and turn taxation into
extortion. "
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Under the diesa system, f ourrd in parts of the Eritrean
highlands, the landholding pattern was based on land
use rights derived on the basis of Village membership. e
The social implications of tribute extraction in the
diesa landholding areas were broadly similar to that
described above for the rist landholding areas.
During the 19605 when the need for land reform was
recognized, the main failing of the rist system as
perceLve d by academics, agriculturalists, economists, and
planners alike was that the system fostered extensive
land fragmentation. These constraints, in turn,
prohibited peasant investment in production and
undermined peasant incent ives to conserve
CBrietzeke, 1975; Fassil Gebre
environmental
resources. Kiros, 1980;
and 19b6; Dese.legn Rahmato,
fragmentation is discussed
study areas in Chapter II.
1984) . TI,e issue of land
context of the case1n the
In the southern territories added to the empire during
Menelik's reign, upon ocupation of an area between two-
thirds and three-quarters of all land was confiscaded
from the indigenous population by the emperor and
port ions were grant ed as &!dll to Amhare-Tigray set t 1er-
soldiers and administrators. Roughly a third of the
land was given as gult to soldiers and officers involved
in the conquest, and ta governors and royal ret ainers
loyal to the crown (Wood, 1983: 513; Pankhurst, 1966: 135-
148). Gult was also given to the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church to encourage proselytization of the largely pagan
and Muslim populations. In certain areas, mainly those
areas that did not resi st conquest, gul t grant s were
given to local indigenous rulers, bal abbat s. In ret urn,
balabbats were expected to undertake administrative roles
and mediate between the occupation forces and the
peasantry. Land not distributed as gult was reserved for
the emperor.
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In theory. gyl_t_ grants were held at the pleasure of the
emperor, although Donham <l985~ 39) has estimated that
one-third or one-quarter of settled lands in the southS
were given as hereditary gult to local balabbats. The
size of the tributes exacted from peasants in this way
could range from one- to more than two-thirds of the
annual harvest. In addition to these tributes, peasants
provided cor ve e labour, and were subjected to a plethora
of petty taxes and fees. (See, for example, Markakis,
1974, and 1977; Stahl, 1974; Hiwet, 1975; Cohen, 1973;
CohE!n and -Weintraub, 1975;) The policy of doling out
1and and gul t grant sas, rewer.ds
was continued by Haile Selassie. 9
in the ext reme peri pheral areas
for loyalty to the crown
The 'unsettled' land
of the empi re was al so
considered government I and and remained 'so unt i 1 the
government saw fit to dole out some of this land as land
grants or to put portions of, it under cultivation as
state enterpr~ses, This' unsettled' land, in practice,
was used by pastoralists. (Bondestam, 1974; Kloos, 1977;
Donham, 1985.)
The heavy burdens on cultivators and the general poverty
of the peasantry reduced the ability of many peasants to
cope with the immediate impact of harsh climatic
c6nditions or to make their own recovery from them.
Fiscal and Administrative Reforms 1941-1967
In the early 1940's Haile Selassie introduced several
administrative reforms and tax laws. These reforms were
an attempt to increase the amount of state revenues from
the agricultural sector arid were designed to undermine
the political and economic power base of the provincial
nobility. In 1942 the government introduced a fixed
legal tax, abolished cor ve e labour, and regulated the
functions of provincial governors and other provincial
officials. Taxes were to be paid in cash and were to be
collected by officials of the Ministry of Finance instead
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of the provincial nobility.
The latter were granted a
regular salary and were forbidden to impose taxes and
dues other than those legally fixed by the government. 10
In addi t ion, provincial governors were
to the Ministry of the Interior and
directly appointing officials
made account able
prohibited from
to provincial
administrative posts. The appointment of provincial
officials was controlled by Haile Selassie personally.
With few exceptions11 the post of provincial governor-
"general was given to Shoans with proved loyalty to the
crown; Further reforms incl uded the redrawing of
provincial
measurement of land and a land tax based on size and
fertility provoked a revolt in Gojjam and violent
opposition in Tigray and Begemeder such that the emperor,
in 1944-, issued a second proclamation exempting these
provinces, hereditary gult land and church land trom
measurement and reducing the tax rate for unmeasured
land. le:
boundaries. A proposal
to introduce the
While these reforms curtailed the independence of the
provincial
burden of taxation on the peasantry, significantly, the
emperor did not initially attempt to curtail directly the
nobility
and theoretically relieved the
privileges of the nobility.
Taxes were not 1evied on
land owned, but on land under cultivation; only those who
worked the land were taxed for it, and unused land was
not subject to tax. This meant that the heaviest tax
burden fell on to the peasantry. (Stahl, 1974; MarkakiS,
1974; Schwab, 1972; Cohen and Weintra.ub, 1975.) At the
same time the existing landlord-tenant relations and the
peasant-gul t lord relations remained unchanged. As Wood
(1983: 528) notes:
II these new demands by cent ral government were
placed on the peasants even as they continued
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to hold their traditional obligations to the
1oc ale 1i t e .If
No fu~ther attempts to significantly alter the tax burden
on the peasantry were made unt i 1 the enactment of the
Land Tax <Amendment) of 1966 whi ch abol i shed suI t j and
the Income Tax <Amendment) of 1967 which abolished the
tithe. Under the 1966 Amendment, taxes were to be paid
directly to the government. The tax payer was to receive
a r.~ceipt of payment and waS recognized as the legal
owner of the land. However, contrary to the intentions
of the law, in many cases peasants in the southern
territories were reduced to the status of tenants. Gult
holders simply paid the taxes, which they continued to
collect from the peasants, in their own name and became
the legal owners of the land. It is estimated that
between 65 to 80 per cent of the peasants in the southern
provinces were tenants. 13
Absentee landlordism, and tenancy, in the northern
provinces at that time is generally considered by
analysts of Ethiopia's land tenures to have been rare.
The implicit assumption of these writers is that land
relations in these northern areas remained 'traditional',
In contrast, McCann (1986), in his study of the rist land
relations in Lasta, northern Wallo, clearly indicates
that rist land relations were undergoing fundamental
changes as early as the 1920' sand 1930' s. Because of
scarCity of land, children were no longer treated
equally in terms of land inheritance. The system was
shifting to one where only the eldest, or favoured, son
inherited land. This study highlights the extent to
which an increasing number
on wage labouring in the
coffee growing areas
indicat ion of the measure
Cliffe <1976: 9):
of northerners were dependent
Sudan, Eritrea, and in the
of s out her-n Ethiopia. An
of these changes is gi ven by
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"Some measure of the extent of these changes can
be estimated by the fact - that in one of the
provinces most hit by drought in 1973, Wollo, there
were about a quarter of a million landless families,
not counting those who were tenant farmers. And
Wollo and Tigre also provide many thousands of
seasonal cotton-pickers and coffee-pickers who went
for casual work on large scale plantations
elsewhere.
Food Security: .
In the 1950's and 1960's the government began to promote
the development of commercial agriculture. These
policies designed to increase the level of foreign
exchange earnings emphasized export-oriented
agricultural production and the promotion ef large-scale
commercial enterprises. In line with this policy, the
foreign investors. of
encouragement
concentration
togovernment offered every
The
possible
area for
capitalist agricultural investment was ~he valley of the
Awash river, the traditional grazing lands of the Afar.
Major concessionaries, such as the Tendaho Cotton
Plantation (the British based firm of Mitchell Cotts) and
the Wonj1 Sugar Plantation (managed by HVA, a Dutch
company) were granted large tracts of irrigatible land at
nominal rents. By 1973 about one-third of the teta1
irrigatible land was under cultivation. The Afar grazing
area was correspondingly reduced. l' With respect to this
strategy in the Awash Valley, Cliffe (1976 ; 10 ) writes:
"The grazing land that was thus lost was only a
small proportion but often the best watered and,
more crucially part of a total environment the
systematic use of each succeeding part of which
was vital to survival, especially in times of
drought. II
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Bondest am (1974: 424) est iroat es that roughly 25 percent
of the Afar pastoralists perished during the drought and
famine of 1972-74-. The loss of these prime grazing areas
was seen by several commentators on the 1972-74 famine
as one of the causes of the famine. (e. g. Bondestam,
1974j Kloos, 1982i Koehn, 1979.) While these writers
clearly highlight the constraints imposed on the Afar,
this single explanation doesn't explain why some Afar
were better able to cope with the drought than others,
nor does it explain the famine in other areas.
In the mid-1960s, two integrated rural development
projects (Chilalo and Wollamo Agricultural Development
Units CADU and WADU) and an agricultural extension
programme (IvIinimum Package Programme MPP) were
initiated to promote peasant agriculture. Tariffs on
agricultural machinery and fuel were eliminated while
c r ed i, t was provided through the Agricul t ural Indust ri al
Development Bank (AIDS) from the World Bank.
The areas chosen for pilot MPP projects, CADU and WADU
were all in southern areas with high rates of tenancy.
Although initially designed to promote smallholder
production, the projects failed to reach the target
beneficiaries. This was because the existing land tenure
relations prohibited peasants from realizing the full
benefits of the projects, and because the conditions set
by the programme actually prevented most tenants and
small farmers who lacked the necessary finances from
participating. (Stahl, 1974; Cohen, 1976.)
Between 1967 and 1972 over 20 per cent of the tenants
(approximately 5000 families) in the CADU area in Arsi
province
farming
were evicted as landlords took to mechanized
(Stahl, 1974: 74-5; see al so Cohen, 1976).
in the Bako MPP proj ect
project (Shoa), and Setit
Similar effects were observed
(Wollega), the Shashemane MPP
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Humera (Begemder) (St ahl, 1974: 115-124 and 133-7; see
also Gilkes, 1975; Hussein, 1976).
Par those who remained as tenants rents increased as land
prices soared. In the CADUarea,
commercial farms that existed
operat ed; and 44 per cent were
from absentee landlords. (Stahl,
56 per cent of the 126
in 1972 were owner
operated by contractors
1974: 103-4)
In terms of agricultural production, the schemes did not
resu~t in s'ignificant increases (Alemayehu Bezabih, 1982:
20). They were important, however, because they showed
the future trend of government policy, the development of
a new group of commercial farmers, and Cl trend towards
increased landlessness among the peasantry in ~he project
areas.
However, we shoul d not overempha~ ze t he ext Hnt of the
schemes and of c ommer c a 81 agr i c uL t ur e. The schemes were
concentrated in the south and only a few areas were
affected, whereas the problems facing peasants in the
north - particularly Wallo, Tigray, Gondar, and Eritrea -
were neglected. This does not mean that there were no
changes taking place in the north. As we described
above, an increasing number of northerners were invol ved
in migrancy and the cash nexus.
1.4 THE 1974 REVOLUTIONAND AGRARIAN REFORM
During the 19606 discontent with Haile Selassie's rule
began to be manifested overtly. In 1960 this dissent
took the form of an attempted coup. This was followed by
militant student opposition throughout the 1960s and
early 1970s. Among the issues given prominence by the
students were the need for land reform, and corruption
among senior officials. Attempts at reform, such as
the landlord-tenant bill were blocked at the
parliamentary stage in 1968.1 S The Catastrophic famine
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of 1972-4, a marked rise in urban food prices, reinforced
by the sharp increase in in costs of all imported goods,
especially petroleum products, in early 1974, discontent
among students and teachers over proposed educational
reforms, guerrilla activity in Eritrea and in Bale, and
peasant unrest in the sout hern provinces set the scene
for the military coup that successfully brought to an
end the absolutist rule of Emperor Haile Selassie.
In February 1974 a series of strikes in Addis Ababa and a
mutiny in the armed forces led to major changes.
Ministers were arrested; the government of Aklilu Habte
Wold, prime minister since 1961, promptly resigned, and a
new .prime minister, Lij Endalkachew Mekonen, was
appointed with B mandate to carry out reforms. In June
the Coordinating Committee of the armed forces, police,
and Terri torial Army was formed and took direct action
resulting in
deposed on
Commit t ee of
further arrests.
12 September 1974,
the Provisional
Haile
and the
Selassie was
Coordinating
Military Government of
Ethiopia (PMAC), commonly known as the , Derg'
(' committee'), assumed full governmental powers.
The next four years were marked by hi t t er and bloody
inter-factional fighting over ideological and politfcal
control over the revolution both between the two main
radical movements - the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement
(MElSON), and the Ethiopian People's Revol ut i onary Part y
(EPRP) and within the I Derg' . At the forefront of
the disputes were the twin issues of Eritrea's right to
self-determination, and the establishment of a people's
civilian government. The 'Derg', 'ideologically naive'
(Markakis, 1981), not surprisingly, initially s1ded with
MElSON, which wanted a Soviet style communist party and,
more important, was prepared to accept the necessity for
military rule for the time being. The more popular EPRP
took an opposite line on the military. It argued for the
immediate establishment of a people's civilian government
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and supported
det erminat ion.
the Eritreen struggle for self-
The disputes between MElSON and the EPRP
intensified into urban violence, and the ' Derg', in en
attempt to eliminate the EPRP launched a ' red terror'
campaign. Between 1977 and 1978 thousands were detained
and several thousand were killed. In roid-1977 MElSON
also fell foul of the 'Derg'. By
organisations were virtually eliminated.
late 1978, both
bloody power struggles within the 'Derg'
of Mengistu Haile Mariam as Chairman
Head: of Sta~e in February 1977.
Markak i s, 1981; Hal i day and
The bitter and
led to the rise
of the PMAC and
(Markakis and Ayele 1978;
Molyneux, 1981 i Ot t away I
1978) In the remainder of this section we highlight
the Derg's agrarian policies and reforms.
Land Reform Policy and Implementation
On 20 December 1974 Ethiopl.an socialism
(Hibrettesebawinet) was declared as the guiding
philosophy of the state. Ethiopian socialism as defined
by the •Derg' meant "equality, self-reliance, the dignity
of labour, the supremacy of the common good and the
indivisibility of Ethiopian Unity. 'I (Cited in Penrose,
1987: 107) In early 1975 the PMACannounced their first
measures of ~ationalisation, imposition of state controls
and land reform.
Land reform is generally regarded as the most important
policy of the 'Derg' s' early period. Among the many
groups that were active during the early days of the
revolution there was a consensus on the need for land
reform; it was the nature of reform that was a subject of
controversy and discussion. (See, e. g.; Cohen, 1981; and
Stahl, 1977.) To a significant extent the land reform
was preempted by a recognition of the realities in the
sout h. In the southern provinces the peasants had
already begun to take over their lands during the months
leading up to the revolution. <Markakis and Ayele 1978;
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Markakis, 1981; Ottaway, 1978) Of no less significance
was the 'Oerg's' determination to win the support of
radical groups agitating for land reform. Prior to the
revolution the slogan of student activists was Meret
larashu. or 'Land to the tiller'. The implementation of
this slogan was the main legitimizing measure undertaken
by the 'Oerg'
On March 4 1975,lb all rural land
all
was nationalised
without compensation; tenancy,
obli~ations·and past debts were
rent s, 'feudal'
abolished; the hiring of
wage labour on private farms was forbidden; sale or rent
of land was prohibitedi peasants were given usufructuary
right.s; and a ceiling of 10 hectares was imposed on the
size of landholdings.
Commercial farms were also nationalized and in general
became st at e farms, although some became co-operat i ves
and others were divided into small plots for landless
peasants. In the lowland pastoral areas, pas"toral
communities were given possessory right Si over land they
used for- grazing. (Koehn and Koehn, 1977: 3-61 j
Brietzke, 1976; Koehn, 1979; Alemayehu Bezabih, 1982.)
Thus, in theory, the land reform provided for better land
access and to full entitlements for the poor, and for the
redistribution of rural incomes.
Peasant associations <PAs) were to assist in the land
redistribution and thousands of senior secondary school
and university students were sent to the rural areas on a
government sponsored campaign (zemecha) to mobilize and
organize the peasantry. The students were also
responsible for establishing locally elected peasant
associations and for organizing literacy campaigns. PAs
were to be established for each 800 hectares of land and
membership was to be made up of tenants, landless
labourers, and landowners wi th less than 10 hect ares.
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Owners wi th more than 10 hectares could become members
only after their land had been redistributed.
In the south, the students began to implement changes
that were more radical than those called for by the land
reform. They excluded former officials and landlords from
holding any office, favoured tenant s, redi st ri but ed oxen,
attempted to establish collective farms, and tried to arm
the peasants. In their eagerness to foster peasant self-
assert i on and t a rid the count rysi de of 1andl ords and
of fa cLa Le , the students came increasingly into conflict
with the military regime which depended on the existing
state structure to maintain control of the country. In
some areas the students were ordered back to Addis Ababa,
and Ministry of Land Reform officials were assigned to
each woreda (sub-provincial district) to supervise the
implementation of the land reform and the organization of
the peasant associat ions. <Markakis and Ayele, 1978;
Markakis, 1981; Haliday and Molyneux, 1981; Ottaway,
1978; Alemayehu Bezabih, 1982.)
In the northern areas, where the rist system
predominated, peasants reacted with little enthusiasm and
in some areas even opposed the land reform. There was
-\ also signi ficant opposi t ion tot he land reform by the
Afar in the Awash valley. This opposition was led by
Sultan Ali Mirah, and other tribal leaders, in response
to the proposed nationalisation of their vast commercial
farms. <at taway, 1978; Alemayehu Bezabih, 1982; Markakis
and Ayele, 1978; Haliday and Molyneux, 1981.)
Data on the size of PA units and on the average holdings
of members is scarce (Cohen and Isaksson, 1988), although
it is generally known that in practice the size of PA
units varied from locality to locality. (e. g. Desalegn
Rahmat 0, 1984.) The popular not ion of the land reform,
held by peopl e 1ike Dessel egn Rahmat 0 <1984, 1988, 1991,
and 1992), for instance, is that the land reform
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equalized rural communities. According to
49) :
Rehmat 0 <1984:
"Not only has tenancy as well as landlordism been
abolished, but landlessness has also been done away
with. In terms of the relationship of the producer
to his means of production, all differ-ences heve
been eliminated, and each peasant now holds usufruct
right over the land that he employs for his
livelihood. In this sense, rural society has been
'1
f dest r at i fied' , and inequalities based on the right
to labour have been abolished. The "self-managing
peasant", to use Marx's term, reproducing himself by
his own effort, constitutes the chief element of the
social structure of the country-side."
However, Rahmato does not Examine, in detail, the
relations of reproduction, thus. it is not at all clear
how his "self-managing peasant" reproduces himself.
He sees the household as an aut onomous, and
undi ff erent 1at ed, unit. His definition of the 'self-
managing peasant' is
equal rights to labour.
gender-bl ind,
As we shall
as is his assumed
see in Chapter II,
although men had rights over women's labour in the study
,
areas, women had no rights over their husband's labour.
He further assumes that land is the primary source of
social differentiation, thus, t he import ance of ot her
crucial meens of production - such as oxen and labour -
as sources of social differentiation in rural communities
is downplayed. Interestingly, he further adds;
"In general, land reform has not brought
about significant changes in the status of a
great majority of peasants in terms of size of
holdings ..... The real benefit of land reform
must therefore be sought. . ... in the guarantee to
rural property that it has assured to every
peasant. If (ibid.)
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Yet, the same author, in subsequent wri t ings (Dessalegn
Rahmato, 1988, 1991, and 1992) argues that increasing
population pressure, and the need to constantly
redist ri but eland to newl y emerging househol ds, has meant
that peasants can have their land taken away from them
from one seaSon to the next. This contradiction
appears to have gone unnoticed by the author.
Rahmat0' s concept of
need to di st inguish
reproduction
between the
is too simplistic.
different elements
We
of
social rep~oduction: the reproduction of the farming
system; the reproduction of the labour force, including
the material reproduction of labour; and human biological
reproduction (see, e. g., Edholm, et. al., 1977); and to
examine the social relations that determine these.
Peasant Associations
In addition to the distribution of landt PAs were
empowered to est abl1 sh marketing and producer co-
operat ives, adj udicst eland di sputes, maintain Iaw and
order, initiate or co-operate with the government in
local development projects, and to administer and
conserve publi c propert y. (Briet zke, 1976; Alemayehu
Bezabih, 1982. ) Elective, sub-district (woreda),
district Cewraj a),
and in
and provincial associations were
1978 the All-Ethiopia Peasantscreated;
were primarily mass organizations outside
PAs
the
Association CAEPA)was established. However, the
administrative apparatus, and were never integrated into
the nat ional pol icy-making syst em. (AI emayehu Bezabi h,
1982; Clapham, 1989;) According to Markakis <1981: 23):
~At the highest levels, the Supreme Economic
Council includes the entire top officialdom of
the administrative and military apparatus, but
has only one representative from the. . All-
Ethiopia Peasant Association. However the AEPA
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representive is not included in the executive
committee of the council. The same holds true
for the corresponding organs at the provincial
and sub-provincial levels. II
However, as Alemayehu Bezabih (1982: 73) notes:
IIDespitethe localized and atomized s"tructure
of PAs they have demonstrated ·an impressive
capability not only to organize local administration
but to ~nitiate and sustain small- scale development
projects on their own or in cc-operation with central
government agencies. II
For the most part, information on the ·social backgrounds
of PA leadership suggests that, in many areas, the
leaders were chosen from among the moS~ li~erate members
of the .community and, thus, in all likelihood from among
the weelthie'r members of the community. (See, e.g.,
Alemayehu Bezab~h, 1982; Stahl, 1989; Pankhurs1:, 1992.)
Accounts of the mismanagement of funds due to the
general lack of simple accounting skills and reports on
the incidence of bribery are not uncommon (Alemayehu
Bezabih, 1982: 73)
Towards the end of the decade the functions of the
peasant associations were further expanded to include the
implementation of the' Derg's' economic and political
policies. These included: the enforcement of state
imposed taxes and grain quotas, the provision of military
conscripts; and the implementation of government
villagisation and resettlement programmes (see below). In
the general perception of the PAs, and in the literature,
the PAs are seen as mere vehicles for top-down-
directives. According to Clapham (1989). for instance,
the PAs became state adjuncts.
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While there was clearly an inherent tension in the
mediating role of PA leaders. what Clapham, amongst
others, fails to examine is the way in which the
increased functions and responsibility of the PA leaders
increased the leadershi p's control over local resources
and created the conditions for the PA leaders to
accumulate resources in their own interest. This issue
is discussed further within the context of the case
studies in Chapter II.
Food Security
In September 1978, on the 4th anniversary of the
revoluti on, the 'Dergt proclaimed the first of its annual
National Revolutionary
Development Campaigns.
Production and Cultural
The campaign was the 'Derg's'
first venture in the field of economic reconstruction
since the nationalisation proclamat ions of 1975. The
campaign was prompted by what
as "a frightening situation in
shortages of food' (cited in
rising urban food prices.
Mengistu himself described
urban areas regarding the
Markakis, 1981; 22) and
The food shortages at that time are generally seen to be
the effects of a combination of factors including the
disruption of production and distribution due to the war
with Somalia and Eritrean movements. According to
Alemayehu Bezabih (1982: 92 f.31>, for instance:
lIAgricultural production in Eritrea, Bale
and Hararghe regions was severely disrupted and
by mid-1978 over half-a-million people were
in war rehabilitation centres."
Other fectors affecting marketed production were
increased peasant consumpt ion f'rorn what was previousl y
1981;
share
Ghose,
<Cohen
1985;
and
Seith,
Isaksson, 1988;the land-owners
Markakis, 1985 Alemayehu
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Bezabih, 1982 )j and a shortage of consumer
which peasants trade their produce CMarkakis,
goods
1981) .
for
An
additional factor was the rapid expansion of the military
during 1977 and 1988 wh~ch placed greater demands on the
available marketed surplus (Alemayehu Bezabih 1982: 76;
Markakis 1981>.
The 'Derg' at tempt ed t a deal wi t h bot h the dist ri but ion
and product ion problems by increasing its monopoly
over marketing through the imposition of compulsory grain
quotap and .controls on private traders, and through the
establishment of state farms and the promotion of
producer cooperatives. These policies were designed to
enhance state control over the agricultural sector and to
maintain urban support by increasing the volume of
marketed output while keeping urban prices low.
(Lirenzo, 1984; Cohen and Isaksson, 1988; Ghose, 1985;
Griffin and Hay, 1985.)
Peasants were forced to contribute a quota of grain e t
fixed prices to the Agricultural Marketing Board (AMC).
Quotas were set for each region by the Grain Purchase
Task Force and passed down through district
administrative levels to service cooperatives and peasant
associations. The PA leaders were responsible for the
allocation of quotas to PA members which, in practice,
gave them a monopoly over marketing at the local level.
It is estimated that the prices paid to peasants on AMC
quota deliveries were on average less than half the
market price. (Ld r enz o,
For households already
further reduced the
1984j Cohen and
short of food
Isaksson.
these
1988. )
amount of food andlor
quotas
income
available to these households.
In addition to grain quotas peasants were required to pay
taxes and • contributions' to local and national campeigns
such as defence, famine relief, and local development
proj ect s. Land use fees and agriculturel income taxes,
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initially set quite low, gradually increased. Land use
fees, for exampLe, increased from ETB.10, to 20 and to
ETB. 30 (Ld,renzo, 1984). Land use fees were uni f orml y
applied, irrespective of size of landholding. The
implications of these fixed land use fees for the food
securi t y of households, especiall y t he poorer community
members, are obvious. While peasants gain from paying
fixed rates, as opposed to proport ional rates, in a good
harvest year, fixed rat es during a poor harvest year can
meen that peasants are forced to sell what little grain
they .:have or some other asset just to meet the
payment. As we shall see in Chapter II, this failure
to graduate land use fees according to size of
landholding was bitterly resented by informants.
In addition to the introduction of quotas, traders were
forced to deliver, depending on area specific
regulations, from 50 to 100 per cerrc of t.heir purchases
to the AMC. 'In general, traders were forced to deliver
40 per cent of "their purchases to the AMC, howe'ver, in
Arsi, Bale, and Gojjam the traditional surplus
producing areas all private grain trade was banned
(Cohen and Isaksson, 1988: 332; see also Griffin and Hay,
1985j and Lirenzo, 1984). Internal customs barriers and
t he pol icing of provincial borders were used t a prevent
blackmarketeering and the inter-regional movement of
grain. This meant that peasants in grain deficit areaS
were forced t a pay high grain pri ces, whi 1e peasant sin
surplus areas subject to demand and supply were
forced to accept low prices for their produce.
State farms at the time of the land reform were
established from existing large commercial enterprises.
The expansion of the state farm sector from the late
1970s onwards was partly ideological in that the 'Derg'
saw state farms as a means of moving towards an
integrated set of socialist agricultural strategies. The
willingness of Soviet Bloc countries to provide financial
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and technical support for such farms was also influential
(Wood, 1983). But, cruciall y, st at e f arms provided a
reliable marketable surplus of food grains for urban
areas and for the expanding military bureaucracy since
almost the entire output of this sector was marketable.
(Griffin and Hay, 1985; Wood, 1983; Cohen and Isaksson,
1988.) As Ghose (1985: 137) notes:
"The government, furthermore. sought to acquire
direct control of a part of the marketed output
~o as to be in a position to determine its
distribution"
According to Cohen and Isaksson (1984: 328) , shortly
after the land reform state farms eccounted for around
67,000 hect eres, by 1983 the area under st at e f arms had
increased to 222,000 hectares, or 3.5 pe, cent of total
cul t i vated area, and was scheduled to expand to 500, 000
hectares by 1994. According to Ghose, 19~5: 135)
between 1980 and 1985 state farms were allocated about 40
per cent of all government agri cuLt ural sect or spending,
and accounted for only 4 to 5 per cent of total
agricul t ural spending. In 1982, for inst ance, st ate farms
recei ved 95 per cent of improved seed all ocat ion, 80 per
cent of credit, and 76 per cent of fertilizer.
In the early directives on PAs issued after the
revolution, among the tesks given to the
promotion of collective farms. PAs were
PAs was the
encouraged to
set aside communal land for collective cultivation. In
the
1979,
new direct i ves on Producer cooper at i ves issued
the new policy was to promote group farming,
in
or
'collectivisation', as the sole form of production. The
producer cooperatives were conceived as rural production
cooperat ives, in which the means of product ion
:'1itially land was held communally. Three stages of
cooperation were envisaged: mel ba, welba.
representing progressive increases in Joint
end weland,
ownership of
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the means of production, the last stage involving a
large~ scale of ope~ations and the inclusion of livestock
as a socialized r-esour-ce. In theory. producer
cooperatives were to supersede the PAs (Cohen end
Isaksson, 1988j Stahl, 1989j Wood, 1983.)
While the
supposedly
formation of producer cooperatives was
a thousand, hastily trainedvoluntary, over
"production cadres" were deployed in the count~yside to
educate the peasants as to the benefits of
coU:ectivisation. Those willing to join were given
incentives of various kinds, including access to the
bette';'" land within the PAs, and preferential access to
state inputs and extension services. (Stahl, 1989;
Ghose, 1986; Alemayehu Bezabih. 1982.) The official .goal
was to have half the country's cultivated land worked by
producer cooperatives in 1994. However, Ghose (1986: 130)
est imates t hat in 1986 producer cooperat i ves accounted
for less than 2 per cent of the cultivated area and for
just over one per cent of .country's peasant families.
The failure of producer cooperatives to take-off is
generally attributed to the element of coercion used by
officials in promoting the collectives, a lack of
management and technical ski 11s, and the generall y low
levels of productivity achieved by the farms (Stahl,
1989; Cohen and Isaksson, 1988.).
The failure of producer cooperatives to take-off is seen
by some writers as the reason lor the 'Derg' s' highly
controversial villagisation and resett lement programmes
(Cohen and Isaksson, 1988). The villagisat10n Campaign
began in late 1985. The official goal, announced the
following year, was to move the majority of the rural
population into the new villages by 1995. Broadly
speaking, villagisation increased the size of rural
communities and locoted the rural population in a planned
physical set t ing, thus simp! i fying the t ask of service
31
provision,
populat ion.
tax collection,
(Alemayehu Lirenso,
and control over the
1992. )
During the first phase of the operation, carried out
between December 1985 and March 1986, the cempaign
covered eight regions, the focus being on Shoa, Arsi, end
Gonder. At the same time, and on a more limited scale,
villagisetion started in Gojjam, Sidamo, Welega, Kefa end
Illubabor. Villagisation never gained momentum in the
northernmost parts of the country where the 'Oerg' lacked
effective control. By late 1986 an estimated 12 percent
of t.he rural population were resettled into 4500 new
vi llages (Cohen and Isaksson, 1988: 330; Alemayehu
Li renso, 1992.). By 1987, the end of t he second phase of
the programme, there were 12 regions
According to
in which
officialvillagisation
est amet es, by
had occurred.
1990 some 40 per cent of the rural
population had been villagized (cited in Pankhurst, 1992:
52)
The villagisation programme received considerable
criticism in the international press and donor
community. In particular the 'Derg' was criticized for
instituting so disruptive a programme at a time when the
country was still recovering from a terrible famine.
Further criticisms focused on the environmental costs of
the programme, and on the economic costs for producers
in terms of work time lost, increased distance between
homesteads and f1elds, and the failure of the government
to deliver the promised social services. <Cohen and
Isaksson, 1988;)
The reset t lement campaign began in November 1984. The
declared goal of the programme was to move and resettle
1.5 million people from the drought prone areas of the
north tot he supposedl y underut i 1ized areas of Kaf fa,
Wollega. and Illubabor by the end of 1985. Officials
argued that the environmentally degraded north was no
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longer capable of supporting its present population.
During the period November 1984-January 1986 an estimated
591,227 people from the northern regions of Wallo,
Gondar, Tigray, and Gojjam were resettled in the south
(Sivini, 1986:227: see also Janssen, 1987) . The
resettlement
international
programme attracted criticism from
donors and non-governmental organisations
engaged in the famine relief effort
was announced.
from the moment it
In addition to the timing of the programme, critics
argued that the operation was badly planned and caused
much suffering and a great deal of hardship to the
resettlers.
resettlement
The forced. as opposed to the voluntary,
of people. and the environmental
consequences of the programme in the receiving areas also
came in for a great deal aT criticism. <See e.g., Clay
and Holcombe, 1986; Survival I nternat i onal, 1985; Cohen
and Isaksson, 1988. )
However, while all of the criticisms
'Derg' at that time were just ifi ed,
levelled at the
the logic of the
programme was never questioned.
accepted the fact that there
Critics unquestioningly
is degradation of the
environment hence the population must be reduced.
Moreover, the perceived degradation is assumed to be
irreversible. This is not necessarily the case. This is
only looking at the problem in terms of land-use, and not
in human terms. It is a simplistic two-way population/
environment carrying capacity argument without
considerat ion of the farming system and broader macro
conditions.
alternative
considered.
Thus, changes in the farming system and
techniques of farming are often not
Throughout this section our discussion has focused on
the 'Derg's' policies and the agrarian reforms since the
1974 revolution. These policies also need to be seen
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within the context of the secessionist wars in the
northeast - Eritrea, Tigre, northern Wallo - and in the
southwest of the country and the consequent loss of human
life and the massive destruction of productive
resources. While the arenas of war were local and
restrictions
nevertheless the effects of the
felt throughout the country
mobility, forced conscriptions, and the
geographically specific,
wars were indirectly
on
enormouS drain on national
expanding military bureaucracy .
resources to support an
.~
From 1988 onwards resistance movements,
the Tigrean People's La berat i on Front
their hold in many parts of the country.
and in particular
CTPLF')t increased
On 21 May 1991
Mengistu Haile Mariam fled the country and a week later
the Ethiopian People's Democrat L c Front (EPRDF), formed
by the amalgamation of the TPLF and o~her liberation
movements, took control of the capi tal and the country.
A national conference on Peace and Democracy held in July
endorsed a 20-art icle chart er. The transi tional
government subsequently set up was headed by the Council
of representatives under the presidency of Meles Zenawi.
Policy declarations made in the year preceding the
downfall of the 'Perg' showed a movement away from the
highly interventionist polices of the previous 14 years,
and towards greater economic incentives to the
peasantry. (Belshaw, 1991.) Officially this shift in
policy was presented as a realization that earlier
policies were not delivering. However, these changes in
policy can also be seen as having external origins.
Pressure had been exerted by the West, in particular the
World Bank and the European Economic Community, which
were f undd rig development schemes in the country.
Finally, the shift can be ~xplained as a response to
I?erestroika and the fundamental changes that were
occurring in Eastern European countries. (See, e.g. ,
Pol y ak ov , 1992.)
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It was not the purpose of this chapter to examine the
rationale of the Mengistu regime's policies, but to
provide the histor~cal context for the empirical studies.
These policies were heavily Lnterventionist and had major
effects on ordinary people. In the following chapter we
focus on the array of forces which face people in the
case study areas and discuss the resource base in which
people sought to survive.
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CHAPTER II
THE LOCAL CASE STUDIES
11.1 THE STUDYAREA
The studies were undert aken in the Kall u area of the
thensouthern Wollo administrative region. Stretching
across an area of 5060.7 square
encompasses parts of south-central
ki lometres, Kallu
and south-eastern
Wollo. At the time of the 1984- Ethiopian Census the
population of Kallu was estimated at 417,000.1 The
peoples inhabi t ing the area are of the Amhara, Oromo,
and Afar, e"thnic groups. In 1989, when a new
country, the region.
was introduced throughout the
formerly known as Kallu awraja,
North Kallu awraja, and South
administrative division
wasdi vi ded in tot wo,
Ka11u awra j a.
Two surveys were undertaken in two peasant associations
over a six month period lasting from the end of October
1991 to the end of April 1992. The peasant associations
were selected on the basis of their different ecological
set t ings. Thus, one of the two peasant associations
select ed was Gerbi Peasant Associ at ion situated in the
eastern lowlands of Kemisse woreda, an administrat i ve
sub-dist rict of South Kall.u awra j a' The second peasant
association selected was Ablosh Peasant Association
located in the western highlands of Albuco woreda. an
administrative sub-district of North Kallu awraie.
II.2 SAMPLESIZE
In Gerbi Peasant Associ at ion, the number of households
sampled was 54 (15%). It was also our intention to
cover a sample of 50 households (12%) in Ablosh Peasant
Assoc i at ion. However, because of political instability
in the region at the time of the survey we,
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unfortunately, were unable to complete the survey. Thus,
the number of households sampled in Ablosh Peasant
Associ ation was 23 (5. 4%). As a result, the small size
of the latter sample makes it more suitable for
suggesting hypotheses rather than for testing them.
In both study areas, sample households were selected
randomly. 'Households' were identified on the basis of
the local, administrative definition of the household as
used by the peasant association. However, households are
not static entities. In both study areas, several of the
respondents were members of different households at
the time of the 1983/84 drought and famine. For
exarnp~e,
at the
some of the women respondents that were married
time of
spouses,
the drought.
the survey were either married to
or headed their own households at the
Similarly, some of the women
headed their own household at the time
time of
different
respondents that
of the survey were married during 'the drought.
Throughout the discussion, therefore, the sample is
adjusted accordingly to take account of the considerable
fluidity of households in the study areas.
In sddi tion tot he househol d surveys, in each of the
study areas interviews were also held w{th village
elders, ex-peasant association committee members, ex-
heads of the women's associations, local extension
workers, local ministry of agriculture officials, and
members of locally based non-governmental organisations.
II. 3. ABLOSH PEASANT ASSOCIATION
Ablosh Peasant Assoc iat i on was I oca ted in t he west ern
highland region of Albuco, North Kallu
geographical boundary of the peasant
awraja. The
association
stretched from the high mountain ranges of the dega zone
CL e. areas of 2500m and above) tot he f 1 at 1ands in the
lowland, koll a zone CL e. areas of 1600m and below) .
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According to
Agriculture,
figures
the total
provided by the
area covered by
Ministry of
the peasant
However, this
Gerbi Peasant
association was estimated at 800 hectares.
estimate, along with the estimate for
Association (see below>, needs to be read with caution.
Although, in theory, peasant associations were officially
allocated a land fund of 800 hectares, the boundaries of
peasant associations are known to have varied both within
and bet ween locali ties. (See, e. g. Rahmat 0, 1985)
Acco~ding to ministry of agriculture officials in
Kemisse, and Dessie, aerial mapping was used in drawing-
up the peasant association boundaries in some parts of
Wollo. In other parts of Wollo, the peasant
asssociation boundaries were drawn on the basis of
negotiation between neighbouring peasant association
leaders with help from the ministry or agriculture, but
no actual measurement of land took place. Thus, the
estimates of the land allocated to the peasant
associataions in these latter areas are based largely
on 'guesstimates'. In both of the areas under study
the latter method was the method used in drawing-up the
peasant associations boundaries.
According to survey informents, the peoples inhabiting
these highland areas were all Amhara. Interestingly, the
people were all Muslim and not, as commonly portrayed 1n
the general 11t erat ure on the highl and Amhara, Christ ian.
According to Mohammed Kalid, the head of the peasant
association's Peace and Stability Cornmdt t ee s , at the time
of the survey the association comprised 421 households.
Of these, 64 househol ds (15%) were headed by women. The
number of single male-headed households was 4- (1%).
The association comprised 6 settlements, each of which
was distinguised by an ancestral place name. All 6
settlements were located at aLtitudes above 2300~ Four
of the 6 settlements were sited at altitudes -2500m and
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above. The sample hOLlseholds were drawn from 2
settlements, Ablosh, and. Ambowenze, located in the higher
ranges. Members of settlements were linked through
kinship, and had kinship linkages with people living in
different settlements and different peasant associations,
partly as a result of the past outmigration of family
members during times of population expansion or family
tensions, and partly as a result of marriage ties.
Typical of the traditional settlement patterns observed
elsewlfere in. Wallo (e. g. McCann, 1986; Rahmato, 1988, &
1991), homest eeds were dispersed, scat tered in between
fields in small clusters of 2 or 3 houses. Houses were
in the form of the traditional round house (' tukle'), and
were made from a combination of wood, mud, dung, and
thatch. Mosst of the houses had gardens, of varying
size, fenced off with cacti, a plant species common to
the area. However, the quality of- housing among the
sample households var f.e.d signi ficant ly. Of the 23 sample
households, 6 households (26%) lived in large, well
maintained, tukles with separate sleeping areas. These
households also possessed a variety of material goods
such as crockery, blankets, and furniture, including, in
3 cases, met al spring beds. Thirt een of the sampl e
households (57%) lived in well maintained tukles, albeit
of varying Size, but had few material possesionsi while 4
of the sample households (17%) were extremely poor with
virtually no material possessions and poor quality
housing. Seven of the 23 sampl e households e I so had
small, conicle, or rectBngular, shaped secondary houses
in which they either kept their animals over night, or
used them for storage of grain end/or fodder.
The association's communal dry season grazing areas were
locat ed in the highl ands; the communal wet season grazing
areas were located in the lowlands. Members of the
association also cultiveted landholdings both in the
highlands and in the lowlands. The local measure for
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land was a 'timed' which is roughly equivalent to a
quarter of a hectare.
We, unfortunately, were not
amount of land allocated
able to gather data on the
within the association to
different
grazing.
timing of
land uses such as, housing, forests, arable,
This was, in fact, understandable given the
the survey. At that time, like many other
areas of the
particular, wes
conf 1i et saver
count ry, sout hern Wollo, and Kall u in
experiencing an escalat ion of localised
territorial rights. Moreover, with the
collapse of peasant association committees, localised
land redistribution was officially the responsibility of
the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, given people's
uncer tet rrt y about land rights, land was a particularly
sensitive issue and the Villagers! reluctance to reveal
how much arable and grazing land the association had was
highly understandable.
Unlike some peasant es aoc t e t t ons , Ablosh did not have a
producer cooperative. However,
several at her neighbouring
in theory, it shared, with
peasant associations, a
service cooperat i ve. Service cooperat i ves were
for bringing infrast ruct ure and services
a vehicle
to rural
communities. In addi t ion, up to March 19~O, the
cooperatives were also used to collect contributions
requi red of the populat i on by the government. (see, e. g. ,
Lirenso, 1984; Saith, 1985j Cohen and Isaksson, 1988j
Stahl, 1989.)
Through a nationwide government organization, the
Ethiopia Domestic Distribution Corporation, service
cooperatives were provided with goods allocated on a
rat ioned, fixed-price dist ribut ui on syst em. In theory,
the service cooperatives could procure crop extension
s(H"vices; market the pr-oduce of their members as well as
produce imported from outside the region; give loens; and
provide storage and milling facilities. The shops
4-0
sold salt, a basic good,
hal f t he market price.
was voluntary, the use
denied to those who had
and sugar.
Membership
of some of
a luxury. at almost
was by househol d and
the facilities being
not paid their membership fee.
Distribution of the goods occurred on a quota basis
whenever they were brought in, theoretically once a
month.
informants, when available, the ration waS usually about
1.5 kilos of salt and 1 kilo of sugar per household.
in pract ice much less regularly. According to
However. up to March 1990. service cooperatives were
also used to collect the enforced sale by peasant
association members of a quota of grain at state prices
which were invariably set at below market prices.
Following a policy change in March 1990 t has system was
aLtered and the Agricultural Marketing Board thereafter
had to buy on the open market.
Theoretically, the members of Ablosh peasa.nt association
shared a service cooperative located in Albuco. In
practice, none of the respondents had ever used the
cooperative's facilities. According to informants, to
reach the cooperat i ve took some 6 hour s on f oat and
meant tr,avelling over mountainous terrain, However,
while the distant location of the cooperative in effect
prevented respondent s from benefi t t ing from the
available services, the latter al-so enabled peasants to
resist the payment of grain quotas. The sanction for
non-payment of grain quotas was the withdrawal of the use
of the cooperative's facilities. Since the latter were
not used by respondents. such sanctions had little
weight. This issue of grain quotas is discussed further
in Section II. below.
The nearest town for these highland dwellers was the
small. lowland, market town of Morkoy some two hours
walking distance down the mountain face. The area was
connected to the main north-south highway, some 19 kms.
41
to the east, by a feeder roed. The road, a fairly
recent construction, was started during the famine of
the mid-1980s es part of a food-far-work project
organised by World Vision, an American Baptist mission.
I1.4 GERB1 PEASANT ASSOCIATION
Gerbi Peasant Association was located in the eastern
lowland region of Kernisse, South Kallu
within the Kolla zone, i.e. areas of
Accor-ding ta figures provided by
Awraja, and fell
1600m and below.
the Ministry of
Agriculture,
association
the total area covered by the peasant
was estimated et 750 hectares.
The peasant
during the
association was subjected to villagisation
first quarter of 1986, shortly after the
Mengistu regime's villagisation programme was expanded
to include Wallo in 1985. According to the figures
provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, Dessie, some
three per cent of the rural population of Walla was
villagised during the period 1986-1989. After Tigray and
GarnoGoia,
established villages
Wallo contained the lowest number of the newly
1992: 136). The(Alemeyehu Lirenso.
all built in the southern Wollonew villages were
administrative region; the programme was never
implemented in northern Wallo where the government
lacked effective power.
In Gerbi, the association members were all Oromo, and
Muslim. Prior to villagisation, the people lived in
dispersed settlements, totalling 5 in all, scattered
among the surrounding hillsides. As in the highland
study. members of settlements were linked through kinship
and also had kinship linkages with people living in
associations. The new village site was a
peasant
hillside
different settlements, and in different
close to the main north-south highway. Some 7kms to the
south of village was Kemisse t own, the wareda capital.
4-2
A much smaller market town, Harbu, was situated some 12
krns to the north of the village.
Three recently constructed, rectangular, brick houses
(one of which was still in the process of construction at
the time of the survey) owned by 3 of the weal thier
members of the community. contrasted sharply with
therest of the village houses which were all in the form
of the traditional round tukle, and were
combination of wood, mud, dung, and thatch .
made from a
.~
One of the many concerns expressed by
villagisation programme (e. g. Cohen and
Aleroa~ehu Lirenso, 1988, Berihun, 1988)
cri tics of the
I saksson 1987,
was that the
increased use of wood for house cons~ruction would
accelerate deforestation. In Gerbi, respondents reported
that, on the insistence of officials trom 'the Ministry of
Agr~culture, the body responsible for establishing the
new village, the houses were transported whole from the
old settlements to the new village site on large wooden
poles.
was provided by members of the
the new
peasant
All of
village
the 1abour used in the construction of
association. To transport each house required from 20
to 40 men, depending on the size of the house.
While most of the houses had a fenced-off garden, some of
the gardens were noticeably larger than others. Roughly
a third of the houses were packed so close together that
these households had no room for a garden.
According to the head of the Peace and Stability
Committee, MohammedAbdu, et the time of the survey the
association comprised 362 households. Seventy-six (21%)
of these households were headed by women. The number of
single male-headed households was only one.
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As in Ablosh, among the sample households, the quali ty of
housing, and the range of material goods possessed by
households, varied significantly. Of the 54 sample
households, 15 of these households lived in large, well
maintained tukles. Twelve of these households also had
secondary houses for keeping animals, or for storing
grain and/or fodder. In sharp contrast, 11 of the sample
households lived in small, poorly maintained tukles.
The ~associ&tion' s communal grazing areas and arable
landholdings were located on the surrounding lowland
plains. In Gerbi, as in Ablosh, the local land measure
-we a the' t Lrnad' and was roughly equivalent to a quarter
of a he.et are. Here, as in Abl osh, we wer e unabl e to get
information on the amount of land allocated by the
association
association
However, it
to
did
different
not have
land use purposes. The
a producer cooperat i ve.
several other neighbouringshared with
peasant associations, a service cooperative, located in
Kemisse.
II. 5 ENVIRONMENT
Rainfall
Throughout most of Wollo there are two rainy seasons. The
main, kerempt, autumn, rains fall from mid-July to end-
September. The short belg, spring, rains fall from mid-
February to end-April. The exceptions are the lower
elevation areas along the fringe of the eastern
escarpment which receive only the kerempt rains. The
bega, dry, season, which follows the kerempt rains and
lasts from October to January, also receives some light
rains. These lat t er rains provide
of moisture for grazing pastures.
an important source
The mean annual rainfall for Wollo tor the period 1961-
1988 is shown in Figure 1. below. These data are
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reproduced from Webb (1993). Average annual rainfall
over this 28 year period is estimated at 837mm. However,
as the data also show, fluctuations around the mean
bet ween years have been large. The 1972-1973 f amine was
preceded by three consecutive years of below average, and
declining. rainfall. Rainfall during the famine year of
1984 was only 47% of the long-term average and was the
lowest recorded rainfall for Wollo since 1961. (See also.
Degefu, 1986, & 1987; Cutler, 1988.) Rainfall during
1985, although improved, was still well below the 10ng-
'1term average; while 1986 end 1988 were characterised by
well above average rainfall. Figure 1, below shows the
mean annual rainfall from 1961- to 1968 for Wollo.
In Wallo, as throughout Ethiopia. precipitation varies
according to altitude. According to estimates provided by
the Ethiopian National Meterologicsl Services Agency.
rainfall in the highlands of Wollo ranges from about
600mm at altitudes between 1600-2300m (the woyna dega
zone); and from about 700-1300mm at etltitudes of 2400rn
end above (the dega zone). Average annual reinfall in
the lowlands (the qolla zone), ranges from about 200-
500rnrn.
Thus, in theory, both survey sites benefitted from having
two harvests. However, informants in Ablosh peasant
association, which stretched from the high dega zone
(2400rn and above) to the lowland qolla zone. had higher
aver-age
diverse
peasant
amounts of rainfall and operated within a more
micro-climate than survey in.formants in (Jerhi
association which fell within the lowland.
qalla zone.
However, we also need to examine the timing and pattern
of rainfall at the local level. The timing of
precipitation (relative to ideal times for planting,
germination, and the maturation of crops) is as
important as the absolute amount of annual preCipitation
Mean Annual Rainfall frOM 1961 to 1988
for Wollo
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for agricultural production,
<Farmer and Wigley, 1985i
and for livestock production
Glantz, 1987). Tables IV. 1,
and IV.2, below, show the seasonal pattern of rainfall
from 1983-1992 for Gerbi, and for Ablosh, as reported by
respondents. Rainfall is ranked in terms of 'poor' and
'good' rains, ranging from 'no rain' to I too much' rain.
It would be unrealistic to expect respondents to recall
the precise timing and pattern of seasonal rains over a
long period, but these
still indicative
indicators,
of trends
although
and they
imprecise.
were theare
desc~iptive .indicators used by respondents themselves.
A characteristic feature of rainfall at both survey
sites was its high variability. As Table 11.1. for
Gerbi, shows, the worst year in the study area over the
Table 11.1
Seasonal Pattern of Rainfall 1983-1992,
Gerbi Peasant Association
As Reported by Responden~s
Belg Meher
1983 good good
1984 no rain no rain
1985 good good
1986 good good
1987 poor v. poor
1988 good good
1989 poor poor
1990 poor poor
1991 good v. poor
1992 good
period 1983-1992 was clearly the famine year of 1984.
According to
during the
informants, there waS I no rainfall' at all
season of 1984. These failed belg
rains were followed by some light rain that fell over a 2
day period at the end of May. These rains arrived too
lata for a belg crop. and were general:y seen by
informants as too sparse for the sowing of a meher crOp,
and as too light to relieve the effects of the prolonged
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these light
grazing pastures. After the
May rains, the remainder of
absence of
cessat i on of
rainfall on
1984 cont inued dry. No r.ain was recei ved in the st udy
area during the long Ker~mpt rainy season.
According to the official rainfall data for WallO,
rainfall in 1985, although improved, was still well below
average, while 1986 is generally regarded as a good
year, with well above average rainfall. (See Figure 1
above, see also Degefu, 1987.) While respondents also
reported 'good' rainfall during 1986, rainfall during
1985 was also reported • good'. Both the belg and the
,:
kerempt rains of 1985 began on time and were generall y
considered good by all informant s. However, as the
above data show, the kerempt rains of 1987, a slightly
below average rainf all year (see Figure 1), were very
poor in the st udy area. These rains began on t. ime and
then ceased in early September some 3 weeks before they
were due to be over. These poor kerempt rains were
preceded by 'poor' rains during the belg season.
rainfall in
also show, over the period 1987-1991,
study area was characterized by
As the above data
the
successive years of poor rainfall. Although rainfall in
the study area during 1988 was describea as 'good',
during 1989 and 1990 rainfall was poor for 4
consecutive seasons. 'Oood' rainfall during the belg
season of 1991 was again followed by 'very poor' kerempt
rains. These rains ceased in earl y Sept ember, almost a
month before they were due to be over. At the time of
the survey, the 1992 belg rains were in progress. These
rains began early, and respondents were optimistic that
these rains would continue.
In the
rainfall
lowlands of
from 1983 to
Ablosh, the seasonal pattern of
1992 was broadly the same as that
described for Gerbi. However, e different picture emerges
when we look at rainfall in the highlands of Ablosh. As
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in Gerbi, the worst year in the st udy area over the
period 1983-1992 was the famine year of 1984. E:xcept for
some light rainfall in the lowlands over a 2 day period
in late May, no rain was received in either the highlands
or the lowlands of Ablosh during the belg and kerempt
seasons of 1984. However, while rainfall in the lowlands
during the belS seasons of 1987, 1989, and 1990, was
descri bed as 'poor' I rainfall in the highlands during
these seasons was generally described as 'good', On the
other hand, rainfall during the kerempt seasons of 1985,
1986,':and 1988, was described as 'good' in the lowlands
and a~ 'too heavy' in the highlands. According to
informants, these heavy downpours in the highlands
resulted in crop damage from excess water. As in Gerbi,
the keremRt rains of 1990, both in the lowlands and in
the highlands, were poor. Although the be1S rains of
1991 were good, these rains were again followed by ,very
poor' kerempt rains. These findings are shown in Table
11.2, below.
Table II. 2
Seasonal Pattern of Ra~nfall 1983-1992,
Ablosh Peasant Association
As Reported by Respondents
Belg Meher
Highland Lowland Highland Lowland
1983 good good good good
1984 no rain no rain no rain no rain
1985 good good too heavy good
1986 good good too heavy good
1987 good poor v. poor v. poor
1988 good good too heavy good
1989 good poor poor poor
1990 good poor poor poor
1991 good good v. poor v. poor
1992 good good
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Vegetation
In the highlands of Ablosh can be found a range of cacti
species, Pines, and Eucalyptus trees. In the lowlands of
Ablosh, as in Gerbi, can be found Accacia shrubs,
thornbush, Eucalyptus, end Shale trees. According to
respondents, the thick black volcanic soils in the
highlands are easier to work than the loam-clay soils
found in the lowlands. Fuelwood short eges was not
reported as a problem in either of the study areas and,
accor::ding to informants, animal dung was not used as a
source of fuel.
II. 6 THE 1975 LAND REFORMAND ITS IMPLICATIONS
One factor crucial to understand the overall entitlements
of these different communities and their differen1:
households is the pattern 01 land holding. This was in
which was the
following the
first state
land reform of March,
enactment undertaken
1975,
by the
fact modified
revolutionary government which had significant
repercussions th)~oughout the country. The impact of the
land reform we s far from uniform within one region, let
alone throughout the country, and the literature suggests
that the most fundamental ~hanges were manifested in the
south. The main components of the land reform, and the
main charact eri st ics of Ethiopia's t radi t ional t.enures
which the land reform sought to replace, were described
in Chapter II and are only briefly restated here.
Analysts of Ethiopia's traditional tenures frequently
differentiate between the I feudal' land relations
introduced by the imperial state in the southern regions
of t he count ry around the t urn of t he cent ur y , and the
• r t s t ", kinshi p. t enures based on ambil ineal inheri t ence
whicn pertained in the north-eastern highlands. The
link age bet ween these traditional land tenures and
peasant food insecurity as perceived by proponents of the
50
land reform was that, in the former 'feudal' land
relations in the south of the country, peasant s were
straffed by onerous landlord exactions and, in some
areas, such as Arsi, by the erosi on of land right s as a
result of the penetration of capitalism and the
privatisation of land. In the latter kinship, or 'rist',
system associated with the northern regions of the
country, the problem was seen as peasants were forced on
to tiny fragmented holdings partly as a result of
increasing population pressure and the constant
subd~vision of land to meet the demands of claimants, and
partly as a result of the commodification of land and
-;~
the gradual erosion of traditional land rights. A
related argument was that the lack of secure tenure
rights faced by peasants both in the north, and in the
south, of t he country inhi bi ted peasant investment in
product i on and undermined peasant incent i ves to conserve
environmental resources. (e. g. Cohen & Weaner, 1975;
Cohen and Koehn, 1977, Hoben, 1973, c i i r'r e. 1974; Gilkes,
1975; Perikh ur e t , 1966; Stahl, 1974-; Bri et zke , 1975 j
Huffnagel, 1961; IBRD, 1973; USAID, 1973; Dunning, 1970.)
With the implementation of the land reform of March 1975,
all rural lands were nat ional i sed and peasant s were
given usufruct rights. In theory, landholdings were
restricted to a maximum of 10 hectares. The sale,
mortgage, and leasing of land, and the hiring of labour
was prohibitedj
relations, land
abol ished.
and all existing landlord-tenant
rents, dues, and obligations were
To consolidate the reforms, new mass organisations
peasants', women's, and youth, associations were
established throughout the rural sector. The peasant
associ at ions, t he lowest uni t of local admini strat ion,
provided an on-going link between the state and the rural
population. Initially charged with the responsibility
for land redistribution and the establishment of local
51
services, such as local defence squads, and local law
courts. the functions of the peasant associat ions
expanded to include the Lmplementation of the
government's economic and political policies. These
incl uded: the proroot ion of service cooperat i veSj the
enforcement of state imposed taxes and grain quotas; the
provision of military ccn s cr-d.pt a: and the implementation
of government conservation,
resettlement programmes.
vi 11agisat ion, and
Theoretically, the land reforms of the mid-~970s provided
':
for better land access and to full entitlements for the
poor,
wake
and for the redistribution of rural incomes. In the
of the famine of the mid-1980s, however, the land
reforms came under increasing attack from academics and
international aid agencies alike. One of the main
failings of the land reform as perceived by critics, is
that the land reform failed to provide secure tenure
rights and thereby failed to remove the disincentive
effectives that were .deemed to be the major pr oduc t aon
constraints of the traditional land tenures.
Rahmato (1988, & 1991), for instance,
land redistribut. ion bl-ought about an
has argued that
equal i sat i on of
ruraL communities and removed the main basis for social
differentiation in the courrt r-y er de , however,
population pressure, and the need to
redistribute land to newly emerging households,
increasing
constantly
has meant
that peasants can have their land taken away from them
from one season to the next. other commentators have
point ed to
state and
the control of land resources assumed by the
to the appropriation of land for state
ventures, such as, state farms. A second, and related,
concern of critics was the erosion of the initial income
gains of the 1and ref arm by government
and by the imposi t ion of compulsory
low producer prices. (e. g. Cohen and
Stahl, 1990, Lycett, 1991; Weiner, 1989;
imposed levies,
grsi..n quotas at
I saksson, 1988;
Wood, 1991.)
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Assessing Land Relations in the Study Areas
In examining the effects of the Dergue's 1975 land reform
on land relations at the local level, the three major
research objectives were 1) to identify the nature of land
relations in the study areas prior to the 1975 land
reform, and to gather evidence as to whether access rights
improved or worsened as a result of the land refor~ 2)
to assess the extent to which the land reform had/had not
resulted in improved security of tenure; and, 3) to
identify the extent to which the land rerorm had brought.~
about an equalising effect on rural households; and,
generally. thereby, to enter the above debates.
Within' the general discussions on Ethiopia's traditional
land tenures, the traditional land relations in Wollo have
been likened both to the' fuedal' tenures a n the sout.h of
the courrt r y , and to the northern' r Ls t ' tenures. (e·8·
Cliffe, 1974i' Fitzgerald, 1980; Lulseged Asfaw, 1974;
Masfin, 1984, and 1985). Yet, there exist few micro
studies of land relations in Wallo before, cr after, the
1975 land reform.
Several studies have focused on changing land rights among
the Afar, and other past.pral communities, inhabiting t he
eastern lowlands of Wallo as a result of the development
of larg~scale commercial enterprises in the Awash Valley
during the second half of the 1960s and early 19706
(e. g. Bondestam, 1974i Cossins, 1972, 1973; Flood, 1974;
Har beson, 1975) 1978; Klo06, 1982). St udies of land
relations in the agricultural regions of Wallo before,
and/or after, the land reform, are few. An exception is
McCann (1986, 1987a, 1987b)' s study of land relations in
the agricultural highlands of the Lasta region of north-
western Wol.lo. The following discussion on land relations
in the study areas prior to the 1975 land reform is based
on information provided by survey informants.
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11.6.1 LAND RELATIONSIN THE STUDYAREAS
Land Relations Prior to the 1975 Land Reform
In both Gerbi, and Ablosh,
land reform, differed both
land relations, prior to the
from the traditional 'r1st'
tenure syst em based on ambi 1ineal inheri tance
associated with northeastern Ethiopia, and
commonly
from the
, feudal' landlord-tenant relations associated w1th the
southern tenures. (See Chapter I.) According to survey
infor.;nants, before the land reform, aCcess to arable
LaridhoLd i ng-s was primarily through male kinship. Men
,
traditionally acquired entitlement to land at the time of
their first marriage. Marriage was virilocal and, on
marriage, young married couples invariably established
their own separate homesteads. polygamous marriage was
reported as common in both study areas.
On roarriage men could inherit land from either their
father or from other male relatives. In addition to
these marriage endowments, men could also inherit land on
the death of a male relative who mayor may not have
res.ided wi thin the same communit y. Where the inheri ted
land was located in a distant community, this land was
generally leased to a local resident on a share crop
basiS. We found no evidence to suggest the beginnings of
the commodification of land at the survey sites at that
time. Respondent s all report ed that land was never
sold.
According to informants, only widowed women
to land in thei.r own right before the land
had access
reform. A
widowed woman acquired the right to cultivate the garden
surrounding her homest ead on the death of her husband.
However, any additional landholdings belonging to the
deceased husband were distributed either among the men's
sons or among other male relatives where the man had no
sons. In those cases where toe deceased man's sons were
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still children the land was held by a male relative on
a custodial basis until the 6006 acquired entitlement to
land. At both survey sites, r,espondents reported that
married women only worked their husband' 5 land, and that
women had no right to a share of their husband's land in
the event of divorce.
The Impact of the 1975 Land Reform on Land Relations in
the Study Areas
In Wallo, as elsewhere in Ethiopia, the 1975 land reform
was introduced in two stages. During the first stage,
land ~BS taken from the' landlords' and redistributed to
the 'tillers'. 'Meret larashu', or 'Lana 1:.0 the tiller',
was the slogan used by student activists prior to the
revolution, and this initial stage of the land reform
was largely carr ted out by these st udent act i vi st s.
Under the 1975 'zemecha' campaign, sponsored by the
'Derg' thousands of st udents were sent out acroSS the
country to assist the implementation of the reforms. In
the second stage, peasant associations were formed, and
associations were responsiblethe leaders of the peasant
for distributing land.
At both survey sites, as throughout most of the country,
the executive committees' of the peasant associations'
were exclusively male. Each association had a chairman,
a deputy chairman, and a secretary. Below them were 9
other members of the executive committee as well as a
local militia and a local law court. According to
informants, the committee leaders were initially chosen
from among the most literate and, thus, in all
likelihood, from among the wealthier members of the
community.
report ed one re-election in
in Ablosn,
1979; and,
respondents
in Gerbi,
There were few re-electionsj
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respondents reported 2 re-elections, one in 1979,
in 1982. In all 3 re-elect ions most of the
and one
committee members were re-elected and
existing
the newly
on theelected members invariably had relatives
comrnit tee.
During the initial period of the lend reform the impact
of the land reform in the study areas was minimal in
terms of land redistribution. In Gerbi, respondents
reported that no land was redistributed at that time. In
Ablosh, respondents reported thet the only l~nd
reallocated in the study area during the zemecha period
was a tract of land in the lowlands belonging to a local
, lord' . This land was land that belonged to the local
I gult' lord, or tax collector, who was also a member of
the local community. The actual amount of land
reallocated was not known, but estimates g1 ven by
respondents ranged from between 40 to 60 hectares.
According to inforn~nts, this confiscated land was
redistributed among households that had only' smell'
landholdings. The lend was elsa allocated more or less
equitably in terms of the quantity received by a
household of a particular size.
To the question 'Has eccess to land improved since the
land Reform?' the general consensus in the study areas
was that access to land had not improved. In Ablosh,
respondent s report ed that there wes no off f i ci al land
redistribution in the peasant association after the
initial land redistribution during the early stage of the
land reform. A virtual freeze on land reallocation since
the land reform was also reported by respondents in
Gerbi. The opinion expressed by almost all informants in
the study areas was that the peasant association leaders
became increasingly nepotistic. A complaint voiced by all
respondents was that the leaders of the associations kept
land for themselves and for their kin.
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However, the main complaint expressed by t nr or-mant e was
that the leaders of the associations' used their control
over land to extract • disguised rents'. The forced
payment of 'bribes' to the association leaders both to
gain access to land and to prevent the confiscation of
landholdings was reported as common at both survey sites.
These 'disgu~sed rents' included: cash payments, the
provision of labour, and payments in the form of
livestock.
towards, in
ef fect s of. and
the study areas
"
However,
attit.udes the land
level,
reform
theat the disaggregate
were mixed. While the Larrd reform impacted directly on
men in general, young male heads of households, in
particular, saw themselves as the main casualties.
Among the older male respondent s, some of t.hese
respondents saW themselves as the main losers during the
early stage of the land reform. These were men that lost
some of their landholdings at that time because these
landholdings were 1ocat ed in set t 1ement s that fell
outside of the peasant association boundaries.
Young male heads of households saw themselves as the main
victims of the peasant associations' leaders' abuse of
power. Those y ourig male respondents that • bribed' the
leaders to gain access to land when they started a
household bitterly resented having to pay for access to
landi while other young male respondents that lacked
sufficient resources with which to 'bribe' the leaders
bitterly resented their effective exclusion from access
to land, and who could blame theml
Among the male respondents sampled in Gerbi, 9 (33%) of
the older male heads of households reported having lost
land during the initial stage of the land reformi 11
(69%) of the young mal e heads of househol ds were forced
to I bribe' the leaders to gain access to land; and, 5
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(31%) of the young male heads of households reported
being excluded from access to land because of lack of
sufficient resources with which to 'bribe' the leaders.
The corresponding figures for Ablosh were: 5 (42%) of the
older male heads of households lost land during the
1ni t ial phase of the 1and reform; and 9 (100%) of the
young male heads of households reported being forced to
':
'bribe' the leaders to gain access to land.
The 'disguised rents' extracted by the leaders from these
young male heads of households varied in form. In Gerbi,
7 young male respondents paid in cash, r arig Lng from 150
to 200 ETBj o.nd 4 young male respondents report~d working
for one year on farms belonging to committee members. In
Ablosh, one young male respondent pai d 4- sheep; 3
respondent s pai d cash, ranging fr oro 100 to 200 ETB; and
5 respondents worked on farms belonging to committee.
member-so The length of these labour services ranged from
one year to eighteen months,
Tables II. 3 end II. 4, below, show, respectively, the
distribution of land and household size among sample
households headed by male respondents in Gerbi. and in
AbLosh, at the time of the sur vey. The deta are based
on a semple of 43 male-heeded households in Gerbi, and 19
male-headed households in AbLcs h: The household refers
to the household head and his immediate dependents.
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Landholdings are gi ven in t imad, the local land measure,
which is roughly equal to a quarter of a hectare.
As these data show, mean landholding in the study areas
increased with the size of households, although the rate
of increase was not great. However, the data also show
that the distribution range of landholdings within each
household size grouping varied significantly.
Table 11.3
Household Size and the Distribution of Land Among
Sampled Households Headed by Male Respondents in
Gerbi, at the Time of the Survey.
Hh. Size
Averase landholding
<in t Lrnad )
Per person Per hh.
Distribution
range per hh.
4-
5
6
7
8
9
0.8
O. 6
O. 9
1
O. 9
O. 6
3. 5
3. 2
5
7.4-
7.3
2 - 4
0-8
o -14
4 -12
6 8
Table II. 4
Household Size and the Distribution or Land Among
Sampled Households Headed by Male Respondents in Ablosh,
at the Time of the Survey.
Average landholding
(in timad) Distribution
Hh. Size Per person Per hh. range per hh.
4 2
5 0.6 3. 3 2 - 8
6 1.3 8 4 -14
7 1 8 4 -12
8 1
9 O.B
10 0.8
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In both study areas, variations in the size of
landholdings were in sOme cases compounded by variations
in the quality of land. This was a compl aint voiced, in
particular, by informants in Gerb!. Respondents
reported that the peasant association leaders kept the
better fields for themselves and for their kin, while the
wealthier members of the community were able to ensure
that they obtained better fields through payments to the
c ommtttee leaders. Four male informants in Gerbi also
repo~ted that t hey had to' bri be' the committee leaders
in order to prevent the confiscation of some of the their
better' quality fields. These complaints were also
voiced, although less frequently, by male informants in
Ab Lo ah .
This abuse of status and power by the associations'
leaders' in the st udy areas generat ad Co deep sense of
insecurit.y and rm s t r ue t among community members, The
f 011owing is a commerrt made by a male i nf ormant in Ger bi I
but similar sentiments were expressed by informants in
Ablosh.
"The people stopped trusting each other.
They (the association leade~s) come and
take your land and give it to another
farmer. This farmer is your neighbour, but
he is a 'rich' farmer, what can the poor
farmer do? There is no trust among people
any more. If
Through their control over the local militia, the peasant
association leaders had et hand the necessary coercive
power to ensure their will, which they did not hesitate
to use. To mention just two examples, one from each of
the study areas: Eb r eh i.m, an informant in Ablosh, told
of how he was shot in the leg during the meher
harvesting season of 1988 after refusing to work the
fields belohg.ing to the committee chairman because he
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was too busy bringing in his own harvest. Hussein, an
informant in Gerbi, told of how hi6 young son was
tragically shot dead in 1987 after refusing to work the
fields belonging to one of the committee members.
Gender and Land
While men's relationships to land in the study areas were
directly affected as a result of the land reform, women's
relationships to land in the study areas were not
.,affected, The only women respondents in the study arees
that had land in their own right were 2 widows living in
AbLosh. These 2 women each had a young daughter living
with them. As was the case before the land reform, these
women acquired the right to cultivate the gardens
surrounding their homesteads on the death of their
husbands. Whereas in the past the deceased husband's
addit:LonaJ.landholdings were distributed among his male
relatives, these landholdings wel-e confiscated by the
peasant association leaders.
I n both study areas, only the head of the househol d was
registered with the peasant association, t rruss, most of
the women respondents were.not even registered members of
the associations, Although all of the women respondents
reported being members of the women's aSSOCiation, the
general consensus of women informants was that the
women's association was nevel- taken seriously by the
peasant association leaders. In Ablosh, one of the two
women t nfor-merrts that
association for land
report ed asking the
was hersel f an ex-head
peasant
of the
women's essociet ion. In both of these cases the women
asked for the right to a share of their husband's land.
And, in both cases, the women were told by the
commndttee that they should be helping their husband to
work his lands and not wasting the committees' time!
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Demands for land by women in Gerbi were met with a
similar response. In Gerbi, 4 of the
respondents reported asking the peasant
married women
association for
the right to a share of their husband's land. As in
Ablosh, these women were told that
help thei.r husband work hi s land.
their place was to
A f ur t her 3 women
respondents that reported asking for land were all
divorcees. These 3 women all headed their OwTI household
and all 3 women had young children, ranging from 1 to 3
chL1dren. per woman. In all of these cases these women
were ':'refused· land by the peasant association committee on
the grounds that they 'had no one to work the land'.
Given the nature of gender property rights on divorce in
the study areas, divorce, for women, could mean immediat~
impoverishment. According to
wo nia n only had the right to
brought to the marriage. All
informants, on divorce, a
ret ain proper t y t hat she
assets accumulated during
the man-i'age, including the house and any personal items
bought by the husband for the wife, such as jewelry and
clothing, belonged to the husband. The right to children
on divorce was also vested in men, al though. in pract ice,
very young chi.ldren were invariably left with the woman.
Men's control over these resources, was in addi tion to
their right to "retain land due the fact that, as we have
seen, the right to land wes vested in the male head of
household.
The frequency of
st udy areas was
di vorce, end, thus, remarriage, in the
high. Out of a sample of 58 women
respondents in Gerbi, and 28 women respondents in Ablosh,
the number of divorces among these women respondents for
eeeh of the study ereas was on average 3, ranging from 0
to 7 divorces per woman. The frequency of divorce as
reported by these women respondents is shown in Table
II. 5, below. In all of these reported c e s e s of divorce,
the divorce was instigated by the husband. To ascertain
information on th€ reasons for the frequency of divorce
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in the study areas, both male end female respondents were
asked to indicate the grounds for divorce for men end for
women. The grounds for divorce for men as reported by
Table II. 5
Frequency of Divorce among women respondents in
Gerbi, and in Ablosh.
Gerbi
No. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Frequency 9 6 1 1 16 9 6 0 2
~
Ablosh
No. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Frequency 5 4 5 7 2 2 1 1
respondent s were: 'barrenness' .sickness' , infidelity,
and 'old 6ge'. What these findings clearly indicate is
that, in both study areas, women were valued both for
their product ive, and their reproduct i ve, labour. In
contrast, a woman cauld only divorce her husband if she
could ,prove' that her hU5band frequently beet her
without good reason.
explained the difference:
Howa, an informant in Gerb1,
"If I am late preparing my husband's meal because.
I have been wasting my t1me talking to other women,
then my husband is right to beat me because this is
my fault. If I have done nothing wrong and my
husband comes home drunk and beats me, then he is
wrong, But my husband can say he beat me for some-
thing I did yesterday, or the day before.
the problem."
That is
The responsibility for resolving marital disputes lay
wi th the male e1ders. However. the high frequency of
divorce in the study areas reflects the ease with which
men were able t a dispose of t heir wives. Por a man to
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divorce a woman only required the men to say 'I divorce
you' 3 times in front of 3 male elders.
For women, these gender property rights meant that, on
divorce, women were forced either to return to their
parents horne or, where this was not an option, to seek
accomodation with, or from, other relatives. Out of the
11 women respondents heading their own household in
women lived
these women were divorced and ell of the
in houses that belonged to relatives.
the 4 women respondents heading their own
Gerbi, all of
Simil:ar1y. of
household in Ablosh, 2 of these women were divorced and
both of the women lived
relatives.
in houses that belonged to
These divorced women accounted for two-thirds of the
landless households in th~ sample in Gerbi, end accounted
for the 2 landless householdS 1n the sample 1n Ablosh.
In Gerbi, out 0:- e sample of 54 household;;, 16 <30%) of
these households were land.l~ss at the time of the survey.
Eleven of these households were headed by divorced women.
(As we have already seen, 5 of the landless households in
Gerbi were headed by young men. ) These households
contained on average 2 persons, ranging from 1 to 4
persons per househol d. Of the 2 househol ds headed by
alone,
households
and one
divorced women in Ablosh,
cantained an elder1y woman
one of
living
these
househol d cantained a young woman and her 2 year 01d
daughter.
Land Relations: Conclusions
To conclude this discussion on the effects of the lend
reform on land relations in the study
findings present,ad here show several things.
the finding that some households in'the study
areas. the
Firstly.
areas were
landless and did not have access to the minimum resource
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with which to engage in subsistence production has
implications beyond the immediate case studies and
highlights the very important fact that policies aimed at
relieving food insecurity in the rural areas need to take
heed of activities beyond agricultural production per se.
Second, and relatedly,
the findings presented
a comparison can be made
here and Rehmeto (1988,
between
1991),s
thesis that t be land reform equalised rural communities.
According to Rahmato, the land reform, through land
redistribution, removed the basis for social differenti-
'tetian in the countryside. To the extent that variations
in landholdings exist in the rural areas this 1s seen
simply as a function of family size. This latter
works on
intellectual origins in
social differentiation
Chayanov
among the
argument
(1966)'s
has its
Russian peasantry in the 1920s. As we have seen, in bot n
study areas, the distribution of land was far from equal,
in
was there any relation
the study areas.
between 1and and family sizenor
And we shall see that
differentiation tends to be amplified by the distribution
of other productive assets.
Moreover. Rahmat 0, as did Chayanov, sees t he household
essentially as an autonomous and undifferentiated unit,
and fails to examine tne nature of social relations both
within and beyond the household. Thus, the ways in which
the relations between the members and the leaders of the
peasant associat ions, and the relet ions between men and
women, determined the actual distribution of land in the
rural areas are ignored.
This neglect, in turn, leads Rahmato, among others, to
assume that where shortage of land, or landlessness, is a
problem in the rural
population expansion.
shortage in the rural
areas, this is due simply to
This s:::' ngle explanat ion for land
of Wollo, and northeasternareas
Ethiopia generally, has prompted certain policy
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sol ut ions, including the Mengistu regime's highly
controversial resettlement programme of the mid-1980s.
Although resettlement is no longer s,ate
the current debates on the land issue
policy, I.-:ithin
the proposed
solutions revolve around land privatisation and/or secure
title to land. While we are not in a position to comment
on the land-population ratio in either of the study
areas, the evi dence present ad here, nevert heless,
indicates t ha t po1i c i es
title to land,
emphasising
1...;111 only
La r.d privatisation.
cor-firm the unequalor secure
Beyond the issue of land allocation the leaders of the
associations' played a crucial role as in~erm~jiaries
both between the state and the rural ?opulati~n, aDd
between aid agencies and the rural ?cpulation. These
edmd nLa t r et I v e power s 2\'e:- i5::UES ::..1::-. == :':::-I=::-i?::!.,:-:-.,
resettlement, and the di::tributi::m cf ::l::! ai:', '""er~ 5.1",-:.
used by .the a s s oc t at t ons ' le:ders' rescur::e;
i bri bes' to the leadersh::'p
and to gain 5.CCESS to food aid was
of
and/or resettlement,
reported as common. ~his latter :.ssue, ~nd its
issignificance during the famine of the mid-1980s,
discussed further in Chapter V
I I. 6. 2 STATE EXACTIONS
According to i nf ormant 5, be for e the _and r <= for m, the
annual t5.X paid by peasants i~ the study areas was one-
f i ft h of the ermue I harvest, or, as one peasant in f or mant
in Ablosh put it:
"In those days (i. e. before the land reform),
the far mer ga ve on e han d tot he' lor d ' (' guIt'
lord, or tax collector) and kept four hands
for himself."
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With the land reform, the
clearly benefited from the
peasant s in the st udy areas
abolition of these taxes and
their consequent increased control over produce and/or
income. These gains were soon eroded, however, with
the imposition of state imposed land txes, agricultural
taxes, grain quotes, and low producer prices from late
1978 earl y 1979 onwar-ds. (See Chapt er I) Land taxes,
initially set qut t e low, rose from ET810 to 20, to ETB30.
CLirenso, 1984). In Gerbi, informants reported having to
pay ETB47 land tax from 1985 onwards. This was not the
case,: in Ab I cs h, however, where the land tax was reported
to be ETB30. It is possible that the increase was not an
increased tax on land but an additional Levey fot- the
famine Or the war effort. Neverthel ess, and not
surprisingly,
re s en t.e d , All
these increased taxes were bitterly
the. more so corning at a time when people
W81-e s.till trying to r ecove r' f r orn the ~e!-rible dr ought
and famine of 1984.
Moreover, whereas before the land l-efor-m t a>tes were:
propor t ional,
at a single
landholding
these fixed
the newly imposed state taxes were fixed
level irrespect i ve
and si ze of bar vest .
rent s are t wofol d:
of size and quality of
The implications of
the burden of taxation
fells heaviest on those householda with less land end
small harvests; and, secondly, while households gain from
fixed t axes in a good harvest year, in a poor harvest
year households could be forced to sell what little grain
they have just to meet these tax demands.
In both study areas. grain quotas ranged from 12kgs. to 1
qtl. C100kgs.) Quotas per household were allocated by
the PA leaders and wet'e based on the number of oxen
owned. The quot a f or thOSE: households without oxen was
12kgs., and for those households with one ox, it was
25kgs. The quota for hous~nolds owning a pair of oxen was
50kgs., and for those households owning more than two
oxen it was 1qtl. Although, in both study areas,
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respondents complained about the low quota prices and
about the PA leaders rarely paying their quotas, unlike
the ungraduated land tax, which was bitterly resented~ it
was generall y fel t that the
fair,
quota allocat ions were
II,7 AGRICULTURALPRODUCTION
Type of Crops Grown in the Study Areas and their Relative
Resi¥tance to Drought.
The main crops grown in the study areas are shown in
Table II.6 below, As the Table shows , in addi t 1on to
the tree crop, coffee, a of cereal and
pulse crops were grown in AbLo eh. This variation between
the st udy Brees in the range of crops grown can be
explained by the diffet-ellces in aLt t t ude , soils and
climate at the survey sites. Tobacco was the only non-
food crop cultivated in the study areas.
Table I1.6
Main Crops Grown in each of the Study Areas
Cereals Pulses
Non-food
Tree Crops Vegetables crops
Ablosh
Maize Beans Coffee Berberr1 Tobacco
Barley Chick peas Onions
Sorghum Lentils Garlic
Teff
Wheat
Ger'ui
Maize Beans BerberTi Tobacco
Sorghum Onions
Teff Garlic
Some crops were relatively more resistant to drought
than others. Among the cereal and pulse crops grown in
Ablosh, sorghum was ranked as the most reliablej a
68
short-maturing
ranked as the
variety of maize called 'Katamani' was
second most reliable, followed by beans,
and by peas.
Barley,
needed
wh e e t ,
st. abl e
tef f, and
rains during
all other
the growing
maize varieties
Tef f wasseaSon.
considered the most temperam~ntal and the least reliable
crop. Informants distinguished between two types of teff
grown in the e r ee , ' whi te' teff, and 'brown' teff.
White t e f f was generally considered the superior of the..
two 'and was mor e suited to the
highlands; whereas brown teff grown
in
in
theclimate and soils
could be the
, Katarnani'
and wheat could only
or in certain years,
because of their
be grown in the
while so~ghum ond
lowlands. Barley
wetter highlands,
maize, lower moisture
reqUirements, could only be grown in the lClwlands. All
other me I ze var-ieti.es and some pulses. su~h as beans,
were grown in both the high-lands and the lowlands.
Tobacco was also grown both in the highlands and the
lowlands, while coffee could only be grown in highlands.
With the exception of teff, which only grown during the
kerempt Clong rains) season, all crops could be grown
dur i ng both the belg <short reins) and the kprempt
rains.
Among the cereal and pulse crops grown in Gerbi, sorghum
was ranked the most rellable, followed by 'Katamani'
rna t ze, and by beans. Tef f, and allot her maize var i et i ~S,
nee.ded stable rains during the g}-owing cycle. Only brown
teff could be gl~own in the area and, as in Ablosh, teff
was consider-ed by r ee poriderrt s as the least reliable
crop and was only grown during the keremQt season.
Beans, and ell other cereal crops, could be grown during
ei ther the ~ or- the kerempt seasons. Tobacco could
also be grown during both cropping seasons.
Interestingly, 'Katamani' maize had only been grown in
the study areas since the famine of the mid-1980s.
69
'Kataman1' was a short-maturating crop and was relatively
less vulnerable to drought than the maize varieties
traditionally grown at the survey sites. Respondents in
both study areas reported having obtained the seeds
directly from migrant workers employed on Chaffa state
farm located in the eastern lowlands of Kallu. The
adoption of this new maize variety by respondents in the
study areas was clearly a response to the drought and
famine of the.mid-1980s. However, as the following case
study illustrates, the dissemination of these maize
seeds. in this way, i. e. , without appropriate extension
advice, was not without its dangers:
Shikur, an informant in Ablosh, obtained the maize
seeds around October 1985 from a 'migrant worker who
worked on Chaffa farm' Shikur was told that the
maize would be ready to harvest in 3 months and that
he would get 'iO ~ imes' the yield of the traditional
meize va~ieties. Shikur had some land in the
highlands, and some land ir. the lowlands. DW'ing the
belS er opping season of 1986, inst ead of pl ant ing
barley and beans in the highlands, as he normally
did, he planted all of his land in the highlands
with the new maize. In the lowlands, for the meher
maize. What Shikur had not known was
long-mat ur-Lrrg
that the new
hervest, he planted the traditional
maize had a lower moisture level requirement and was
unsuited to the wetter highland areas. In the event,
he was faced with total crop failure. While the crop
grew 'very tall' t.here were 'no heads of corn to
har-vest ". Wi thout any harvest to see him and his
family through to the meher harvest, Shikur was
forced to choose between selling one of his two oxen,
or his 40 coffee trees, both of which represented
his future means of subsistence. Because an ox would
be 'too expensive' to replace, he finally decided to
sell his 40 coffee trees!
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Shikur's expe r aen ce was the most extreme example of the
dangers of the dissemination of new seed strains without
appropriate extension advice, but it was not an isolated
case. Several other informants also related similar
experiences of crop failure with the new seeds.
Yet, these findings on the adoption of this new seed
strain in the study areas, so shortly after the
devastating crop failures of the mid-1980s, clearly
contradict the popular image of African peasantr1es as
trapped in a cycle of poverty of their own making because
of their unwillingness to adopt new technvlog1es and take
initiatives, and highlight, in the Ethiopian context, et
least; the state's long term neglect of the drought prone
regions in governmental out-reach projects. 17
The Relative Importance of Crops Qrown in ~he Study Areas
In both study areas peasants relied both on the ~
and on the meher croppieg season. In 1991, the meher
her ve s t accounted for 56% of the annual harvest among
sample households in Gerbi, and accounted for 69% of the
apnual harvest among sampled households in Ablosh.
These figures suggest that the belg harvest was of far
less importance in Ablosh than in Gerbi. However, in
both study areas. all of the peasant households sampled
grew bot h a belg and a meher crop in 1991. In Ablosh,
14 (67%) of the 21 peasant households reported eating
part of their belg, and part of their meher, crops 'at
the early maturing stage' because of the need to bridge
the food gap between harvests. A similar picture emerges
when we look at Gerbi. Of the 38 peasant households
sampled in Gerbi, 21 (55%) of these households a1so
report ed eat i ng par t of t hei r bel g, and pert of t hei r
meher, crops et the 'early maturing stage' to bridge the
food gap between harvests.
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Two implications follow from these findings, firstly,
weight ing the relat ive importance of seasonal harvests
simply in terms of output is clearly misleading and
obscures the crucial importance of the belg harvest in
terms of seasonal food securi-ty for individual
households. The second, and related, implication is that
the failure of either one of the two harvests would
equally threaten the food security of individual
househol ds .
Table II.7
Type of Crops grown and Area sown in Timad during 1991,
for Sampled Households in Gerbi Peasant Association
No. of j Area Average % of total
hhs. sown area SO\N.1 cultivated area
per hh.
f\1ai =e 3& 95 2.5 51
So r g h um 38 46 1 25
Teff 17 21 1 1 1
Beans 22 17. 5 0.8 9
TobaCCO 13 9 0.6 5
Tot al area cu Lt ivat ed in 1991: 186. 5 timed (86%)
1 Based on a sample of 38 households
Table II. 8
Type of Crops grown and Area sown in Timad during 1991,
for Sampled Households in Ablosh Peasant Association
No. oft Area Average % of total
hhs. sown area sown cultivated area
per h h ,
Maize 19 58 3 45
Barley 19 29 1.5 22
Sorghum 19 20 1 15
Teff 5 9. 5 2 7
Wheat 3 3 1 2
Beans 16 7.5 O. 4- 6
Tobacco 5 2.5 O. 5 2
Total area cultivated in 1991 : 129. 5 timad (86%)
Based on a sample of 21 households
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Tables 11.7, and 11.8,
main type of crops grown
above, show, respect i vel y, the
by sample households in Gerbi,
and in Ablosh, in 1991, the number of households growing
each crop, and t he area sown to crops. <Areas are g1ven
in 'timad', the local land measure, which is roughly
equal to a quarter of a hectare. )
To ascertain the areas sown to different crops, rether
than ask respondents to give precise land measures,
wh Lch would have been very difficult, if not impossible,
inf-,ormants. were asked to indicate the percentage of their
land sown to a particular crop. The de t a do not include
garden crops, such as veget abIes, whi ch are di scussed
separately, below. The calculations are based on a sample
of 38 cultivating households in Gerbi, e r.d 21 cultivating
households in Ablosh.
As these data show, maize was the most ~mportant crop at
both survey sites; followed by sorghum, teff, and
t obecco in Gerbi, and followed by barley. sorghum, teff,
beans, wheat, and tobacco i~ Ablosh.
Out of the sample househol ds, 38 (100%) househol ds in
Gerbi, and 19 (90%) households in AbLoah , grew maf ze in
199 1. Mai z e acca un ted for 5 1'7. oft he cu1 t i vat e dar ea i n
Gerbi, and for 45% of the cultivated area in Ablosh.
This preference for maize in the study areas c en be
explained in s ev er e I ways; firstly, maize was the most
important food crop. At both survey sites, maize was the
main ingredi ent used in the preparat i 0:: of 'inj ere' (a
savoury pancake), 'dabbo' (bread), and in the pr-eper e t a or.
of 'n1ffro' (s type of porridge).
Secondly, respondents grew mainly a short-maturating,
relatively reliable, and relatively high yielding type of
maize. As we descri bed above, although traditional
maize varieties were still cropped in the study areas,
most of tlie maize crop grown since the m1d-1980s was of
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the ' Kat amani , variety. According to informants, of the
cereal crops grown in the st ud y areas, ' kat ement ' maize
gave a higher yield per area sown.
Thirdl y, maize was one of the least labour intensive
crops and could be grown during both cropping seasons.
In preparat ion for pI ant ing, for instance, met ze requi red
from 1 to 2 ploughings, whereas barley and wheat required
from 2 to 3 ploughings, and teff, generally considered
the most lebour intensive crop, required from 4 to 5
ploughings. Par a ~ crop, met z a, under favourable
rains, was usually sown in February and could be sown up
to the end of the first week in March. The 'Katamani'
maize was harvested around the middle of May, while other
maize veri et i es were har-vest ed around mid- to end-June.
For a meher crop, traditional maize varieties were sown,
unde r favourable rains, dur i ng April and harvested around
early Oct obe r ; while' Ket.emarrd ' maize was sown from mid-
to end-July and harvested around end-October-early
November.
Finally, in Kallu, as throughout Wallo, maize commanded
the lowest price in the market and was, thus, the more
affordable crop for households that did not meet, or that
could only meet part of, their subsistence requirements
directly. Thirty-three of the sample households in
Gerbi, and 14 of the sample households in Ablosh,
purchased grain in 1991. In all of these cases, these
households reported purchasing maize, as opposed to other
cereal s, because maize was the 'cheapest·. According to
informants, the grain sold in local markets in 1991 had
come from the surpl us producing areas of south-western
Wallo which had received relatively better rainfall.
Sorghum wes ranked as the second most important food crop
in Gerbi, and the third most important food crop, after
barley. in Ablosh. Sorghum was used in combination with
maize to make the above mentioned dishes and was used
74
instead
Ablosh,
of maize when no maize was available. In
barley was also used in the preparation of
these dishes. In addition, barley was also roasted and
served as a snack ('qollo') and was used in combination
with wheat to make 't'ella', the local beer.
For a ~ crop, sorghum could be sown, under favourable
rains, from mid-February and up to the end of the third
week in March for harvesting in June. The meher crop
coul d be sown in Apri 1 or May for harvest ing in
Novambe r . As the above Table shows, all of the sample
households grew sorghum in combination \.lith the short-
maturating maize in 1991.
This c r op+md x et rategy enabl ed househol ds to phase their
planting and thereby minimize the risk of total seed
loss and/or crop failure becausE:: of de:ayed on-set of
rainfail dod/or mid-season droughts, and to reduce
However, 21 of the 38 househol ds inlabour conflicts.
Gerbi t he t grew sorghum in 1991, and 13 of the 19
households in Ablosh that grew sorghum in 1991, all
reported sowing less sorghum since the availability of
the short-maturating, and relatively reliable, 'Katameni'
maize because of the need to reduce the food gap between
harvests.
In Ablosh, berley was gro1;.m by 19 (90%) of the sample
households and accounted fur 22% of the area sown in
1991. Barley, as
during the
highlands
we have already seen,
growing cycle and
of Ablosh. Under
required stable
was grown in therains
wetter favourable rains,
barley was sown in February, and harvested in June for a
Q.gl..g_ crop, and was sown from mid- to end-Jul y end
harvested in November for a meher crop. 8ar18y was
ranked by informants as the most important belg crop and,
awong the sample households, accounted for 67'i~ of trle
1991 ~ harvest. This preference for grOwing barley, as
opposed to the more reliable sorghum or maize, during the
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belg season was because the Le t t er C)-OPS could only be
grown in the lowlands and the belg rains were considered
by informants to be more reliable in the highlands than
in the lowlands. However, informants also reported a
preference for
highland crops,
growing lowland crops, as opposed to
during the kerempt Clong rains) season
because rainfall during the kerempt season was often 'too
heavy' in the highlands which increased the risk of crop
damage from excess water endvor- flooding. Extremes in
temp~rature in the highlands also increased the risk of
crop damage from frost.
Teff accounted, in 19911 for an estimated 11% of the
area sown by sample
8s t. i meted 7% 0 f the
households in Gerbi, and for
area sown by samp:e households
an
in
G-erbi,
Ablosh.
and (24%)
of the s6mple:
of the sample
si teSt t e f f wasAt
by
both
17
5
Ablosh, and
households in
households in
was grown by
survey
cons Loer ed a luxury, and had t he highest value in t he
themarket. However, as we have seenl teff was also
1eas t reLi abl-=, and the most labour int ensi ve, of the
cereal crops.
Tefl was reserved mainly for use in the preparation of
I injera' for ceremonial occasions, and was grown by
respondents mainly ae, a cash crop. Of the 17 sample
households in Gel-bi I and the 5 sample households in
AbLoah , that grew teff in 1991, all of these households
reported that they intended to sell most of their teff
harvest. The main rees on gi ven by respondents for not
growing teff in 1991 was because of the need to grow a
more reliable crop. This was followed, in Ablosh, by
sh or t ag e of oxen and shortage of labour, 9 households
(43%), and by shortage of labour, 8 households (38%); and
was followed i~ Gerbi by shortage of oxen, 14 households
(37%). and shortage of oxen and shortage of labour, 7
househol de; (18%).
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Interestingly, wheat, the main form of food aid in the
st ud y areas, was generally di s I i ked by informant s as a
consumption crop because of its taste. In Ablosh, wheat
was mainly used in the preparation of 't' ella', and like
teff, was grown by respondents primarily as cash crop.
Wheat required stable rains during the growing cycle and,
under favourable rains, was normally sown in February,
and harvested in June, for a belg crop, and was sown from
mid- to end-July, and harvested 1n Novembe r , for a meher
crop. Wheat was grown by 3 of the sample households in
Ablosh in 1991, arJd accounted for only 2% of the area
s.own .
Pulses, although. needed in smaller quantities, were the
main supp Lemerrt e to a cereal diet. A.t bot h survey sites,
the most important pulse was beans. The beans were ground
and then used as t he basi s for 'shi ro'. t he sauce wi'( h
which 'injera' ",'as corie urned . In AbLos h, le:ltils were
used for t he same purpose, 31 t hough informant s reported
that they preferred to grow beans because beans were more
reliable. Beans were also eaten fresh, roasted, or dried
and then boiled or roasted.
Beans and, in Abl ash, ot her pul ses, such as 1ent i 1s, and
peas, were sown, under favourable rains, in February,
and narvested in May, for a belg crop, and were sown from
mid-July to mid-A.ugust, and harvested in late October for
a meher crop. In Ablosh, lentils were at times
intercropped with barley or wheat because lentils were
per t LcuLer-Ly susceptible to frost. Beans, nitrogen
fixers, were normally rotated with eithe, lentils or a
cereal crop and were never sown on the s~me plot twice in
succession. Beans ac:ounted, in 1991, for 9% of the area
sown by sample households in Gerbi, end for 6'. of the
area sown by sample households in Ablosh, and were grown
by 22 (58%) of the s ....mple households in Gerbi, and by 16
<76%) of the sample households in Ablosh. SiKteen (48%)
of the sample households in Gerb!, and 5 (24%) of the
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semple households
in 1991 because
cereal crops.
in Ablosh, reported not growing
of the need to grow the more
beans
vital
Thus, strategies to minimize the risks of crop failure
commonly found in Africa, (e. g. Watts, 1983; Richards,
1985; Shipton, 1990) were known end practiced in the
st ud y areas, including staggered (or phased) planting of
these strategies were
and crop rotation.
used de pe nd a d on
a range of
Which of
cereals, intercropping,
ra1n{all, o~ the consumption needs of the household, end
on the r-e s o cr-c e e available to the household, including
land, oxen, and labour.
areas, does not appear
Wallo. Yt='t,
crop cultivated in the study
in ~he official production
for some households in the
Tobacco, the only non-food
5tat is tic s f 0.'
stUdy areas, tobacco was a valuable cash crop.
Acc o r d i n g to survey informants, a bundle of unprocessed
tobacco sold in local l~wland m~rkets in January/February
CL e , post harvest) fetched around 40 ETB., however, the
same bundle of tobacco sold in September fetched around
700 ETB., The tobacco waS bought by the 'big' merchants
from Dessie for sale in
Ababa and Asmara, end
Dj i bout 1.
the mai n towns, i ncl udi ng, Addi s
for export across the border to
Tobacco has a storage life of around 5 to 6 years' and
was generally considered by informants as an iUlportant
means of savings. The mejori ty of respondents, however,
reported that they were either unable to grow tobacco or
that the amount that they were able to grow was too
small t a be of much val ue. Tobacco, in 1991, account ed
for an estimated 2% of the area sown by sample households
in Ablosh, and for e n estimated 5% of the area sown by
samp18 households in Gerbi. Five <24%) of the sample
households in Ablosh, and 13 <34%) of the sample
households in Gerbi, grew from 1 to 2 bundles of tobacco
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per household. A further 2 households in Ablosh, and 6
further 4- households in Gerbi, reported growing small
amounts of tobacco in their gardens. All of these
informants reported that the amounts they were able to
grow were too small to take to market and the tobacco
grown by these households was sold to wealthier members
of the community. However, the majority of
households, 14 <67%) households in Ablosh,
the sample
and 21 (55%)
households in Gerbi, all reported that they were unable
t.o srow tobacco because of the need to reserve land, and
La bo-ur, for. growing the more vital cereal crops.
Cash crops grown at t 11e expense of
portrayed in the literature as a cause
food are widely
of food insecurity
bot h at the househol d, and at the national level (e. g,
GeorgG, 1976; Lappe and Collins, 1977; Dd rrhe rn and Harree ,
1983; Lo f ch i e , 1988). Howeve:r, as t he findings presented
here show, the gener~l criticism laid asainst cash crops
that they compete with food crops for land and labour did
not fit thd situation in either of t.he study areas.
In AbLo s h, the main food crops were rnef z e , barley, and
sorghum. In 1991, these 3 crops were gr own by 19 (90%)
of the sample households, and accounted for an estimated
84% of the area sown. Similarly, the main food crops in
Garbi were maize and sorghum. These two crops were grown
by all 38 (100%) of the sampl e househol ds in 1991, and
accounted for an estimated 76% of the area sown. These
primarily oriented
agri-
towards
findings
cultural
indiCote that,
production was
at both survey si t es,
meeting sUbsistence requirements and th~t food security
was the important consideration in determining land wse
priorities.
Table II. 9, below, shows the production for careals end
pulses obtained by sample households in 1991, a 'poor'
rainfall year. ccrnpe r ed t o what r es porid e n t e would expect
from production in a 'normal' rainfall year. The data
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show the cumulative production for 21 sample households
in Ablosh, and for 38 sample households in Gerbi, as
well as the average production per household. Yields
are given in quintals (lOOkgs.).
TobIe II.9
Production in 1991 'Poor' Rains, and Expected Production
in 'Normal' Rainfall Year (in Quintals (IOOkgs.)
Ablosh PA1 Gerbi PA2
1991
• Poor'
Rains
Expected
Production 1991
Rains 'Normal' Roins 'Poor'
EKpected
Produc t ion
Rains' Normal'
Maize 64 163 179 387
Bex-l ay 39 40
Sorg!1um 26. 5 44 74 110.5
Teff 8 15 21. 5 32. 5
Wheat 5. 5
Beans 16. 5 16 12 20
Total 159.5 280 286. 5 550
Hh. Avge. 7.5 13 7.5 14
1 Based on a sample of 21 cultivating households
2 Based on a sample of 38 cultivating households
In Ablosh, the expected production in a 'normal' rainfall
year for sample households was on avarage 13 qtls.,
ranging from 1
households (43%)
to 21 qtls per household. Nine of the
expected to grow less than the average.
Of these, 2 households (10%), both of which were headed
by women, did not expect to grow more than 2 qtls.; and
5 households (24'%) did not expect to grow more than 10
qt 15. Thus, even in a • normal' year these househol ds
only grew a limited portion of their food needs and can
in no accurate sense be thought of as 'subsistence
producers' .
A similar picture emerges when we look at Gerbi. In
Gerbil the average expected production in a • normal' year
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was 14- qtls., ranging from 6 to 21 qtls. per household.
Twenty-one of the households (55%) expected to grow less
than the average.
expect to grow
Of these, 4 households (11%) did not
mor e than 6 qt 1s., and 16 households
(42%) did not expect to grow more than 10 qtls.
Consumption of Foods other than Cereals and Pulses
Other foods consumed in the study areas incl uded:
vegetables, coffee, milk, sugar, salt, end meat.
The main vegetables grown in the study areaS were:
onions, garlic, and I berbere' I Berbere' a type of
chilli pepper, was used as the basis for a hot, spicy
sauce which, 1ike '5hi)-0', was eaten as a complement to
'injera'.
supplemented el
These cultivated vegetables
limes with forage plants, such as
nettles, e.nd a type of wild cabbage, collected by the
women of the household.
In Ablosh, veget abIes were grown mainly in gardens and
were grown by the maj ori t y of sampled households. Those
households that did not grow vegetables in Ablosh, were 2
households headed by women. One of these households
contained an elderly divorced woman who lived alone, and
the other household contained a young di vorced woman in
her m1d-20s and her 9 months' old daughter. These two
women were both lendless, and neither of t hem had access
".
to a gar deri. In Gerbi, 4 (10%) of the sampled
households blso reported that they were unable to grow
vegetables because they had no gardens and no arable
landholdings.
Coffee was the most important refreshment at both survey
si t e s , In Gerbi, coffee had to be purchased. Although
coffee was grown in Ablosh, only 5 (22%) of the sample
households owned coffee trees. The number of coffee
trees owned by these households ranged from 10 to 35
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trees per household. The estimated annual yield per
mature coffee tree, under favourable conditions, is 2
k f Lograrna (Keith Tomlinson, ODA, persons.1 communication).
So the average household could be expected to produce 20-
70kgs. which would realize ETB160-875.
At both survey sites, the seeds from a plant known
locally as 'Asenemeeka' which, although bitter, had a
similar taste to coffee were at times mixed with coffee
beans, or ylere used instead of coffee beans, by those
hcueehoLds that could not afford to purchase coffee. In
Gerbi, 20 (37%) of the sampl e households report ed buying
coffee regularly, 23 households (43%) bought coffee
,sometimes', and 11 houeeooLds (20%) bought coffee onLy
'rarely'. All of these latter households reported
drinking 'poor man's coffee', i. e. coffee made from
7 (33~~) of
The corresponding figures for Ablosh
the sbmple hOUSEholds bought coffe~
'Asenaffi8eka'seeds.
'regularly',; 9 households (43%) bought cof f ee 'sometimes'
(3 of these households owned coffee trees), and 5
househol ds (24%) bought cof f ee
these latter households all
made from 'Asenameeka' seeds.
,rarely' . As in
reported drinking
Gerbi,
coffee
Milk was only consumed by those households that had
access to milk yielding animals, such as milch cows,
goats, sbeep and, in Gerbi, camels. Milk was also
processed into butter, sometimes for personal use, but
mainly for sale in local lowland markets. The processing
itself was always undertaken by the women of the
household. According to survey informants, a pet of
butter weighing around 200 grams, f etched between 7 to 8
ETB.
Milk itself was never sold because of the belief that
the animal would die if the milk was boiled. Among the
semple households, 13 households (62%) in Ablosh, and 31
households (57%) in Gerbi owned milk yielding errtma.ls,
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all oft hese households report ed t ha t • although adult
household members sometimes consumed milk. milk was
mbinl Y gi oen to children. Five of theSe households in
hblo
sh
• and 17 of these households in Ger b t , repod
ed
that they • regularly' gave their children milk. ThuS,
milk ",as cleedy an important supplement to the diet of
the children of these households. Eight of these
households in Ablosh• and 14 of theSe households in
Gerbi. reported giving their chI Idren milk • somet imes' •
depending on the level of milk produCtion yieldS, and on
the inc~e needs of the household.
timesslaughtered for meet on festioe occasions such as
marriages (~ich took place during the month of January,
after the meher harvest and before the commencement of
the bel~ cropping season), and to cehb,-ate religi~US
fest 1'lit les, such a& the end of Ramadan. the .. ",eEl,
period of Muslim religioUS fasting. Mimal
s
were only
ever slaughtered by men, and the type of animal
slaughtered depended on wealth. More comll>only, small
livestock. such eS 50ats or sheep ",ere killed. although
cows we,-e also slaughtered by weal thier m"mbers of the
streSS
ceremonial occasions and during
as drought. Animals wereMeot was onl y eat en on
of such
during
such as sheep and goats were
~imes of dr~u8ht and food
shall see in the following
community. Small
also slBughtered
li vest ock,
more commonly sold
during theshortage, although, as
Chapt er, animal s wel-e
drought of the mid-1980s.
we
Salt, a basic good, and sugar, a luxury, could be bought
from the service cooperative shOP at almost helf the
market price. The distribution of theSe goodS occurred
on e quota basis whenever they ",ere brought in,
theor
et
ically once a month, In praet ice much less
regularly. When ava,labla, the retion waS usually about
1.5 kiloS of salt and I kilO of sugar per household. In
1991, sUll
er
waS not available, although all of the semple
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households reported buying salt in 1991. In Ablosh, salt
from the servicewas purchased on the market and not
cooperat i ve. As already ment ioned,
Ablosh reported that they never
the
used
villagers in
the service
cooperative because it was too far away. Thus, these
households were forced to pay the full market price.
Fragmented Landholdings
The cultivation of several fragmented and dispersed
plots was common at both survey sites. Among the sample
households in Gerbi, landholdings per household va r t ad
from around 0.5 to 3.5 hectaresT with a mean at 1
hectare. These holdings were fragmented into between 2
and 14 plots, the average being 7 p l o't s.. The location of
plots (other than gardens) in r e l e t t on to homesteads
r arrg ed f r orn less than half-an-hour to 2 hours' walking
di st ance.
In G-erbi, the impact of villagisation in terms ef
distance from arable holdings was mixed. While 7 (18%)
of the sample households reported having to walk further
to reach plots since villagisetionj 3 households (8%)
from
decrease in the distance from p Lo t e ; end 28
(74%) reported all. increase in the distance
plots, and a concomitant decrc:8se in the
reported a
households
some
distance from other plots since villagisation. Moreover,
distance f'r-orn plots was not generally considered as 5
problem by respondents. This was explained by the feet
that the traditionel pattern of landholdings was
characterized by fragmentation into dispersed plots, and
by the fact that, prior to villagisation, the villagers'
t radi t ional set tlement 5, and peoples previous homest eads,
were located roughly within up to a maximum of 3 hour's
walking distance from the new village.
Howe ve r-, lack of access to pack animals to transport
inputs to and from distant plots was considerad a serious
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constraint. At the time of the survey, 20 (53'%) of
sample households owned donkey/mules, ranging from 1 to 3
donkeys/mules per householdj and 18 (47%) of the sample
househol ds had no pack ani mals. Of the 18 households
without pack animals, 8 of these households hired
donkeys/mules in 1991, and 10 of these households
reported that
in 1991. The
~hey could not afford to hire pack animals
r erit f or donkeys/mules vsried seasonally
wi th increased demand, during harvesting.and incr eased,
According to informants,
from 3 ETB' per day, out
during
the rent for donkeys/mules rose
of sea.son, to 10 ET8. per day
animals,
ha.rvest ing.
these rents
For those househol ds rent ing pe ck
reduced the income available to
For those households that could notthese
afford
househol ds.
to hire pack animals, the difficulties
plot s, and
0:
t~ansporting inputs to and from dd st an t the
difficulties of bringing in the harvest, were increased.
In Ablosh,
Civeraged 1. 6
landholdings among
hect ares, ranging from
sample households
less t han 1 timed
(roughly a quarter of a hectare)
househol d. The number of plot s
to 3.5 hectares per
cultivated by these
households
household.
households,
Ablosh had
and in the
averaged 8. r ang t ng from 1 ·to 13 plots per
With the exception of 2 women-headed
,
all of the cultivating households sampled in
landholdings located both in the highlands
lowlands. The 2 women heading their own
both cultivated gardens surrounding theirhouseholds
homesteads in the highlands.
The cultivation of steep mountain slopes observed in the
agricultural highlands of Lasta in northwestern Wollo,
(McCann, 1986) and in the agricultural highlands of
Ambasel in northeastern Wallo ( Dessalegn Rahmato, 1988,
an d 1991) was not common in Ablosh, and none of t he
plots cultivated by sample households were on steeply
sloping land. That steep slope cultivati.on was not a
feature of the agricultural ey s t-em in Abl.oesn indicates
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two things. The first implication is that population
pressure on land, commonly associated with steep slope
cul t i vat ion in the highlands of northern Wollo, was not
such _8 problem in the area. And we shall later that
shortage of
implication
labour was
is that,
reported
to the
aE ·probl em.
extent that
The other
population
pressure on land is a problem ~n the agricultural
highlands of Wollo, this problem is locally specific and
not generalized throughout the highlands of Wallo.
'.
Plots located in the highlands were generally close to
the homestead, whereas the location of lowland plots in
relation to. homestead ranged from 2 to 3 hours' walking
da st er.c e . Not s':lrprisingly, pack animals were highly
valued by respondents in Ablosh because of the
difficulties of transporting inputs from the lowlands to
the highlands. As in Gerbi, the distribution of pack
animals in Ablosh was also highly skewed. Among the
sample househol ds, 12 households (57%) owned peck
animals, ranging f r orn 1 to 3 pack animals per household,
and 9 households (43%) had no pack animals.
According t a survey informant s, the rent f or pack animal s
out of season was from 3 to 4 ETB. per day. These rent s
increased to 12 ETB. per day during harvest ing time.
That these rents were higher in Ablosh than in Gerbi
indicates the high value placed on pack animals in the
area. Out of the 9. sample households that had no pack
animals, 5 of these households rented pack animals in
1991, and 4 of these households reported that they could
not afford to rent pack animals in 1991. For those
households that nei ther owned. nor
pack animals, the tra.nsporting of
lowland plots was a particularly arduous
made more difficult during the
narrow mountain path became
could afford to hire,
inputs to and from
task that was
r a t ny
muddy
season when the
and dangerously
slippery.
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In AbLosh,
amount of
in addition to access
labour available to
to pack ani mal s,
the household
the
was
crucial in determining the extent to
were able to minimize the work spent
highlan'd and lowland plots. During
which households
travelling between
the agricultural
cycle. members of households, typically the male head and
the children of the household took turns in spending from
1 to 3 weeks' at a time in the lowlands. In this way,
members of households alternated their time spent
tending highland and lowland plots.
January. i. e: • before the on-sEt
During the month of
of t he ~ cropping
season, small conicle shaped houses. made from crop
stalks, were constructed in the lowlands specifically for
this purp os e , These houses were sited as close as
possible to lowland plots, In addition to reducing the
time spent t r-eve Ll Lng to, and from. these distant lowland
pLct s, respor.d8nt. s 01 su r-eport ed that r es.I d ins in the
lowlands in this way enabled them to guard crops against
birds and other potential predators
For those households that either had no children. 0)-
where the childr-en were at school or were too young to
stay in the lowlands, the male heads of these households
were forced to reduce the time spent tending individual
plots. Children were generally considered ~esponsible
enough tO,stay in the lowlands at about 8 or 9 years of
5 households (24%)age. Among the sample households,
reported that this distribution of labour between men
and chi 1d r-e n was not possible in 1991 because the
children of these households were too young to stay in
t he lowlands.
Although women provided labour for almost all
agricultural tasks both in the ,highlands and in the
1owlands (see below) it was unheard of for women to
spend the night in the lowlands. Howevel-, in addition to
their agricul turol taslcs, women were also responsible
for the task of taking food and water to men working in
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the fields. The women took food and water to men tending
highland plots on a daily basis, while food and water
fOI- family membe r s tending lowland plots was carried
do~n to the lowlands on alternate days.
Those women that had children were, at times, assisted
in these tasks by their children. However, the extent to
which women were able to allocate these tasks to chf Ldr eri
depended on the age of the children and on whether or not
the children themselves were staying in the lowlands.
Children t"'_et-e generally considered old enough to
transport food to the lowlands at around 5 or 6 years of
ege:
these
The work time spent
women and children
taking food to the lowlands by
ranged from 4 to 6 hours per
round tr-ip. The time spent taking food and wa t er- to men
wor-king in fields in the highlands ranged from er ourid
half-an-hour la one hour per round trip.
Th~ cultivation of fr-agmented and dispersed plots in the
study areas did increase the labour demands placed on
some households, but only to the extent
more than one plot per day. However,
that they go to
as the findings
presented het'€! show, t he main problems as perceived by
respondents were lack of access to pack animals, and the
limited amount of labour available to the household,
In response to the question 'would you prefer your lands
to be less fragmented?', none of the respondents in
Ger bi , and only one respondent in Ablosh, said they would
prefer their lands to be less fragmented. By for the
majority of respondents reported that they preferred
their lands to be fragmented because of the benefits and
reduced risk to be derived from micro-ecological
variations in soils and climate. Fragmented land came
about as a result of the traditional system of land
relations based on inheritance and was preserved in the
land reform. Fragmentation was preferred both to m~nimize
the risk of total crop failure, and for crop
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diversification,
c ert ai n crops.
si nee some pL at s were more sui t ed to
This suggests that policies promoting
land consolidation are likely to be unsuccessful.
Agricultural L~bour
At both survey si t es, 1and was ploughed for the
crop in December or January, before the on-set of the
rains, and in June or July for a meher crop. The minimum
requi,rement for ploughing was a pair of oxen. The use of
other types of livestock for ploughing was not common
in the st udy er-eea , aLthough some informant s r epor t e d
pe ar t ng cows
i9805 because of t he short age 0:' oxen.
of the mid-
The plough
with oxen after the drought
itself consisted of a long wooden shaft with a metal tip.
Ploughing was done by 'men e r.d , in both st ud y areas, it
was unhecu-d of f o r- women to plough. According to sur vey
informants, 'it took a man one day to plough a timad
(roughly a quarter of a hectare) with a pair of oxen. In
both st udy areas, the di s t r t but ion of oxen was highly
skewed. At the time of t he survey, 3 (14%) of t he sample
households in Ablosh had no oxen; 6 households (32%) had
only one OXi
households
8 households (42%) had a pair of
(5%) had from 3 to 4- oxen. The
8 households (21%) had no
oxen; and 5
figures for
Gerbi were: ox eri: 13
households (34%) had one ox; 8 households (21 %) had the
necessary pair of oxen; end 9 households (24%) had from 3
to 4 oxen. Those households that were short of oxen were
dependent on wealthier members of the community for their
access to oxen. The implications of these oxen shortages
for these households is discussed in Section IV. 4. 2,
below.
To minimize the l-isk of seed loss because of rain
failure, or delays in the on-set of the rains, planting
was delayed until 2 or 3 days after the commencement of
the first rains of the season. Women were responsible for
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bagging seeds in preparat ion for s owdng , a1 though the
actual sowing of the seeds \-Jas done by both men and
women. According to survey informants, roughly half a
quintal of seed grain was requi red per t imad Ci. e. about
a quarter of a hectare). None of the respondents
reported purchasing seed in 1991, although all informants
reported having purchased some seed during times of seed
short age. Seeds wel-e usually ret ained from crops
harvest ed dur ing the preceding season, or were bartered
for with neighbouring growers.
As we have seen, staggered plant 1ng, int.ercropping, and
rotation were pr-acticed at both survey sites. While the
benefits of fallowing were also widely known, leaving
land idle was generally associated with rain failure, and
the inability to undertake cultivation because of
shortage of' oxen and/or shortage of labour.
U¢ to the time of the' survey, none of the respondents had
ever used chemical fertilizers, and only 2 r~spondents in
Gerbi had ever used pesticides. However, the use of
natural fertilizer in the form of animal dung was assured
because of the practice of grazing livestock on crop
et ubble aft er harvest. Short age of wood was not
considered as a problem by;respondents in either of the
st udy areas and animal dung was nei t her used as a
source of fuel, nor was it ever sold and, thus. had no
exchange value in the study areas.
At both survey sites, there was a general accep~ance that
animals were allowed to graze freely on private
landholdings (:lIter harvest. An important outcome of this
pr ec t t ce was that those households that had no livestoc.k
had access to' fertilizer. Given that, in both study
areas, those households without livestock were among the
poorer members of the community, the implication of this
finding is that policies promoting the exclusive use of
chemical fertilizers would likely result in the erosion
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of this
households,
pr e ct ice and thereby
that could not afford
exclude
the cost
t he poorer
of inorganic
fer til i z er 5, from acc~ss to fertilizer
Weecn.ng was
arduous task
generally considered as a particularly
and invol ved men, women and children.
Weeding of b81~ crops was done during the months of march
and April. Weeding of long-maturating meher crops, such
as sorghum, . and. the traditional maize varieties, was
done dur ing .Tune, whi1e all meher crops had to be weeded
during the. months of August and September. Weeds were an
important source of feed for livestock
for use as fodder.
and were reserved
Harv~sting and threshing were done by both men and
women. Harvest i ng of be:lQ crops was done duri ng the
mont hs of May and Jt.r,€:, wll::'le meher crops ·w':::l- e har ve e t ed
in Cc t ober and N0v8mbe:r-. ;-r.:)\.vEver, dUJ-ing t iroes of food
=.bort,=ge, thE:! h ar-ves t ing of part, if not all, of the
bela- crops a t, the early maturing stage (normally in
Apr i 1>, as well cS tbe harvest ing of mehel- crops at the
early rnaturing stage Ci. e., in August>, was common in
both study areas.
As rnent Lori e d
holds sampled
above, 14-
in Ab Loah ,
<67'%) of the cult i vat ing house-
and 21 (52%) of the cultivating
households sampled in Gerbi, reported
ea t ins bot h bel g and mehel- C)-OPS at the
harvesting and
early mat uring
stage. In all of these cases these households reported
that they regularly eat crops at the early maturing
stage. These pet-iods of food shortage, i. e. April and
August, coincided with periods of high grain prices. In
Kallu, as throughout Wallo, grain prices rose in April,
prior to the belg harvest, and reached their peak during
August and September, i. e., during the months immediately
preceding the meher harvest. Thus, t he eat ing of crops
at the early maturing stage was clearly a local
to seasonal hunger and high grain prices_
response
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Threshing of belg crops was normally done in May and
June, and in Ncvercbe r- for meher crops. Threshing was
mainly done by men, although women and children helped
with such activities as driving the livestock over the
grain. Once threshed the grain was put into Et large
granary, • gudgnot' t out si de t he owner's hut . These
granaries were controlled by men and men were
responsible for trans-ferring grain needed for
sUbsistence from these stores to small granaries located
inside the hut. These small granaries wer-e controlled by
the h eed wornen of the house-hold, al though these women
were expe~ted to use this grain for the preparation of
food.
The. ccofJpi:'jg cal end.sr s. fur Ger bi, and for Ab Los h, are
shown, r ee pect Lve Ly , in Tables II. 10 and 1: L 11, below. As
can be seen from these Tables, these agricultural tasks
over lapped and/ or- had to be carr ied out simul taneousl y.
Labour demands peaked during the months of weeding ''Cnd
harvesting. These periods necessitated the involvement of
all eva i Lab Le labour. The weeding of meher crops fell
within the main rainy season and was generally considered
by informant s 6.S a part i cuI arl y arduous task t hat I in
Ablosh, we s made rno r e difficult during periods of heavy
rainfall in the highlands because this encouraged the
spread of weeds and increased the demands on labour. As
vie have seen, for rneny househol ds, t 1':i s was also El
period of seasonal hunger and, thus, low energy levels.
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It was a160 the period when people became increasingly
susceptible to
below,
sickness from malaria. As we shall see,
at both si t es, malaria was bysurvey seen
informants as a serious labour constraint.
Table II. 10
Cropping Calendar for Gerbi Peasant Association
December-January
February
March
April
May
;une
Mid- ';une-n.id-Jul y
Mld-July-mid-August
t.:id-Au8ust-end Sept.ember
Oc.'l.ob;r-NovembE:;J"
Ploughing
Sow: maize1, sorghum, beans
Weeding
Weeding. SOW' meLze ", s or'ghum
Harvest and t hr-esh first maize crop
Harvest and thresh first ~orghum crop
Ploughing, weed 6Bcond maize/sorghum
crop
Sow: teff, maLze! , beans
Weeding
Haryest atid thre~l crops
= shorL-ro~turin8 maize variety
2 - long-matujing maize varieties
Table II. 11
Cropping Calendar for Ablosh Peasant Association
Dec./Jan.
February
March
April
May
June
Mid-June-mid-July
Mid-July-mid-Aug.
Mid-Aug. lend-Sept.
October-November
Highland
Ploughing
SOW! pulses, barley, wheat
Weeding
Weeding
Harvest puls~s
Harvest & thresh berLey, wheat
Ploughing
Sow: pulses, bar-Ley, wheat, teff
Weeding
Harvest & thresh crops
1 - long-maturing maize varieties
short-maturing maize variety2 =
Lowland
Ploughing
Sow: maize1
Sow: Sorghum
Weeding
Ploughing'
Sow: teff,
maize2, beans
Weeding
Harvest & thresh
crops
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Pr-ocessing and cooking were done exclusively by women.
Women were responsible for setting out the grain to dry,
for the washing, pounding, and the grinding of grains and
spices. Most of these tasks were done just outside the
hut. On sunny days gr a f ns and s p i ces were set out to
dry on a sack just outside the doorstep. When dry, the
grain was then pounded, samet imes by two women working
t.. ogethel-.
The! srinding of grains and spices was mainly done wi th
the use of a grinding stone and was a laborious task. In
Ablosh, some of the women occasionally uS"?d the mill
Lo c e t ed in Mo r koy , thE:< smeLl , Lov.Le nd, t own ::')'::.ng e t thE:
fooL of the mountain and
down the moun t e I n face.
s.orne 2 hour-s walking distanCE:
How-ever, roost hous e noI ds re;!. ied
on the labour of women. Only 3 (11%) of the women
respondents reported
Unlike Ablosh, Gerbi
having
Peasant
used the mill in 1991.
Association had its own
mill, although the mill did not -,always function and
often ran out of diesel. In addition, poorer households
found the few cents l~equired too expensive. Only 15
(26%) of the women respondents reported using the mill in
1991.
At both survey sites, agricultural tasks were carried out
within the household, supplemented in some cases wi th
non-household labour. Short age of Lab our- was ranked 05:0
the main r-eason for leaving land idle, in AbLos h, and was
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ranked second in Gerbi, the first being shortage of oxen.
Factors affecting the amount of household labour
available foe egr LcuLt ur-aL production included: the size
and compos I t ion of households,
labour I and si ckness.
the gender division of
The Size and composition of Households
Table II. 12, below, shows the composition of households
at the time of the survey among peasant households
sempLed in Ablosh. The household refel-s to the landowner
and his or her immediate dependants. The data are based
on a sample of 21 households. The household unit
contained on averase 6 persons, ranging from 2 to 10
people per b ous-e-rhoLd. As these da t a show, househol d
composition varied significantly. Marriage was virilocal
and polygamous. me r r a ege was common to 'the area, although
mor.og amoue n16rriag8 was the predominant type of marriage
among the sample households. By far the maj0rity of
households (67%) contained a husband, wi f 8, and
chi I d ( ren) j 3 households contained 3 generations; 2
households contained a widowed woman and her child, and 2
Table II. 12
Composition of Sample Households in 1991/1992, Ablosh Peasant
Association (No. of Households)
Husband, wife, child (ren) 14 67'7.
Husband, wife, child (r eni , grandmother 5%
Husband, wife, child Cr en) , div. daughter, grandchild 2 10%
Husband, 2 wi ves, children 2 10%
One womanand one child 2 10%
Sample size = 21 households
households were polygamous. In the polygamous households,
the number of co-wives was two. In both of these cases,
the co-wives were resident in the same settlement, but
each wi fe and he)- children lived in a separate house
with the husband sharing his time between the two
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residences. The women prepared their own food and the
senior wife had no control over the labour of the junior
wife. In theory, the amount of time a husband spent
wi th each wi fe was based on an agreement between the
spouses. However, as one co-wi f e informant reported,
there was little that a co-wife could do if the husband
chose to spel"ld more of his time with o~e wife. The
amount of time the husband spent with each wife in the
sample households ranged from 3 to 7 days at a ·time.
The eompos t tion of households among peasant households
sampled in Gerbi is shown in TebLe II. 12, be-low. ihe
dat a are based on a sample of 35 househol ds.
vJas vLr L'Ioce I and, as in Abl ash, a.nd polygamous
mar l~ i age wos common to t~e ar e e , altho ugh only orie of
the sample house-holds was polygamous. The household unit
cori t e ane d on
Table II. 13
Compo~ition of Sample Households in 1991/1992. Gerbi Peasant
Associat.ion (No. of Households)
Husband, wife, child (ren) 34 89~
Husband, wife, child (r en) , grandmother 1 31.
Husband, wife, chi ld (r en>, div. daughter, grandchild 1 3'4
Husband, wife. chf Ld (r-en) , div. daughter, 2 grandchildren I 3~
Husband. 2 wives, children I 3'4
Sample 38 households
average, 6 persons, ranging from 4 to 9 people per house-
hold. Eighty-nine per cent of the households contained
a husband, wi fe, and chi 1dren, arid 3 of t h~ households
contained 3 gener5t1ons. The number of wives in the
polygamous household was 2. As in Abl ash, the women
lived in separate houses and each wife prepared her own
food.
Thus, in both study ereas, the average size of households
was only smell. The average number of adults per
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household was two, ranging from 1 to 3 in Ablosh, and
from 2 to 3 in Gerbi.
The small average size of households cannot be explained
by the famine of the mid-1980s. Only 3 of the sample
households in Gerbi, and one of the sample households in
famine.
reported having members that died during the
In all of these cases it was the;, children of
Ab Lo e h ,
women-headed households that died (See Chapter III,
below) .
However, one exp l arie t a on for the small size of families
is the young age of marr i age. In both st udy areas,
accor~ing to informants, women marry for the first time
be tween the age of 13 and 16, while men mar r y between the
age J 7 and 21. Ano t her possible e:xplanat:.on could be a
high incidence of infant mortalit.ies in 'n0rmal' times.
Although we did not include the q0estio~ of infant
mo r t eLt tLe s in OU1~ survey, during discussions wit.h groups
of . women, the women repor-ted that infant mortalities
were frequent.
In addition to the size and composition of households,
additional factors affecting the amount of labour
available to the household ir\cluded the gender division
of labour, sickness, and more recently, in Gerbi,
compulsory litel-acy classes for adults, especially women,
and schooling for children.
Gender- Division of Labour
In addition to the processing and cooking of food, women
were responsible for the care of children, for fetching
water, end for collecting fuelwood. Collecting fuelwood
was an arduous task t ha t took from 4 t Cl 5 hour s per round
trip. POI"" those women that had access to a pack animal
this task was made easier. However, as we have already
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seen, in both study areas tha distribution of pack
animals was highly skewed.
Moreover, among the sampl e housel1ol ds t hat owned pack
animals, these animals were in all c es ee owned by the
husband and the women of these households did not have
automa.tic. entitlement to use these animals. In both study
ereess, those women re'spondent s married to man that owned
pac~ anim~ls reported that they had ecce ss to
thes~ Bll:;'rnaJ.s.
Table II. 14
Wo~en's Allocation of Labour Time during a Typical Working
J\.bloshPeClsont. AssQciatlull
Hr s. Mins.
10Feed husband & children
Fetcp water 1
Clean house
Collect dung from garden
Feed hens
Coffee break
Collect fuelwood 4
Take food/water to
husband/children in field
(highlands)
Work in fields 3
Pound spices
Cook evening meal
Collect water 1
EHt 1
Wash dishes
Bathe children
Make injera and
wot (sauce) for
following day
15
3()
5
45
30
30
45
15
30
2
Total: 16 hours 15 minutes
Gerbi Peasant Association
Hrs. "tins.
Feed husband &
children 15
Clean house 15
Collect dung from
garden 30
Coffee break 4
Collect fuelwood 30
Fetch water 30
Take food & water
to husb8nd in field 1 30
Work in field 4
Cook evening meal 1
E8t 45
Wash dishes 15
Collect water 30
Bathe children 30
Make injera and
wot (sauce) for
following day 2
16 hours 30 minutes
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Table II. 14, above, shows the allocation of labour time
during a typical working day as reported by one woman res-
pondent in Ablosh, and by one woman respondent in Gerbi.
The length of the working day of both of these women was
over 16 houl-s. Out of the 16 hours the work time spent on
domestic task~ ranged from 12 to 13 hours, and these data
do not include additional occasional tasks such as
washing clothes and going to the market.
In Gerbi, women respondents also complained that the
forced daily att.endance, on the payme'nt of fine, at
liter3cy classes for up to 3 hours a day simply increased
th~ir working day as they had to wo~k lons~r hours to mak~
up the lost. time. .4t the s eme time, !-espondent:. r-eport e d
t he t t.he compul SOl-y at t enc e.nce of chi 1dr--en in school
r&duced the amount of child labour available to the
household. Children were expected to attend school on 6
mornings a week. Ablosh didn't have a school, and what
1i t eracy cl asses there WEn-e: do not appear to have been
compulsory as respondents reported rarely attending them.
Sickness
At both survey sites, sickness, and malaria in particular,
affected the availability of household Lebour . Malaria,
commonly found in the hot lowlands of southern Wollo, was
was generally seen by infOl-mants as the main cause of
sickness in the s t udy areas. In Gel-bi, Villagers benefited
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from their recent incorporation into a Malaria control
programme implemented jointly by CONCERN, a locally based
NGO, and the Ministry of Heal tho The programme, which had
been in operation in some lowland areas of southern Wollo
since the Le t t er part of the 1980s, was ext ended to
include Gerbi in late 1989 early 1990. However, many of
the informants in Gerbi had long suffered from this
recurring illness and Malaria was still regarded by
respondents as a problem. At the time of the survey,
the programme had not reached the western lowlands of
Ke::.llu and, . i n Ablosh,
sickness; was
Malari a, a
f)-equent 1v
particularly
mentioned bydebilitating
informants as a serious labour constraint. Among the
sample households, 12 household:; (57%) in AbLos h, and 15
houssehcLda (28%) :i.n Ger' bi, had one household member sick
wi~...h Maloria in 1351, and one household in AbLos h had 2
hcuaehoLd membe: s s.Lc.k with Hc161-ia in 1991.
II.S LIVESTOCKPRODUCTION
Sorn~ as.pact s of the importance of anifiols in the
production systems of the study areas were touched upon
in the previous section. It is nevertheless important to
stress
Ii ve s t oc k.
the close
Livestock
relationship between crops
need to be fed from the land
and
and
its products; land needs to be cultivated with the use of
livestock. The dung of livesto.:k fertilizes the land and
the yield from the land is threshed using livestock.
The Relative Importence of Animals
Except for poul try, all kinds of ani rneLs were r-ank ed as
more or
donkeys,
cattle,
less equally important, including.
goat s, and sheep in Ablosh;
mules, donkeys, camels, and goats,
cat tIe. muI es,
and including,
in Gerbi.
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The importance of oxen for ploughing, and the importance
of pack onimal& for transporting inputs and produce, was
discussed in the previous s.:::ction. Mul.:::, donkeys, and,
for
also important for trade and as a
those renting them out, while
source of milk. Goats and, in
in Gerbi,
source of
camels,
income
were
female camels were a
Ablosh, sheep, were val ued because of thei r reI at i vel y
faster reproductive rate, compared with the bigger
animals, bnd their relatively greeter resistance to
dr c ught , compared wi t h cat t 1e, and wer e us ed as a means
of a~cumu:a~ion and a& 5 source of savings that could be
sold in times of need. These en f rnaLe were also important
for their dairy products, including milk, and butter
which provided '0 source of food and/or income.
Animal 11::des,' and skin~ wero? also a source of i ncorne.
Despite 'the 10"" valuation place:d on poultr-y, both eggs,
e.n d ch':'c l.e.ne , a sOU,'c e of i ric orne ar.d/ or f ood,
part.::"cul.:u-ly for the poorer- membe r s of tho? community.
Livestock Grazing
ht both survey
f ami. 1y lnerubers..
the househol d' S
sites livestock
Exactly who did
composi t ion, and
were mainly grazed by
the herding depended on
the source of grazing.
or f e me I e ,
children above the age of about 8 or 9,
were responsible for taking livestock
male
to
In
graze, and for water-ing, B:1d guarding animals. Where the
houssehoI cl had no chi 1dren, or t he chi 1dren \>]el~etoo young
f or- such a r e s pon s Lbi Lt t y, the herding was done mainly by
women , There: were 3 sources of gr az t rig a va I LebLe to
households, direct feeding of stubble after the harvest.
in whic.h private crop land became communal pasture,
pr i vat. e f odde r from harvest ed crops, and communeI past ur e
lands.
The communal grazing of livestock an the crop stubble of
private crop land after harvest, and the ways in which
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this et r et egy compLernent ed crop cultivation through the
1i vest ock from the chaff
discussed in the previous
of fodder was the feeding of
of harvest ed crops. The
ferLilization of land, was
section. The second source
residues from all types of crops were used as a source
of feed for cattle, while the remains of pulse crops,
which were more suited to the digestion of smaller
livestock, were uss e d as a source of feed for goats and
sheep. The importance of this SOLwce of fodder was that
it could be: st or ed and used when necessary. At the same
"
time, those' households without livestoc.k could use their
chaff as a source of income. However, as we saw in the
previous section, in practice, the size of harvests and,
thus, the amount of feed available from this source of
fodder, var Led bet ween households.
The third f' or m of grazing was the COITLlluna2.pasture areas
of the Chaff~ Valley. These gra2ing pastures were used by
adjacent peasant associations and by the Afar, a~d
other, pas t or-eL communities f r om the 5un-ounding e.aste,-n
lowlands. The Chaffa Valley had been a cornmurie L pasture
area for- as long as people could remember.
In Ablcsh, the Chaffa Valley was mainly
during the dry seasons. During the
used for grazing
rainy seasons,
livestock we~e grazed on communal pastures in the
highlands. Cattle, goats, and sheep were driven down to
the Chaffa plains during the dry season months of May and
June, and from October to February. Donkeys and mules
were general I y kept at home because, as we have seen,
pack animal s were needed tot r ansport goods bet ween the
highlands and the lowlands. Cows that could be milked
were also kept at home. In addition, during ploughing and
threshing time oxen, and other livestock, were brought
back to the homestead.
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Men, and bays above the age of about 12 years, were
responsible for livestock grazed in the lowlands, while
women, and younger ch f Ld r en above the ag.::: of about 3
years, were responsible for the care and maintenance of
an Lrne Ls kept at the homestead. Men and boys took turns
in spending from one t a two nights in the 10w1ands to
look after animals. Animals kept at the homestead were
t aken to graze on the communal pastures early in the
morning and were br-ought back to the homestead in the
evening. The herding of animals in the highlands during
the rainy season was the responsi bi 1 i t y of women and
children.
Those households with livestock, but lacking
necessary male labour, and those households with only a
few livestock, mainly used the highland grazing areas.
Out of sample of
(43%)
21 households that had livesto.::k,
grazing areas in
reported using
1991 because they
or. Ly the IIig111 endhouseholds
number of livestock; and 4- households
h5d only a small
rsported using only
Lhe highland grazing areas b~cause of shortage of labour.
The shor-t age of g r e z i ng due tot he exp eris t on of cr-op
cuLt Lv a t Lon observed by McCann (986) in his study of
farming practices in the agricultural highlands of Lasta
in nor-t be r n Wallo, was not mentioned as a problem in
Ablosh - perhaps because crop cultivation in Ablosh was
not restricted to the highlands. Ac c ordd ng to
informants, grazing conditions were 'very poor' after the
long drought of 1984. With the return of • good' seasonal
rains during 1985 and 1986, the cond1tior. of pastures
improved.
past ur ee
described
At the time of t he survey, the condit ion of
as
prospects for grazing were generally
'good'. Although crop yields were directly
and
affected by • poor' seasonal rains
1991 (see Section IV.5), grazing
over the period 1988-
was not r e:port ad as a
that rainf~llproblem by respondents. This suggests
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during this period
grazing at-sas.
provided su:fficient moisture f o r
In Gerbi, livestock were grazed on the Chaffa plains
close to the village during the dry seasons and were
driven southwards during the rainy seasons.
wornen and children were mainly responsib:::'.:
As in Abl ash,
f 01- El1-a z i ng,
watering,
months of
livestock
and guar d i ng animals. Dur ing the dr y season
May and June, and from Oct ober to Februar Y,
taken tot he communal past ures close towere
the village,in the early morning and were brought back to
the v t l Lag e in the evening'. Men, and boys above the ase
of about 12 years, were respo:isible for animals grazed on
t he distant, southern plains during the wet seasons. As
in AbLossh , whO?ther or not houssehc Ldss in Ger't-i used the
wet season pastures depended in part
or rneLe Le bour , arid in par t on the
on the ava~lability
si:z& of the he r c .
Out of a sample of 3.3 ho us ehc Lda that had livestock at
th~ time of the survey, -3 hOLls~hCilds (21~~) did not use
th& ~et se~son pastures in 1991 because ~hey had too fe~
anLmaLs.; end 5 households (13%) did not use the pastur-es
becaUS8 of shortaga of mala labour.
In Ge r b f , the condition of the dry season grazing
pasLures close to the ~villege and the prospects for
grazing were generally described by respondents as
,poor', The poo r condi t ion of these grazing areas was a
resul t of
and the
pr ob 1ern,
overgrazing and was
forced changes in
blamed on villagization
herding practices. The
6.S by informant s, was the forced
grazingconcentration of livestock onto a much smaller
area than that used in the past when people lived in
dispersed settlements. OvergraZing was reported as most
serious clo~e to the river which was the only watering
point for livestock.
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The problem was aggT8vated by the fact. that the. rivet-
flooded the grazing areas during the rainy seasons. Over
large areas of the grazing pastures soils had become
compacted ~nd water logged as a result of these seasonal
floods and the trampling of animals and people and this
WaS seen as a serious pr-oblem by informants. According
to informants, appeals to the Ministry of Agriculture by
the p~C1sant association for permission to create a river
diversion to prevent the flooding, and for the use of a
tractor to plough the. compacte.d areas, had go~e unheeded.
The structural arrangement
additional problems for
vi 11age was or gan.Lzed in Cl
of the new village caused
1i vest ock management. The
grid-like pattern, with rows
of houses separated by passagewa ys. The.se
passC\gewdys tot he hut s wer-a gener-all y seen by infol-mant s
es too tight fOI- the rnovernerrt o f livestoc~:.
was assravat ~c.1 dur i ng t.he r e t ny seasons when all
t r empLl rrg contriuuLecJ to a muddy ten-ain. This i:lcre3.sed
t he d:~ffic\...llti6s of moving cnimalE> in and ou t, of the
vi 11d8B. A fur+ IlE=r cornpI dint voi cad by livest ock
owners was that where livestock were kept
overnight, were too small, although the. size of this
with the size of the herd and the size
Although most 01 the Sardens were of
problem increased
of the garden.
unLfor-m s.izE:, SOlne gordens were visibly much larger than
others.
However I some 1i vest ock owners had no gal-dens end t hi s
created ver-y real problems. These were households that
were among those households formed after the completion
of the villagization process. The village site allowed
liltle room for population
formed since the completion
cl ust ered together at the
expansion and
of the village
households
were simply
ext rami ties of the village.
For livestock owners without gar-dens, w.:::rn-ies included
where to put the animals and a fear that their livestock
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could roam during the night and be killed by nightly
predators.
In the general perception of environmental degradation,
and in the literature,
land is assumed to be
degradat ion oT communal grazing
the result of over-stocking by
livestock owners. The gene!al criticism laid against
livestock owners is that they accumulate herds beyond the
land's 'carrying capacity' (e. g. i Timberlake, 1985;
Her r Le , 1989; FAO, 1985; World Bank, 1986). This
argument is .associated with Har dLn (1968)' s thesis, The
T'r ag edy of the Commons, . and the idea ·that a s t r uc t ur e t
contradiction exists between the actions of individual
liv~sL0ck own~rs and the long-t.er-m COIOJilOn good. Proposed
scLutLori s include, d~sto..::king (in P:-Bc:':'ce restricting
t he I'i urnbeI- of liv8~tock to a size t hs t gr'azing could
support in t.r.e d r t es t yt2E.rs), chanses in ar:i.mal h.ussbarro r y
practh:es, and privatisation of gra::~ns c.l~ea5. In t.h e
c.ont ex t of Ethiopia, these proposals, with ~r-.e exception
of the latte~ prescript~0n ·....3l-:i ch has not, yet, surfaced
on the environmentalists agenda, can be found, fo:-
example, in the works of Constable, 1984,
IUCN,
& 1985; Hur-n t ,
19.86; GOElI UCN,1988; Barhan and Egziabher, 1989i
1990.
In the context of the case studies, the assumption that
livestock own e r a have too m.any animals, is discussed
below. However, as the findings ori the deterioration of
.srazing pes t ur ea in Gerbi peasan± aa s oc ce t t on clearly
show, a more direct cause of over-grazing in the study
area was the forced change in herding practices as a
result of the policy of villigization.
In SUI(J, there were 3 sources of grazi ng avai 1able to
houssehoI ds, direct. feeding of stubbl e aft er the harvest
in which private crop land became communal pasture,
pri vat e fodder f rom harvest ad Cl' ops, and ccmmune L past ure
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lands. The forms of grazing available led to
complementary stt-ategies. Which una was used depended on
the ee es on , c r op y t e l ds , the type of livestock, the size
of her ds, end the type uf labour available the
household. Herding was done with the use of household
Leboer , with tasks e L'loc et ed according t.o age and gender.
Distributi0n of Livestock
T'ebLe II. 15 below shows the distributic.n of liv8st.ock
among e.olnplE:: households in GE::('bi peasant association in
1992. The data are baa ed on a sample of 38 pe s s en t
househoI ds end gi \18 t be
dor.k e y e rmu l e e , and catrlel s .
distribution o f oxen, goats,
households did not have the pair of OX2n ne~essary for
Table II. 15
Distribution of' Livestock Among Sample Households in Gerbi
Peasant Association, 19921: O....mersh1p of" Oxen Rtdated to
Other Types of Animals.
goats Idonkeys/mules I camels
oxen 17-12 1-6 0 aY-en 13 2 1 0 oxen 14- 3 2 1 0
I I I
>2 I 1 3 5 >2 12 3 4- )2 I 1 2 1 5
2 I 2 5 1 2 1- 2 6 2 l- a
1 I 9 4- 1 1- 2 11 1 1- 13
0 4- 4- 0 (- 1 7 0 1- 8
! Based on a sample of 38 households
The number of oxen was on average 2, ranging from 0 to 4
oxen per household. Nine of the households (24~) had from
3 to 4· oxen, 8 households (21";) had a pair of oxen, 13
households (34%) had only one ox, and 8 households (21Z)
had no oxen. The distribution of goats was only slightly
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less skewed. The nUDlber of goats was on average 3,
r angt ng from 0 to 8 goats per household. The number of
donkeys/mules was on average 1. ranging from 0 to 3 per
household. Only 4 of the households (11~) owned camels.
Camels were very expensive, costing around 1000 ETB. f and
were consIdered by all informants as a clear indicator of
weal tho
As the data show, most of those househol ds without oxen,
or with one ox. were also without other types of animals.
Thus. these households not only lacked draught animals
for ploughing, they were also bad no animals for sales!
dairy pr oduct.e , and for transport. Thus, if we look at
animals in terms of need and not simply in ternas of land
use or grazing then clearly the assUJll.ption that
1i vest ock owners ha v~e too marry animals does not fi t the
si t uat ion in Ger-bi. Nm- does it fit the situation in
Ablosh.
Table II. 16
Distribution of Livestock AmongSample Households in Ablosh
Peasant Association. 19921 OWnership of Oxen Related to
Other Types of Animals.
sheep & goats donkeys/mules
oxen 17-12 1-5 0 oxen 3 2 1 0
I
>2 I 1 3 >2 2 2
2 r 6 2 2 5 3
1 i 6 1 2 4
0 I 1 2 0 1 2
1 Based on a sample of 21 households
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The distribution of livestock a.mong sample households in
Ablosh. in 1992, 15 given 1n Table 11.16, above. The data
the sheep and goats,
show
and
are based on a sampl e of' 21
distribution of oxen,
pea.sant househol ds and
donkeys/mules. Forty
lacked the necessary
three per cent of the households
pair of oxen for ploughing. The
number of' oxen was on average 2, ranging from 0 to 4, oxen
per h~usehold. Four 01 the households (19~)had from 3 to
4 oxen, 8 households (387.) had ,8 pair of oxen, 6 of the
households (29~) had only one ox, and 3 of the households
(14%) had no oxen. The distribution of pack ani~ls was
The number of pack animals was onalso high! 'i sk,ewed.
average one, rangins from 0 to 3 per 'household. As the
uata, sho"",, most of thosoa households without oxen, or with
only one ox, also had no pack aniJr.als. The distribution
of sheep and goats W-ciS less skewed and was on average 3,
ranging from 0 to 8 per household. Two of the households
had no animals at all, both of these households were
headed by W'omen.
Within househol dss, only 8. small number of women
respondents reported owning animals. Out of a sample of 28
women respondents in AbLoeh, and 58 women respondents in
Ger bd , only 3 (11~) of the women in Ablosh, and only 7
(12~) of the women in Gerbi, owned animals. Of' the 3
women in AbLoesh, 2 of' the women owned one cow. and one
woman owned 2 cows. In Gerbi, one woman owned 3 cows, 4
of the women owned 2 cows, and 2 of the women owned one
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cow. In all of these cases, the women reported acquiring
the animals from their parents at the time Or their first
marriage. A further 4 women in Ablosh, and a further 6
women in Get·bi, had owned from 1 to 2 cows before the
drought of the mid-1980s, but these animals were sold
during the drought to buy food.
In reality, the 'ownership' of animals by these women was
"
only partial, since the women had no control over their
animals. In all of these cases, the women reported that
they had no control over the off-spring of their animals,
and no control ov er- income generated from the sale 01
dairy pr-oduct s, n01- could they sell the anima] s w""i thout
the penniGsion of their husband.
This lack 01 cmimals in the study areas is partly
explained by the loss of animals through forced sales
during the 1984/5 drought. The distribution of livestock
before and after the drought in the study areas is
discussed in Chapter III. However. Tables II. 15, and
II. 16. below give the distribution of livestock before the
drought in Gerbi, and in Ablosh, respectively. As the
data show, before the drought the distribution of animals
was less skewed. Thus, in Gerbi r 17 households (45~) had
2 or more oxen before the drought. 25 households or 66~
had one ox compor-ed w""1 t h 34'; in 1992 (see Table II. 15
above) • and 6 househo1ds or 16% had no oxen compared
with 21~ in 1992. As TabLe 11. 17 below shows, the
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distribution of' other types of animals was also less
skewed.
Table 11.17
Distribution of Livestock Among Sample Households in
Gerbi PA. Before 1984/5 Dr0ughtt: Ownership of Oxen
Related to Other Types of Animals.
Idonkeys/mules Isheep & goats Icamels
oxenl4 3 2 1 0 oxen!6-10 1-5 0 oxenl3 2 1 0
3+ 1- 7 1 4 3+ I - 12 3+ I 1 1 2 8
2 1- 5 2 I 5 2 1- 5
• I- t 5 19 1 I 9 16 1 1- 25l-
0 1- 6 0 6 0 1- 5
I Based on a sample of 38 households
Similarly, as can be seen ·from Table II. 18 below the
distribution of Oxen among sample households in Ablosb
b~fore -Lhe drought was also less skewed. Nineteen
hous.eholds 907.. hod or more oxen before t he drought
compared with 577. in 1992.
Table II.18
Distribution of Livestock Among Sample Households in
Gerbi PAt Before 1984/5 Droughtt: OWnership of Oxen
Related to other Types of Animals.
donkeys/mules sheep & goats
oxen I 4- 3 2 1 0 oxenl 6-10 1-5 0
3+ I 1 2 2 3+ I 1 4
2 I - 6 8 2 I 9 6
1 I - 1 I
0 I - 1 1 0 I 1
1 Based on a sample of 23 households
However, this seeming inabili ty of these households to
rebuild their herds since the drought cannot be expla:1.ned
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by natural regeneration given the time lag between the
drought and the timing of the survey. If we consider, for
example, that sheep and goats reach maturi ty at 5 to 7
iaon.ths , and that the duration of pregnancy is only 'five
months, we would expect to see an increase in these
smaller animal herds er ourrd mid-19B7. (See, Cli'ffer et.,
1991) Again, the age of maturity for cattle 15 around 13
months and the durat ion of pregnan.cy is 9 months, thus we
wou.ld expect to see an increase in cattle by the end of
1987. This suggests that part of the explanation for the
se~nd.n8 inability of' these households t.O rebuild their
h.eI~d$must be that they are having to sell their animals
d.-i.. e rot e which does not allow them to rebui Id their
11erds, and may even be -forced ta sell their reproductive
animals.
Access to Oxen for Oxen-short Households
There were 3 forms of access to oxen for households that
e.i ther bad -.no oxen. 01- t hat had only one ox: through
relativesj sharing of' oxen, and renting.
Only 2 of the sCimple households that either had no oxen,
or that had only one ox, depended on relatives for access
to oxen. These were two 'Womenheaded hous.:holds in
Ablosh that had small gardens. Both of these women had
sons living in the village that ploughed for them .
.The sharins 01 oxen among households with only one ox was
common in both study areas. Within these ox sharing
arrangements, two ox owners agreed to share their oxen for
one or two seasons. The agreement was that each ox owner
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loaned his ox to the other every other day during the
ploughing and the threshing seasons. Thus, each OK owner
had access to a pair o~ oxen on alternate days. Of the 13
sample households in Gerbi, and the 6 sample households
in Ablosh, that had only one ox at the time of the survey,
all of these households reported sharing oxen in this way
in 1991.
A featUl-eof this practice of ox sharing was that neither
of 'the households incurred any loss of Le bour-. At the
SCime time, t,he fact thal landholdings were ploughed on
c11ter-fJcst(:!deys , &s opposed to one household completing
:l t' s own ploughing requirements first, meant that each
household was able to minimize delays in the timing of
ploughing, . FOl households operating in a highly variable
climate, delays in the timing of ploughing could restrict
both the amount. of land cultivated and the chcice of
cr·ops grown,
harves t sand.
and thereby
thuG, the
adversely affect the size of
food availability and income
levels of households.
This type of arrangement for accessing oxe.n contained
t::leruents similal- to those identified by Robertson (1937)
in his study of share-crop contracts in Africa. Although
the. resource shared here was oxen, as opposed t a crops,
Robertson's approach is nonetheless applicable in that he
suggests that informal institutional arrangements for
accessing resources in rural communities need not
nec essar i 1Y
contract.
exploitati.ve to either party to the
Rather the relationship may
wi th complement ary
be one which
ena.bles households endowments to
combine resources in such a way as to share the burdens of
I-i5k in situations where there are often important risk
factors ou-tside their immediate control, such as weather.
Tho s.ee households w-ithout oxen, and without relatlves to
plough for- t hem, were forced to rent oxen from the
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wealthler members of the community. In AbLossh , these
rental payments were in kind. In gerbi, the payments were
in labour.
Within the rental -agreements reported by respondents in
Ablosh. a -fixed amount of' grain, ranging from 2 to 3
qtls.. was paid to the oxen-owner, irrespective of the
size. of the annual harvest. These payments could
correspond to one-fifth 01. the annual harvest in a good
year. and one-third of the annual harvest in a poor year.
and ~n a ba~ year the peasant borrowing the oxen may even
have to purchase grain to be able to pay the oxen-owner.
As the following case study illustrates. In 1991. a poor
rainfall yeal~, Abdul's annual harvest was 6 qtls. For the
rental of & pair of oxen he paid 2 qtls., or one-third of
his tsnnual harvest. Abdul reported a.n. expected yield of 9
qLls in Cl • good' ye~r. thus. these payme.nts in a •good'
yedr correspond to just over a fifth of his annuel
harVf3Gt. It should be recalled that these payments f or'
oxen in addition to the poor peasants other
commitments. including land and agricultural taY-es.
In. Gerbi, th<:!labour payments in exchange
widely known and were uni formly applied.
for oxen were
The peasant
borrowing the oxe.n worked f oi the oxen-owner for one day
in exchange for the loa.n of one ox for one day. and worked
for 2 days in exchange for the loan of a pair of oxen for
one day. Thus, . if the peasant cultivated 4 t Lmad, roughly
one hect are, he had to work for 8 day's for the oxen-
owner as payment for the rent of two oxen.
At the time of' lhe survey, the pay for one day's wage
labouring on the farms of wealthier members of the
community was from 4 to 5 ETB. The post-harvest price of
a quintal of' maize in January-February 1992. was around 70
ETB. Given the price of labour and the price of grain,
this suggests that this form of payment was the cheapest
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alternative for the peasant. However, for the peasant
supplying the labour, these labour payments meant that
Labo'ur+ t Lme was taken from his own fields and this could
adversely affect his own comins, harvest. Of the 8 sample
llou-seholds in Gerbi without oxen that rented a pair of
oxen in. exchemge for 1abour in 1991, none of these
households had a surplus of labour. The size range of
these hous.~holds was from 4. to 6 persons per household.
In addition, the oxen-owner naturally ensured that his own
ploughing was completed first. Thus, the peasant
supplyIng the labour had to wait and this could delay lhe
"Limlng of his own plou.ghing and negatively affect the size
of his bar vee t
These r'ent e.L arTCs.ng.::mentsfor oxen enabled those hODse-
hoLds, owning 2 or more oxen to accumulate and thereby
r ed nLorced household differentiation within the study
areas. As shown in Tables II. 15, and 11.16. above. by far
the n~jority of the sample households wi thout oxen were
also withou.t other types 01 animals, including pack
animals. Among the sample households in Gerbi, 88% of the
pack animals, and 100% of the camels, were owned by those
respondents that had 2 or more oxen. This suggests that
these respondents rented pack animals to accumulat e. A
similar picture emerges INhen we look at Ablosh. Among the
sample households in Ablosh. 83'Z of the pack animals were
owned by those respondent s owning 2 or more oxen. (See
Tables II. 15, and It. 16, above.) Thus. the consequences
of the rental arrangements for pack animals were the same
as for oxen.
What these findings indicate is that, among the sample
households, the ownership and use of animals was the
basis of wealth in both study areas. The unequal
distribution
enabled lhe
of animals, and of oxen in particular,
richer households to become richer and made
it difficult for the poorer households to ·take off' from
115
their poverty. The importance or livestock as the basis 01
wealth and social differentiation in rural communities is
confirmed by other studIes
agricultural highlands of
McCann (1987)' s recent
Laste. northern Wallo. (See.
on farming systems in the
Ethiopia. See, for example.
study of farming systems in
also, Cliffe, et.aL. 1991.)
II. 9 TR.ADE
Much of the trading that occurred in the study areas was
carr-ied out ~t marketE' in the local Low+Larrd towns of
K~mios~ <which was also the awraja capitol), Harbu. and
Markey. Monetary and non-monetary exchanges were
transacted alsu within and between cOllllllunities, although
'(he lotter .was more common among the high~and comruun.lt Lees
in Ablosh.
at least some of their
c.ou s.umpt Lon requIrements through j nvol'l7ement. in trade. The
basi~ foodb - grains and beans - consumed by non-peasant
households had to be ruet through exchange; while at
1east par t of the agricul tural short t-all among peasant
households was supplemented through trade. In addi tion to
these basic foods, salt, corfee, sugar. and oil. had to be
bought. There were also occasional expenses on
manufactured goods, such as, kerosene. matches, razor
blades, cloth, and shoes. Various payments to the state -
taxes, levies as well as peasants', and womens',
association membership fees, up tOr and including in.
1991, were all paid in cash and were. thus, met through
Involvement in trade.
Transactions involving livestock, other than poultry, were
always carried out by men, while women tended to be
involved in sBlall-scale exchanges. the selling of butter,
eggs, chickens, and small quantities of grains and spices.
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However, women were also involved in the brewing and
selling of • t.' ella', the local beer, a trading activity
Lhat was commori at both surve,y si tes. Among the sample
households, 2 of the female heads of households in Ablosh
earned money by brewing and selling 't'ella'. These
were 2 widowed women, both of whom had a young child to
support. The women eith.er sold the beer locally, retail
(a glass at a time) or wholesale <a bottle at a time). or
took :i.t to sell in the local lowland town of Markoy. The
profit mede by these women from these beer sales was
about 4. ETB. .per bottle. In add! tion, both women also
made • Injero' as a by product from t.he fermented barley
which they also took to sell in town. This trade
provided these women wi th Cl. small, but regular source of
income.
:La dddllion, women we:ne involved in the sale of fuelwood,
which, for SOme households. also provided a regular
soure:e 0 f Lncome , rr, : 1991, fuel wood sales provided a
):-egular source of income for all 16 or the non-peasant
sl:1mplehouseholds in Gerbi. and. for one of the two non-
pel:1santsample households in Ablosh. The latter household,
and 11 of the 16 housl~holds in Gerbi were all headed by
di vor c ed women.
Allor these 12 female heads of households reported that
the cash earned trom selling fuel wood was their only
source of income in 1991. Eleven of these women collected
the fuelwood and look it to sell 1n the local town on a
daily basis. As we have already seen, the collection of
fuelwood was a par t Lcu Lar-Ly arduous task and none of
these women had access to a pack animal.
At the ti111e of the survey, a bundle of fuel wood sold in
the local towns fet ched from 4 to 5 ETB. per bundle,
depending On the quality of the wood. Thust assuming that
the women sold a bundle 01 luelwood everyday, the weekly
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income earned by these women was from 28 to 35 ETB. per
week.. The daily income earned from these fuel wood sales
was the seme as the wage rate for daily labour in Gerbi.
However, the demand for labour locally was highly seasonal
(see below) and selling fuel wood for these women was the
only means oF earning a regular income. All of these 11
female heads of households had children to support,
ranging from 1 to 3 children per woman. The twel f t b
respondent, an elderly woman who lived alone, reported
Lhat she sold fuel wood only twice a week because she was
'old' and 'tired'.
This trade in fuel wood was important both for female
lseads of bouseholds and -for married women. For married
women, cash earned from selling fuel~.lOod was the only
income over which they had any control. Although, as
desc..rib·:.:u LhrOl).ghovt. this section, womeri were actively
invulved in lbe pr oductLon, processing, and llldrketing of
exchange vaLuee, none of the wome.n responden.ts in lhe
Sot ody aretiS il<:Jd corrt r oI over income genera. ted from land-
r'el at ed or Ii vest ock product s. Trade in fuel wood was seen
by married women respondent.s as a means by which they
could generate slllall amoorrt a of money t o buy things that
their husband objected to spending money on, such as cloth
for' (:l new dress or, in times of sickness, medicines lor
themselv~s and/or for t.heir children. More important Ly ,
th~ cash from fuelwood sales enabled the women to save
small a.mounts of money which they could draw on in the
event of divorce.
The opportunities for generating income In this way f'or'
these married wome:nwas, however, limited. Both because
or I.he women's exis'linS labour comndt.ment e which limited
th~ amount of ~ime they could spend on this activity, and
beca~se of the control ruen had ov~r women's mobility. At
both survey 51tes, married ~"'omen could not go to town
without first acquiring their husband's permission.
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However, not all married women respondents had control
over the income f rom this trade. Within the poorer
peasant households. and within the non-peasant households,
cash earned from fuelwood sales was in all of these cases
controlled by the husband.
TIle selling of
households was not
I sexual favours' by female heads of
althoughuncommon at the survey sit es,
only one of the female heads of household in our sample
was involved in the selling of sexual favours. This was
a young dLvorced woman in her late-twenties living in
Ablosh. The woman lived alone ~th a young daughter of
about 2 years of ase. The respondent began selling sexual
favourl?> Ghor'tly aft,€oI" her dLvorce (her second divorce) in
1963. Some of he! 'men. friends' that visited her lived
within the communit y, but she also had •men friends'
li -ving in she regularly visited.
The i1lJ.portanceo f lhis trade in luel wood and in the
belling of sexual ftivours lor lhese women needs to be seen
in the context of the lack of altel-native opportunities
for income generatton in the study areas, and in the
nature of gender relations described in Section II.5 above
During "normal" yeere, "these trading activities provide
female heads of households with small but regular amounts
of cash. However, as we shall see in Chapter V, during
the drought of the mid-1980s, these female heads of
households were the most vulnerable members of the
conuuunit y ,
II. 10 WAGE LABOur.
At the time of the survey_ none of the sample households
had memb~rs engaged in wage labour away from the
communIty. In Gerbi, wage labour locally" was an important
~ource of income for non-peasant households. The demand
for labour was mainly Tor agr-icultural labour working on
t.he farms of the wealthier members 01 the community.
AccordiTlI:!; Lo informants, the daily wage rate for this work
ranged 4 lo 5 ETB., depending on the task involved. The
wage r~Le w~s the same for both men and women. However,
t.his demand lor Lebour was highly seasonal. Labour demand
peaked during the belg harvest month of J"une, and during
t, he m~her season mont hs, Sept. ember-Novembel-. Fi ve of t. he
non+pee sse.rrt households depended for part of their income
on cash earned from selling their labour locally. In all
of these cases, both the husband and the wi fe sold their
ldbour.
Thi::. diopter- d1.~cussed the resource base in which people
in Lhe ccse btu.dles ~ousht 'le eur vf.ve. Tbe findings
pn"3s,t:mted in Se~:tior~ II.5, sho\oJ that 1n both study areas
tht:: distribt.J.tl-on of' land was highly unequal. In Gerbi,
erable landholdings were on overage 4- {.imad, ranging f ro n,
2 tu 14 t.inJbdj and, 16 (30'h} of -the sample households had
no land. In Ablosh, landholdings were on average 6 timad,
ranging from 2 t o 14· timad, and 2 (4%) 01 the households
had no land. Our findings also show that there was no
correlation between family size and size of landholdings.
ThIs unequal dist.ribution of land was partly explained by
lIle nature of the relationships between the PA leaders and
the FA If.lembE:!rs.·The for-mer, through their control over
lanG set the terms of access to land which enabled them t.o
accumulate resources in their own interest. Poorer
ruemuers of the commun.iL":/J 1ack1ng sufficient resources
with which to bribe the PA leeders were, tlluS, effectively
excluded from accessing land.
However, bol..h of the landless households in Ablosh, and 11
(69%) of the households without land in Gerbi, were headed
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by divorced women. Landlessness. among thes.e women headed
households was explained by the nature of gender
f""BlatiofJs. Tradi tionally, women, with the exception 01
widows, did not have acce6S to land in their own right and
this si luation was not al ter-ed by the land reform.
In Section II. 5, we indicated that ownership and the use
of arr.l maI e , and not land, was the main source of
differentiation among peasant
samp}e houst-~holds in Gerbi,
households.
and 43~
Over 50% of the
of the sample
h0US~hDldE. :i n, Ablosh, lacked the necessary pair 01 oxen
fur pl.uuglling. In Ger'bi, 13 (34-~) households had only one
ox, and 8 (21Z) households had no oxen. Six of the
huusellol cIs (29%). :1 Cl Ab Lossh, had one ox, and 3 (14Z)
househol ds. bad ne. ox-e.n,
The finding':_" 0.::50 shc,w that must. of these housebolds
w.i.. Lhuui:. oxen, or with one ox, were also without other
typ.a~ of animals. Tbuis, 'lhese I-.louseholds not only Lecked
drd~~ht Cilni.D:lsls for ploughing. tliHY also had no animals
for &~Jes, lh:d.r)' pr octuct s , and lOT tr·ansport. In fact, in
Ablosh, two of the peasant households had no animals at
all. Both of these were headed by women.
Households bihorL of o~en wer~ forced to depend art richer
peasants for access Lo oxen, And. excepting those cases of
ox-sharing between people with the same limited resources,
the terms of exchange facing oxen-short households were
highly exploitaLive. Rental payments were in kind <grains)
ur in Le.bour j the former redu.ced the amount of food
available to the pour peasant households, and the latter
could mean Cl loss of labour to the poor- peasant household
at crucial times of tha agricultural cycle and adversely
esf f e-cL the size of his harvest. The.tendency for oxen-
owners to give priority to their own landholdings also
means that the poor peasant risks delays in the timing of
his own ploughing, which in turn could affect the timng
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of planting, reduce the amount of land cultivated, and
negatively affect the size of his harvest.
At the same time. these rental arrangement s enable those
households owning 2 or lUore oxen to accumulat e resources
arid thereby reinforce differentiation. It was also the
case t.hat those households owning two or more oxen also
owned more of the pack animals. The consequences of the
reri t aI arrangements for pack animals were found to be the
same dS for oxen.
This highly skewed distribution of animals was partly
explained by forced animal sales during the drought of the
mi.d-1980s and part ly by the need to sell animals at a
rate that does not allow sufficient time for the
n!plenishruent of herds.
Another factor affecting agriculture and livesloc.k
production was shortage o:f labour. ThE: finding that
shortag~ of Lebour !..7BS senerally considered a problem in
Ablosh sharply corit r eddc Les t.he popular notion that the
main constraint on agriculture in the highlands of Wallo,
and northern Ethiopia generally. is overpopulation. SOIne
households.. 16 (42%) households in Gerbi, and 3 04%)
households in Ablosh. had access to non-household labour.
Landle&s households in lhe study areas were mainly
dependent on cash earned from fuelwood sales and on local
wage J abouring opper t uni ties. Fuel wood sal es was shown to
be the most important source of income Tor women. and Tor
women heads of households in part icular. This was a
par t icularl y arduous and time consuming t ask and none of
these women had access to a pack animal. Other sources
of income generatIon for women included brewing beer aud,
in one reported case, selling sexual favours.
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Thus, in both survey areas. the degree of di rferential
ac.cess to resources WBS sign! fi cant. I t is not simply
that. there is differentiation. the point is that
differentiation mat ters. The types and amol..m.tsof
the
IIIoptions and strategies
different groupings shape
for survival. Chapter
resources' available to
discusses precisely these issues within the context of the
drought arid. famine of the mid-1980s.
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CHAPTER III
HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES TO
FAMINE IN WOLLO
THE DROUGHT
IN 1984-85
AND
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we describe the different strategies
pursued by people in the study areas during the 1984/5
drought and famine, and discuss the effects of people's
actions for their future strategies of survival.
Previous work on local responses to drought and food
shortage in Wollo, and elsewhere in Ethiopia, (e. g.
Cut 1er and St ephenson, 1984; de Waal, 1991; Dessal egn
Rahmato, 1988 and 1991) has useful~y documented a series
of different household and community mechanisms for
'coping' with drought, but has tended to leave unexamined
the specific situations and actions/strategies of
different individuals and household grou?ipgs.
In Section 111.1, we first identify the different social
categories in the study areas. In the following three
sections we discuss the extent of aridity in the study
areas during the 1984/5 drought and the impact of the
drought on agriculture and livestock production. In both
study areas the most commonly reported means of accessing
food during the drought was through marke~ purchase.
Income for these grain purchases originated from a
variety of sources including, animal sal es, sales of
fuelwood and other cash crops, wage labour, and sale of
household, farming, and personal asset s. These various
responses are discussed in Sections 111.5 to 111.11. The
effects of food aid, and the •Derg' s' resettlement
campaign, in the study areas are briefly discussed in
Sections III. 12 and III. 13, respectively. The
conclusions on the actions that people took, and the
outcome of those actions, is discussed in Section III. 14.
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111. 1 DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS BY STRATATUM
Table III. 1 below shows the distribution of sample
hous-eholds by stratum in each of the study areas Ln the
immediate pre-drought period. Peasant households are
stratified on the basis of their ownership of livestock
which, as we descri bed in the previ ous ch apt er, was the
main source of di ff eren t 1at ion among peasant households
in the st ud y areas. Poor peasant households are those
househol ds wi t hout oxen; these househol ds wer e dependent
on richer peasants for their access to oxen and also' sold
their labour. Middle peasant households are those
househol ds wi t hone tot wo oxen, arid ot her types of
livestock, and richer peasants are those households wj_th
two or more oxen and other types of livestock. These
households, in addition to own t.rig 2 or mor a oxen also h ad
1arger herds and
animal s, donkeys,. mul es, cows and, in Gsr bi, c arneI s. The
non-peasant households are those househ2~ds without land
who were dependent for their livelihoods on a combination
of petty trading activities and local employment
opport uni ties.
,\able 111.1
Distribution of Sample Households, by Stratum, in the
Study Areas in the Immediate Pre-drought Period.
Ablosh PA Gerbi FA
No. of No. of
hhs. % hhs. %
Rich peasant 5 19 17 28
Middle peasant 16 59 25 42
Poor peasant 4 <2 ) 1 15 8 (2) 13
Non-peasant 2 (2) 7 10 (8) 17
Figures in brackets refer to women headed
househol ds.
Middle peasant households were predominant in both
study areas, accounting for 59% of households in the
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highland case study, and 42% of households in the
lowland case study. Rich peasant households accounted
for 19% of households in the highland study, and for 28%
of househol ds in the lowl and st udy; whi 1e poor peasant
househclds accounted for 15% of households in the
highland study. and 13% of households in the lowland
study.
Two of the 4 poor peasant households in the highland
study. and 2 of the 8 poor peasant households in the
lowland study, were headed by women. Non-peasant
households (i.e. landless households) accounted for 7% of
households in the highland study. and for 17% of
households in the lowland study. Both of the non-peasant
househol ds in the 1owl and st ud y were headed by wornen: and
8 of the 10 non-peasant households in the lowland study
were headed by women.
111.2 DROUGHT,AGRICULTURE,ANDLIVESTOCKPRODUCTION
The Drought
It is generally accepted that the drought in central and
south-eastern Wollo (south-west Wallo was unaffected by
the drought of the mid-1980s) began in early 1984 with
the fai 1ure of the belg, spring, rains. (RRC, 1984;
RRC/EEPG, 1987; see also Degefu, 1987) According to the
Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission there was
•no rain at all' in the belg producing areas of Wollo
during the
belg rains
1984 belg season (RRC, 1984 : 4). These failed
were the followed by I much below average'
rainfall duri ng the 1984 kerempt season CRRC, 1985).
Rainfall during the 1985 belg season, was also' poor'
and 'untimely· (RRC, 1986), The 'cycle of drought ended'
with the return of more ravourable and 'adequate'
rainfall during the 1985 kerem~t season (1985).
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patt ern of
variation
this descriptive account
rainfall in Wallo during
in the distribution of
of the
1984-1985
aggregate
masks the
However,
rainfall between
local:!,ties and obscures the timing and pattern of
The timing of precipitationrainfall at the local level.
relative to ideal times for planting, germinat ion,
maturation is as important as the absolute amount of
seasonal or monthly precipitation for the development of
crops and for 1ivest ock produc ti on. <Farmer and Wigl ey,
1985; Glantz, 1987).
In order to elicit information on the drought in the
case study areas, respondents were asked to indicate the
on-set and duration of the drought of the mid-1980s and
to describe the pattern of rainfall (see Tables 11.1,
and· II. 2) In batt).study areas respondents r-epor-ted
that the drought began in early 1984 witn the failure of
the ~ spring rains and lasted for one year. Except for
some light rainfall that fell over a two-day period i~
the latter part of May, the climate in bot h study areas
in 1984 was characterized by extremely prolonged dry
conditions. In both study areas respondents reported •no
rainfall at all' during the bela; season (mid-February-
end-Apri 1); 'no rainfall at all' dur t ng the, kerempt
season (mid-July-end-September); and 'no rainfall at all'
during the besa (dry) season (October-January). The
drought ended in early 1985 with the return of the belg
rains which fell in both st udy areas. These rains were
reported 'good' by respondents in both study areas.
Rainfall was also received in both study areas during the
1985 kerem~t season. These rains wer~ also reported
'good' by respondents in both study areas.
The Impact of the Drou~ht on Agricultural Production
The impact of the drought on agricultural production in
the case study areas was clearly devastating. In both
study areas, peasant respondent s all report ed that they
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had 'no belg harvest at all' and I no meher har vest at
all' in 1984. With peasant households forced to
leave their lands idle during the drought, the incomes
of those households dependent on employment wi thin the
Villages were also directly affected as, in both study
areas, agricul t ure was the main source of labour demand.
This latter issue is discussed in Section II, below;
here, we descri be the impact of the drought on household
food availability among cultivating households.
"
The linkag~ between drought and famine is often posited
simplistically: drought results in crop failure which in
turn inevitably leads to mass starvation. Household food
availability among peasant households is not simply
determined by a drought year alone, however, we also
need to take into account the previous. years' harvest
and stocks. In order to elicit information on household
food avai la b.i1i t Y among peasen t households during the
drought year, respondents were asked to state the number
of months' food s uppLy they had at the beginning of 1984-
(1. e. the drought year), The number of months' food
supply as reported by peasant households is shown in
Table III. 2 below. What the Table shows, first, is that
among
the
the
drought "
peasantand household food
relationship
availability
betweenthere was no direct
households in the case study areas.
In both study areas rich peasant study areas rich peasant
households had more than sufficient food stocks from the
previous year's harvests to survive the drought. In
Gerbi, rich peasant households had an average of 25
months, or just over two years', food supply. The number
of months' food supply per household ranged from 19 to
32 months. In sharp contrast, middle, and poor, peasant
households had an average of 5.8 and 2.6 months food
supply, respectively. For middle peasant households the
number of months food supply ranged from 5 to 8 months;
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while the range for poor peasant households was 2~ to 3
months.
Table III. 2
Number of
at the
households
households
beginning
and
of
number of
1984, as
months'
reported
food
by
supply
sample
Gerbi PA Ablosh PA
Food supply
no. of months
No. of
hhs.
Food supply
no.of months
No. of
hhs.
Rich peasant 19
20
22
24
28
1
1
1
9
1
18
20
24
2
1
2
30 3
32 1
Poor peasant1 2~
3'
4
2
Average per hh. 21
5 10
6 5
7 1
Average per hh. 5. 4
2 1
2~ 1
Average per hh. 2. 2
A~er~ge per hh. 25
Middle peasant 5
6
7
8
1 1
9
3
2
Average per hh. 5.8
Average per hh. 2. 6
Excluding women-headed households
Simi 1arl y,
average of
in Ablosh, ri ch peasant househol ds had an
21 months' food supply; the number of months'
food supply per household ranged from 18 to 24 months.
Middle, and poor, peasant households had an average of
5.4- and 2.2 months food supply, respectively. For middle
peasant households the number of months food eupply
ranged from 5 to 7 mont h s , while the range for poor
peasant households was 2 to 21-2months. Let's now see
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what other resources/sources of income households had.
especially those in deficit.
In both study areas, the most commonly reported meens of
accessing food during the drought was through market
purchase. Income for these grain purchases originated
from a variet y of sources incl uding, animal sel es, sales
of househol d,
shall look at
farming. and
livestock.
cropS, wage labour,
personal asset s.
and sale
First we
of fuel wood and other cash
III. 3 DROUGHT, GRAZING AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION
Grazing
Chapter
livestock; but of course these are not fi.>::ed assets and
II gave evidence of
the distribution of
were also affected
respondents reported
prolonged drought of
by drought. In both study areas,
that grazing conditions during the
1984 were • very poor'. Al though
some rainfall was received in both study areas during
the latter part of May, according to informants, this
rain f all was not useful f or crops and was descr i bed as
too' light' and as 'too short' to relie-;ve the effect of
the prolonged absence of rainfall on grazing pastures.
In addition to the direct impact of drought, respondents
reported that additional pressures on grazing in 1984
were created by the influx into the grazing areas of the
Afar, and other pastoral communities from the more arid
east ern lowl and areas of Awsa. These past ora list shad
themselves been forced westward because of drought and
reduced grazing in the eastern lowlandS.
In addition
respondents
immigrat ion
grazing areas
to
in
the
both
increased pressure on
study areas reported
grazing.
that the
of these pastoral communities into the
and the resulting heavy concentration of
animals increased the risk of animal deaths from disease.
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In this respect, livestock owners in ablosh were better
placed to minimize the risk of animal deaths from disease
than livest ock owners in Gerbi. In Ablosh, respondents
reported moving their animals to higher ground in the
highlands in order to reduce the risk of animal deaths
from di sease. In Gerbi, respondents reported that
animals were unsuited to high altitudes, thus, the
possibility of moving animals to higher ground in order
to mini mize the risk of ani mal deat hs from di sease was
not an opt ion open to them. At the same time, the influx
of p~storal communities from surrounding areas into the
grazing areas was seen by respondents in Gerbi as
confirmation of the lack of bet.ter grazing elsewhere.
None of the respondents in Gerbi reported migrating to
other lowland areas in sear~h of bett~r grazing.
Livestock product~on
For some households t.he reduction in grazing was
richmitigated by access to fodder. Ln both study areas,
peasant respondents all reported that they had access to
sufficient amounts of fodder to feed their animals
throughout the drought. The average number of months' of
fodder supply owned by rich peasant respondents in Ablosh
during the drought was 3j the range of fodder supply per
household was from 2 to 4 months. In Gerbi, the number
of months' of fodder supply owned by rich peasant
respondent s was 3. 6j the range per household was from 3
to 5 mont hs. All of these responden t s al so reported
buying fodder locally to feed their animals
own fodder supplies ran out.
after their
Al t hough all middl e peasant respondent s report ed havi ng
some fodder during the drought, none of these respondents
reported having enough fodder to feed their animals
throughout the drought. The number of months' fodder
supply owned by middle peasant respondents in ablosh
averaged 1. 6. The range per household was from 1 to 3
131
months. In Gerbi, the average number of months' fodder
suppl y report ed by middle peasant respondent. s was 1. 8j
the range per household was from 1 to 3 months'.
of these middle peasant respondents reported
Only 3
buying
fodder to feed their animals after their own fodder
suppl i es ran out. Of t he poor peasant- respondent s, onl y
the 2 poor peasant househol ds in ablosh owned animal Sj
neither of these households reported having, or
purchasing, fodder during the drought.
III.4 SALES· OF ANIMALS DURING THE DROUGHT
In both study areas the reduction of livestock during the
drought was extremely high. The report ed number of
animal losses through death, however, was much lower
than the reported number of animal losses through sale
for all types of animals. Animal sales was more common
among rich and middle peasant respondents. The main
reason for animal sales during the drouSZ"1t reported by
middle and poor peasant respondents was to buy food,
although some middle peasant respondents reported selling
animals to generate cash to enable them to take-up more
lucrative income earning activities. In contrast. rich
peasant respondents all reported selling animals during
the drought to ens ur-e that they got some r e t ur ri on their
investment s. Thi s comment I made by a rich peasant
respondent in Ablosh, is t ypi cal of t he responses gi ven
by rich peasant respondents to the question of why
animals were sold during the drought .
..Oxen are very expensi ve, it is bet t er to sell and
get something back. If you don't sell, and they die
from disease you lose everything."
Tables II I. 3, and I I 1. 4, below give the reported
reduction in animal herds through animal sales and
through animal deaths during the drought in Gerbi, and
in Ablosh, respect i vel y. The reported reduction in
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animal herds during the drought by peasant strata is
discussed below. The reduction in animal herds during
the drought was 55% in Gerbi and 49% in Ablosh. As the
data show, animal losses through deeth during the
of report ed animal
20, per
losses in
drought
cent of
accounted for only
the total number
15, and for only
Gerbi, and in Ab1osh, respectively.
TABLE 111.3
Reported Reductions in Livestock in Gerbi During the
Drought through Animal Sales and Animal Deaths.
Gerbi Peasant Association
Total no. No. sold No. died
of as % of as % of
Original animal total totaL
Herd No. losses losses losses
% %
Camels 7
Oxen 72 53 48 91 5 10
Cows 326 185 137 74 48 26
Donkeys/mules 27· 12 12 47
Sheep&goats 77 32 28 88 4 14
Total 509 282 225 79 57 20
TABLE III. 4-
Reported Reductions in Livestock in Ablosh During the
Drought through Animal Sales and Animal Deaths.
Ablosh Peasant Association
Total no. No. sold No. died
of as % of as % of
Original animal total total
Herd No. losses losses losses
% %
Oxen 48 38 35 92 3 8
Cows 102 77 58 75 19 25
Donkeys/mules 21 6 6 100
Sheep&goats 40 30 29 97 1 3
Total 311 151 128 85 23 15
In both study areas the highest rates of reduction were
among oxen and cows. The reduct ion rate in oxen and in
cows in Ablosh was 79% and 75%, respectively. Ninety-two
per cent of these oxen losses, and 75% of the losses
in cows, was through animal sales. In the lowland study
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the rate of reduction in oxen and in cows was 74% and
57%, respect i vel y. Ni net y-one per cent of these oxen
losses,
sales.
and 74% of the losses in cows, was through animal
I n bot h st udy areas, t he ext rernel y high
reduction rate in oxen, the principal means of draught
power, was the factor that was weighted much more highly
than any other reason as presenting the greatest obstacle
to recovery in the aftermath of the famine (this issue is
discussed further beloW).
The reduct ion rate in pa ck animals and in sheep and goat
herds in Gerbi during the drought was 47 and 42 per cent,
respect i vely. Forty seven per cent of these losses in
pack animals, and 88% of the losses in sheep and goat s,
was through animal sales, In AbLosh, the reduction rate
seven per
and goats and in pack enimels during the
was 75 and 28 per cent, respectively, Ninety
cent of these losses in sheep and goat herds,
in sheep
drought
and 100% of the losses in pack animals, was through
animal sales. As Table I I I. 3 shows, camel herds fared
best, there was no reduction in camels in the lowland
st udy during the drought. That no losses were reported
for camels can be explained by the fact that these very
expensive animals (c. ETH. Birr 1000) were owned by the
wealthiest households in the survey and were highly
means of trade. Camel s, moreover,
better than cattle.
can
of t r an s.por t and
withstand drought
val ued by these respondents as means
Who was DoinS the BuyinS?
Respondents in both
were sold in Kernisse
study areas
market, a
reported that
roadside market
animals
in the
lowlands of south-Kallu renowned for its livestock trade.
In all r~ported cases of animal sales, respondents
reported that animals were bought by 'big merchants from
the south of the count ry' . That merchant s from the south
of the country were active in purchasing livestock
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throughout Wollo during the drought was confirmed by the
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in Kemisse (personal
communicat ion).
MOArecords in Dessie also show that merchants from the
south of the country exported around 44,132 head of
cattle and 23, 018 pack animals out of ~/ollo during the
latter part of 1984 and the first quarter of 1985 (cited
in RRC/EPPG, 1987). According to these same data, the
livestock exported out of Wallo by these merchants was
d e stLn ed for Addis Ababa, Aerne r e , and Gondar, thus,
indicating that animal herds
reduced during the drought
in Wallo as a whole
gi ven the likel ihood
were
that
animal s sol d in these t ermi nal market s wOLlld have been
slaughtered for meat,
However, Rahmato (1987, and 1992), in his recent study
on drought and famine in Ambasel, north eastern Wallo,
indicates that merchants from south-western Wallo were
also active in purchasing
The livestock purchased
exported, but was driven
livestock during the drought,
by
to
these merchants was not
in
some cases,
drought-free
the animals
areas
sout h-west Wallo, In bought by
these merchants were returned and resold to the original
owners in the post-drought period. According to Rahmato,
a number equivalent to 25% of the same animals sold in
Ambasel during the drought was brought back and resold
to the original owners after the drought,
From his findings, Rahmat 0, argues that livestock
merchants provide an invaluable service to rural
communities during times of drought, However, this
assessment of the nat ure of these soci al relat i onships
obscures the highly unequal terms of exchange faced by
those forced to sell livestwck during droughts and masks
the extent to which many of these same livestock
merchants were also active in the grain trade. In both
study areas respondents reported buying grain at
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exhorbitant prices from the same' big mer-chants' t.o whom
they sold livestock.
Movements in the Livestock/Grain Terms of Trade During
the Drought.
RRC/EPPG (1987), reports that in south-central and south-
eastern Wallo the terms of trade between livestock and
grain suffered a drastic decline during the drought.
Cutler (984), and Baulch (1985), report the seme
exchange rate movements for northern Wello. These
movements in the livestock/grain terms of trade during
the drought were due to a combination of declining
livestock prices and increasing grain prices. The
Ministry of Agriculture, Kemisse, repor";::: the fo110wins
typical prices for livestock in Kemis EO.e market r:::lrthe
peri ad 1982-83 and 1984-85. As Table III.:; shows,
livestock prices fell drastically during 1984-85. The
average price of o xen, for instance, dec l a ne d by 85%.
Table III. 5
Livestock Prices in Kemisse Market 1982-b3 and 1984-85
(in ETH. Birr)
1982-83 1984-85
Oxeri
Cows
Sheep/goats
Donkeys/mules
Camels
Poultry
350-450
300-400
50-70
100-150
1000
4-8
40-80
40-50
10-20
30-40
3-4
Source: Minist ry of Agricul ture, kemisse.
The price of oxen, and the price of cows, reported by
the MOA for the drought period is moreover, slightly
higher than the drought prices reported by respondents,
but that implies that respondents were not way off. In
both study areas, the reported prices received by
respondents ranged from 40 to 65 ETH. Birr for oxen, and
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from 25 to 35 ETH. Birr for cows. Respondents in both
study areas reported that livestock prices declined
slowly during the first
dramatically thereafter.
quarter of 1984, and fell
Table III.6, below, shows the prices of :he three main
period 1983-1985, as reported by the
during
Ministry
the
of
cereal crops, teff, sorghum, and maize,
Agricul ture, Kemisse. Grain prices in Wallo normally
fall t.o their lowest levels
of January-February,
duri ng t he post harvest
and reach their highestmont hs'.
levels during the pre-harvest period from end-July to
end-Sept ember. (see also, Cut ler I 1984; Baulch, 1985;
RRC, 1986. > As can be seen from the Table, there was
Table II I. 6
Grain Prices in Kemisse Market 1982-83, 1984, and 1985
(in Et h. Birr. per qt 1. ).
1983 1984 1985
Jan/Feb Aug/Sept Jan/Feb .A.ug/SeptJan/Feb Aug/S€?:.
Teff 60 110 60 200 220 170
Sorghum 50 75 57 180 220 155
Maize 35 55 35 165 190 130
Source: Ministry of Agricult ur e, Kemisse
no increase in the seasonal price of grains during
January/February
increase in the
1984. There was, however, a huge
theseasonal price of grains during
second half of 1984 and the first half of 1985. During
the second half of 1984 the seasonal price of teff was
almost doubl e that for the same period in 1983. The
increase in the seasonal price of sorghum and maize for
the same time periods was 140 and 200 per cent,
respectively. Prices for all three cereals peaked during
the first half of 1985 and only began to fall with the
return of more favourable kerempt rains during the latter
part of 1985.
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This combination of declining livestock prices and rising
grain prices during droughts has been noted in other
studies on drought and famine elsewhere in Africa. (e. g.
van Appledorn, 1981; Hesse, 1987; Mort imore 1988). Sen
0981>, and Seaman and Holt (1980), also report a
decline in
Ethiopian
the livestock/grain terms of trade during the
famine of 1972-74. Interestingly, from his
analysis of exchange rate movements during the Ethiopian
famine of the early 1970s, Sen concludes that the
decline in the terms of trade was due to a fall in
1i vest ock pri ces
remained st able
only. According to Sen,
during the Wollo famine
grain prices
of the early
1970s. (For a reassessment of Sen's analysis, see Cutler
(1984). )
The Average Value of Livestock Holdings Before, and
During. the Drought.
The average value of livestock holdings before, and
during, the drought in the case st ud y areas is shown in
Table III. 7 below. The calculations are based on the
average price of livestock reported by the Ministry of
Agriculture, kemisse, shown in Table 111.4 above.
What Table III. 7 shows, first, is
the distribution of animal
that in bot h st udy
wealth was highlyareas
skewed. Gi ven the a1 t ered terms of trade, t he average
val ue of 1i vest ock hoLdings owned by poor and middl e
peasant respondents was not sufficient to cushion t.he
effects of the drought. In Ablosh, the value of
livestock owned by middle peasant respondents declined to
an average of 272 ETB during the drought, enough to
purchase, for instance, a.bout 1. 6 qtls of maize during
the second hal f of 1984. The val ue of 1 i vest ock owned by
poa, peasant respondents declined to an average of 40
ETB, enough to purchase around 24 kg. of maize during the
second half of 1984. In Gerbi, the average value of
livestock owned by middle peasant respondents during the
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drought was 202 ETB, enough to buy 1. 2 qtls. of maize at
late 1984 maize prices, while t he poor peasant, and the
non-peasant, households in the lowland study had no
livestock to sell.
Table III.7
Average Value of Livestock Holdings Before,
and During the Drought. <in ETH. Birr)
Average value
of livestock
before drought
Average value
of livestock
during drought
Ablosh PA
Rich
Middle
Poor
6, 170
1,784
152
989
272
4.0
Gerbi PA
Rich
Middle
Poor
Non-peasant
7, i ae
1,350
I, 3551
202
Pre-drought average values per head in ETB: : Oxen 400,
Cows 350, Camels 1000, Sheep/goats 60, Donkeys/mules 125,
Average drought values per head: Oxen 60, Cows 45, Sheepl
goats 15, Donkeys/Mules 35. Prices are based on average
livestock prices shown in Table 111.6 above.
t This ·yalue is distorted and is only given here for
illustrative purposes. The distortion arises because 4
of the 17 rich peasant respondents in Gerbi owned camels.
No deductions are made for camel prices during the
drought due to lack of data.
Livestock Sales During the Drought by Peasant Stratum
The above discussion on the aggregate reduction rates in
animal herds in the case study areas during the drought
leaves unexamined the
In
impact
Table
of reduced herds at the
household level. 111.8, below, we show
livestock ownership among the peasant household sample
in Gerbi and in Ablosh both before and after the
drought. What the Table shows, first, is that while all
peasant households suffered reductions in animal herds
139
Table III. 8
Livestock Ownership, by Peasant Stratum, Before and After
the 1984/5 Drought in Ablosh and in Gerbi
<Number of households)
Sheep &
Oxen goats Camels Pack Animals
)2 2 1 0 6-10 1-5 0 3 2 1 0 .4- 3 2 1 0
Ablosh PA
Before drought
Rich 5 1 4- 5 1 2 2
Middle 16 9 7 - 16 6 10
Poor 2 1 1 2 1 1
Average livestock units: Rich 17.6. Middle 4.7. Poor .5
After drought
Rich 3 2 A 5 5..,.
Middle 2 14 2 14 - 16 4 lZ
Poor 2 2 2 1
Average 11vestock units: Rich 7.6, Middle 0.3, Poor 0.2
Gerbi PA
Before drought
Rich 12 5 17 1 1 2 13
Middle - 25 9 16 - 25
Poor 6 6 6
Average livestock un1 ts: Rich j'7.7. Middle 3.8. Poor 0
After drought
Rich 2 15 17 1 2 13
Middle 25 25 - 25
Poor 6 6 6
Average livestock units: Rich 10.5, Middle 0.08, Poor 0
76.4-
1 5 19
6
2 7 8
4- 21
6
1 Livestock unit = an equivalent grazing unit = 1 oxen = 1 cow =
1 camel = 2 pack animals = 6 sheep&goats
during the drought, after the drought middl e and poor
peasant households were virtually cleaned out. This was
because poor and middle peasant households had far fewer
animals to begin with. Rich peasant respondents not only
had larger herds in the pre-drought period, these
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ani mal s, oxen, pack
more of the bigger and more valuable
animals, cows, and, in the lowland
households also owned
study, .cameLs .
In Ablosh, the number of ani mal s owned by rich peasant
respondents in the pre-drought period averaged 3.3 oxen,
2.8 pack animals, 13 cows, and 1 sheep/goat, ranging from
3 to 4 oxen, 2 to 4 pack animals, 10 to 18 cows, and 0
to 5 sheep/goats.. After the drought these households
owned on average 1. 6 oxen, 2 pack ani mal 5, 5 cows, and O. 6
sheep/goats, ranging from 1 to 2 oxen , 2 pack animals, 5
cows, and 0 to 3 sheep/goats. In the pre-droLlght period,
ell 5 of these rich peasant respondents had more than the
pair of oxen they needed to plough. After the drought, 3
households had 2 oxen, . and 2 households had lox.
The number of animal s owned by middl e peas an t respondent s
in the pre-drought period averaged 2 oxen, 0.3 pack
animals, 2.::i cows, and 2 E'.heep/goat s . Of these 16 middle
peasant househol ds, 7 households had no sheep or goat s,
and 10 households had no pack animals. Whereas ell 16
of these households owned the pair of oxen they needed for
ploughing before the drought, after the drought, 2 of
these h.ouseholds had only lox, and 14 households had no
oxen at all. The number of households wi thout pack
animals after the drought had increased from 10 to 12.
The loss of these pack animals to these households
represented a loss of their means of transport and trade.
All 16 househol de had no cows aft er t he drought, whil e
the number of households without sheep and goats had
increased from 7 to 14.. The loss of these animals to
these households represented a loss of their meat and milk
consumption, and a loss of their income from the sale of
animal products.
The two poor peesant households
livestock units between them in
in Ablosh had onL y 1. 5
the pre-drought period.
14-1
One of these respondents owned a donkey which he still had
after the drought, while the second respondent had 3
goats, all 3 of which he sold during the drought.
A similar picture emerges when we look at Gerbi. Before
the drought, rich peasant households owned on average 2.7
oxen, 1. 1 pack animals, 0.4 camels, 19. 7 cowe, and 2.8
goats, ranging from 2 to 3 oxen, 0 to 2 pack animals, 0
to 3 camels, 10 to 26 cows, end 2 to 3 5oe~s. Afte.r the
drought these households owned on average 1. 1 o:xen, 0.6
pack animals,· O. 4 camels, 8.2 cows, and 2.6 goats, 1 to 2
oxen, 0 to 2 pack animals, 0 to 3 camels, 6 to 12 cows,
and 2 to 3 goat s. Before the drought these rich peasant
respondents had on average more than the pair of oxen they
needed to plough. After the drought, dnly ? of these
households had a pair of oxen; and 15 of t r e s e households
had only lox. The number Qf households without pack
animals after the drought had increased from 4- to 8.
Among the middle peasent respondents in Gerji, the number
of animals owned by these households befo:-e the drought
and from
h'ou s eno Ld s ,
ox, 0.2 pack animals, 0 camels, 2. 4 cows, and
from lox, 0 t.o 2 pack animals. 2 to 5 cows,
o to 5 goats. Of these 25 middle peasant
16 househol ds had no goet 5, and 19 households
had no pack animals. After the drought t none of these
averaged 1
1. 1 goats,
households had any oxen or any cows. The number of
households without pack animals after the drought had
increased from 19 to 21 i and the number of households
without goats had increased from 16 to 25.
This massive loss to these poor and middle peasant
households of their future means of reproduction due to
these animal sales during the drought clearly invites a
reconsideration of the issue of what is meant by the
notion of 'coping', so central to much of the literature
on famine surviva.l strategies. In both study areas, the
drastic reduction in oxen was the factor that was
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weighted much more highly than any other reason as
presenting the greatest obstacle to recovery in the
aftermath of the famine. In Ablosh 12 of the middle
peasant respondents (75%), and the 2 poor peasant
respondents (100%), all reported that they were unable to
cultivate their landholdings when the belg rains returned
in 1985 because of shortage of oxen. Sixteen (64%) of the
middle peasant respondents (64%), and 2 (33%) of the
poor peasant respondents in Gerbi also reported being
forced. to leave their land idle during the 1985 belg
cropping season because they had no oxen and because of
the general shortage of oxen.
That shortage of oxen is critical in postponing post-
drought
effect
recovery is
of drought
confirmed by other studies on
highlands
the
in the agricultural of
Ethiopia. Mestin Walde Mariam (1980), for instance,
reports that {he loss of oxen during the Wallo famine of
1972-73 was the factor presenting the greatest obstacle
to recovery and McC'errri 0984, and 1987), concludes the
same about the 1984 drought. B1..\tthis author also suggests
that historical records show the importance of this factor
during other droughts throughout this century. Fewer oxen
not only result in less land being cultivated, but yields
may also suffer as the limited number of oxen will be
utilised for as long as possible, so some fields will be
planted late
The effect on income and recovery is amplified by the loss
of other animals. The loss of small animals, goats and
sheep, with their much faster rates of reproduction,
of herds. These households haddelays the replenishment
no goats 0)- sheep, thus this strategy for survival was
not an option and they therefore faced the problem of how
to get back animals. In Chapter II, we gave evidence of
the highly unequal distribution of livestock among
peasant households at the time of the survey and
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discussed the fact that not all of the respondents had
been able to recover their herds since the drought.
III.5 EMPLOYMENT LOCALLY. AND MIGRATION
The main source of demand Tor labour locally was
agriculture. working on the farms of the wealthier members
of the community. During the drought there was not demand
for this type of labour and people faced few alternative
employment opportunities.
Employmen~ locally
Only 2 (3%) 'ot the sample households had members employed
on a permanent bas~s both before and during the drought;
both of these households were in Gerbi. and neither
househol d.. had 1and. The rna n occupation of t he mal e heads
of these two households was that at forestry guards. Both
men worked on ~n MOA conservation project and were paid on
a tood-tor-work basis. The reported monthly food-far-work
rat ion rec e~ved by these respondents was 90 kgms. of
mai ze and 4 1trs. of 011. This work and. thus, the means
of subsistence of these households was not affected by the
drought. However, whi let he mont hl y food rat ions of these
respondents were
payment s were at
weeks and these
earning cash to
reported as being sufficient for needs,
times delayed for up to as much as 3
households had seek addi t i onal means of
buy food. Both of these forestry guards
reported having to sell fuelwood to earn cash!
Some respondents reported finding work within the Village
working for wealthier members of community. Three of the
sample households (13%) in Ablosh and 8 (15%)of the s~mple
households in Gerbi. reported that they sometimes found
work working for wealthier members of the community. Eight
of these households were poor peasant households that were
dependent for their livelihoods on casual wage labouring
144
and petty trading activities before the droughtj and three
of the households were middle peasant households.
In all of these households it was the male-head that found
work erid, in both study areas, respondents reported that,
in general, men stood a better chance of finding work
than did women because these, al bei t limi ted, employment
opporortunities involved work that was socially defined as
'men's work' and included such tasks as, fixing fences,
building/repairing houses, well digging, rope-making, and
chopping wood,
In Ablosh, the income by these men from these tasks ranged
from 2-3 ETB per day. According to respondents, the daily
wage for these tasks was the same both before and during
the drought i although in real terms these wages were
ext remely low because of the hi gh pri ce of grai n. In
Gerbi, wages for these tasks fell from the pre-drought
level of ETB 3-4 to ETBl-2 per day.
Only two women respondents reported finding work during
the drought, both of these women lived in Ablosh, and in
both cases the women reported that they sometimes earned
food during the drought, usually 'injera', by coLl ec t t ng
fuel wood or fetching water for wealthier households in
the village.
Migration in search of work
Migratory searches for work during the drought was not
widel y report ed by respondent s in ei t her of the st udy
areas, but was more common in the lowland study. In the
highland study, only one man from one of the 16 middle
peasant households reported leaving the Village to find
work during the drought. This man left the village to work
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on his uncle's farm in Were Himeno awraja but, unable to
find work in his uncle's village because of' drought, he
returned to the village after only 1 week.
households
drought to
reported leaving
find work. Two
the village
of these 6
6 poor peasant
middle peasant
during the
men, bot h poor
In the lowland study, 2 men from 2 of the
households, and 4 men from 4 of the 25
peasants, went to Dessie. One of these respondents,
unable to find work in Dessie, returned to the Village
after ~nly 2 ~eeks; the second respondent stayed in Dessie
for just over 3 weeks, during which time he worked for
onIy 3 days.
The 4 middle peasant respondents were more successful.
Three of these respondents went to Djibouti and worked for
9 months on cattle ranches owned by the Af~r. The pay for
thi-s work was 160 ETB per month, plus food. The fourth
respondent went to the Awash valley and worked for 6
months on a cotton plantation, also owned by' an
plus
sending
Afar.
food.This respondent
Three of these
earned 120 ETB per month,
reported some4 respondent s
money back home to their families.
ranged from ETB50 to 100.
These remittances
However, these long distance migrations were expensive,
thus, the choice of where to migrate to was conditioned by
weal tho The 4 middl e peasant respondent S 311 report ed
that they were able to pay thet r expenses for these
distant migrations from
sales. The following
income earned through livestock
case studies illustrate the
different migration experiences of 2 of these men:
Ebrahim, a poor peasant, was a married man and had one
child. He left the village for Dessie in August 1984 to
find work. He had no reI at i ves in Dessi e and couldn' t
afford to pay for lodgings, so he had to sleep on the
streets. For the first 5 days he could find no work and
146
survi ved by begging. On the sixth day he found work in
Dessie market loading sacks of produce. The work was low-
paying manual labour, paid by the piece, and lasted for
only 3 days. He stayed in Dessie for a further 9 days
Defore returning to the village. During these 9 days he
was unable to find work and survived by begging and was
unable to bring anything back to the village for his
family.
Hassan, a middle peasant, was also married with 2 young
children. He had heard that work was plentiful in
Djibouti and decided to leave for Djibouti in early August
(1984), following ~he failed arrival of the kerempt
rains. He sold his only ox for 60 ETB, and one cow, the
last of his two cows, for 35 ETB and went to Bati to
arrange for an Afar guide to take him across the desert.
he left
to Bati he had to bribe 2 checkpo~n~ guards with
each to let ham .pass. On his second day in Bati
for Djibout1 with a group of around 30 men after
On route
10 ETE.
paying r he Afar gu i de a tee of 50 ETB. The journey
On his arrivalacross ~he desert took 12 days on foot.
in Djibouti the Afar guide got him work on his uncle's
ranch for a fee of 10 ETE. From his first month's wage
of 160 ETB he sent his wife 100 ETB. Worried that his
wife might not get the money he decided not to send any
more money. He returned to the village -the following .June
and bought a pair of oxen wi th the money he'd saved in
Djibouti and was able to plant a meher crop.
Labour migrations out of farming areas are often cited as
a cause of food insecurity (e. g. O'Brien, 1985, and
1986;). Commentators (e. g. Hussein, 1974;) on the Wallo
famine of 1972-73 also sought to explain the cause of that
famine in terms of the development of a seasonal migratory
labour force in Wollo throughout the 1960s. The evidence
from the case st udy areas does not reveal that seasonal
labour migrations was as common in the study areas as in
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northern and western Wallo before the famine. However,
the evidence presented here also shows that labour
migrat ions can also be a means of survi val and, thus,
should not be seen simply in terms of impoverishment.
Food for Work
Only 4 of the sample households
employed on a
famine. Three of
reported having a
food-far-work CFFW)
these were in Gerbi
household member
proj ect dur i ng the
and o~e was in Ablosh. Of three repondents in Gerbi, two
of these were the two forestry guards discussed above who
were already employed on a FFliJ project, one, according to
survey informants, was a relative of one of the PA
committee members. However, the project, a road
construction project set up by World Vision (an American
Baptist IV!iss~on) only began in mid':"'1985 by whf ch time
most, i1 not all, of the respondents had already
registered for food aid, thus, it is possible t-he t people
dintn't register for the FFW project because of the
availability of this alternative source of food aid.
111.6 FUEL WOOD SALES
In both study areas, fuel wood sales during the drought
were common among poor, middle, and non-peasant
househol ds. The 2 poor peasant househol d respondent sin
the highland study, and the 6 poor peasant household
respondents in the lowland study, all reported selling
fuel wood on a regular basis to generate cash before the
drought. All of these househol ds report ed that fuel wood
sales was their main source of income during the drought.
Twelve of the 16 middle peasant households in the highland
study, reported that they sold fuel wood during the
drought j and 19 of the 25 middle peasant households in the
lowland study reported selling fuel wood during the
drought. None of these households sold fuel wood before
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the drought; thus,
drought represented
these fuel wood sales during the
the forced adoption by these
households of an alternative source of income. The 2 non-
peasant households in the lowland study also reported
selling fuel wood both before, and during, the drought.
Holt (cited in de Weal 1991) reports that in Wollo the
pri ce of fuel wood fell by mol"e than hal f during the
drought due to increased suppl y and fall ing demand. The
same decline was reported by respondents in the case
study'.areas.. In both study areas, respondents reported
that fuel wood sold for between 3-4 ETB per bundle before
the drought. During the drought, a bundl e of fuel wood
sold for between 1-2 ETB.
In both study areas the gathering and sale of fuel wood
was normal I y done by women end chaLor e ri. . inl.s di vi s aon 01
labour was blurred during the drought es men jOJ.ned women
and children a n this task. In Ab Loeh . t.he number of
household members that sold fuel wood in the 2 poor
peasant households during the drought 'averaged 2; the
number of household members that sold fuel during the
drought in the 12 middle peasant households averaged 2,
ranging tram 1 to 4 members per household.
In Gerbi, the number of household members that sold fuel
wood in the 6 poor peasant households during the drought
ranged from 2 to 3 members per household. The number of
household members that sold fuel wood during the drought
in the 19 middle peasant households averaged 2.6, ranging
from 1 to 4 members per household. In each of the 2 non-
peasant househol ds, two house:hol d members sol d fuel
wood during the drought.
The aduLt
intensively
members of these households
to counter the lowered market
had to work
price and high
grain prices. The 2 poor peasant households in Ablosh, and
the 6 poor peasant households in Gerbi, all reported that
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t he amount of fuel wood coL'lec ted per eduLt member each
day during the drought was increased from 1 to 2
bundles. The income earned from these fuel wood sales
per household ranged from 1-12 ETB per day.
This gathering and sale of fuel wood was an arduous task.
The amount of time spent gathering fuel wood by these men,
women, and children, ranged from 3 to 5 hours per person
per day in Ablosh, and from 4- to 5 hours per person per
day in Gerbi. Respondents in Ablosh reported that they
sold -fuel wood in variouS lowland markets, including,
Morkoy, Harbu, and Kemisse.
these lowland markets took
Transporting fuel wood to
from between 2 to 4 hours on
foot. In Gerbi, fuel wood was also sold in Kemisse and
markets to the lowland
the closer proximity of these
case study area meant that
Har bu market s. However,
transporting fuel wood to ;;hese markets took less t.ime.
from between 1 to 2 hours.
Por those households owning pack animals the task' of
gathering and transporting fuel wood to markets was made
less arduous. However, only a minimal number of these
households owned pack animals. In Ablosh, only 2 of the
12 middle peasant households, and only 1
peasant househol ds , were 1eft wi t-h a
Si mil a r 1y, 1n Ger b i , o riLy 4- of t he 19
households owned a pack animal; none of
of the 2 poor
pack animal.
m; ddl e peasant
the 6 poor
peasant householdS,
and neither of the 2 non-peasant
households owned pack animals.
The long term effect of these fuel wood sales during the
drought for forestry resources is difficult to know in
quantitative terms as a result of the lack of localized
studies on forestry resources in the case study areas.
However, in nei t he r of the st udy areas was short age of
fuel wood reported as being a problem by respondents. At
the same time, however, 11 (16.6%) of the 66 women
respondents in the lowland study, end 4 (13.3) of the 30
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women respondents in the highland study, reported having
to walk further to gather fuel wood since the drought.
Deforestation in Wallo, and in Ethiopia generally, is
often mistakenly understood as being due to population
expansion only. _ This single explanation for the observed
reduction in forestry resources has prompted certain
policy solutions incl uding, population stabilization,
1and enc 1osure, restricting 'peoples access to existing
and newly planted forests, the alienation of arable land
for reafforestation schemes; and resettlement. (see, e. g. ,
ADB/ECA,
Constable,
and 1988;)
191:18; .Belshaw, 1987, and 1989;
1984j FAO 1986; FAO/UNDP 1988;
Berhan,
Hurni,
1989;
1987,
The findings presented here, and our discussion on fuel
wood sales in Chapter II, highlight t ne importance of
fuel wood as Cl cash crop both in normal years and in times
of stress. Thus, where deforestation is a problem in Wollo
the causes are multiple and need to be addressed within
the context of
to
the lack of alternative
defici ts.
income
land
off-set
closures
food
and
Policiesopportunities
emphasizing the restriction of
peopl el s access t a forest ry resources,
the si t uat ion of the poorer communit y
unlikely to succeed in their objectives.
wi 11 onl y worsen
members and are
111.7 SALE OF OTHERCASH CROPS
Some respondent s were able co generat e cash during the
drought from sell ing ot her cash crops, ine 1uding t obaceo
and' chat' (a plant indigenous to Ethiopia that contains a
mild stimulant). Tobacco was more commonly sold by rich
peasant respondents and was Cl 1uerat i ve cash crop during
the drought. In both study areas, resp::mdents reported
that the price of tobacco remained stable during the
drought. Before the drought, tobecco sold for 4-0 ETB
per bundle during January-February, i. e. post harvest, and
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for 600 ETB per bundle during September. All 5 of the
rich peasant households in the highland study, and 15 of
the 17 rich peasant households in the lowland study.
reported that they sold tobacco during the drought to
•big merchants' from Dessie at 600 ETB per bundle. In
all of these cases these respondents had tobacco stored
from previous years' harvest s and report ed sell ing
tobacco during the drought to generate cash for livestock
repurchases after the drought.
One of the middle peasant household respondents also sold
tobacco during the drought. This respondent grew
tobacco bet-ore the drought but reported that because of
the high labour demand of this crop, he could only grow
small amounts. During the drought he had just over half
a bundle of t obe.c co which he had storea from previous
years' harvests. To make up the bundle, he sold his 2
cows and with this cash bought small amounts of tobacco
from other villagers. He sold this bundle of tobacco to
a •big merchant· from Dessie for 600 ETB. Wi th the cash
from this sale he was able to continue buying and selling
tobacco throughout the drought at a profit of 200 ETB per
bundle sold.
Chat, a plant indigenous to Ethiopia contains a mild
stimulant and is widely used for reIigi ous purposes, but
is also commonly used as a means of stavi~g off hunger
pangs. In both study areas, respondent s report ed that
chat was expensive during the drought. Before the drought
a bundle of chat sold for less than 1 ETBj during the
drought the price per bundle was from 1-2 ETB. Two
middle peasant respondents in the lowland study reported
that they bought chat in small amounts from surrounding
villages and sold it in local market towns for 2 ETB
per bundle. The profit per bundle was 1 STB.
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I11.8 SALE OF HOUSEHOLD, FARMING, AND PERSONAL ASSETS
As shown in Table III,9, below, in both study areas s a.l e
of household and personal assets, such as clothing.
during' the
respondents.
drought was common among poor peasant
The type of household assets sold by these
respondent s incl uded wat er carriers, cook i ng pot s, end
co f fee pot s. Three of the 6 poor peasent households in
the lowland study elsa reported selling farming equipment
during the drought including, sickles. knives, and rope,
" Table III, 9
Sale of Hcusehol d, Farming, and Personal, Assets
During the Drought. I (Number of Households)
Household
Assets
Farm
Equipment
%
Personal
Items
%
Ablosh p,~
Rich
Middle
Poor 2 100
3 ,19
2 100 2 100
Gerbi FA
Rich
Middle
Poor
Non-peasant
6 100
7 28
3 100 6 100
I Excludes women-headed households
The sale of these household and farming assets by these
households meant a loss of crucial means of consumption
and means of product ion, Both of the poor peasant
respondents, and 3 of the 16 middle peasant households in
Ablosh, and all 6 poor peasant respondents, and 7 of the
25 middle peasant households in Gerbi, also sold
sickles, knives, and rope during the drought. 25 middle
153
peasant households in Gerbi, also sold si ckles, kni ves,
and rope during the drought.
111.9 SOCIAL SUPPORT MECHANISMS
Within the literature on famine there is an on-going
sharing wi thi ndebate over the nature and extent of
communities during times of stress. Part of the debate
centres on whether communities, or even relatives, share
or do not s.hare food and other resources, such as cash,
during famines. Evidence has been supplied to support
both sides of the argument. (e. g. Pankhurst, 1985;
Rahmato, 1987, and 1992; Vaughan, 1987; Shipton, 1990;
Webb, et. 19.1., 1992; and Webb, 1993.) In the case study
areas, sharing food was more widely reported by
respondents than cash loans. Cash loans and the extent
of borrowing in the study areas are discussed below.
Sharing Food
The extent of food sharing during the drought as reported
by respondent s in each of the st udy areas is shown in
Table III. 10. The .data refer to food shared in both
senses of receiving and giving food. What th~ Table
shows, first, is that in both of the study areas
sharing food was more cornmori among the middle peasant
respondent s.
Among middle pea.sant respondents in the Ablosh, 37%
of these respondents reported sharing food during the
drought. In Gerbi, 24% of the middle peasant
respondents reported sharing food during ~he drought.
In cant r-es t , none of the rich peasant respondent s in
Ablosh and only 6% of the rich peasant respondents in
Gerbi reported sharing food during the drought. This was
despi t e the fact that all of these ri ch peasant
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respondents reported having more than sufficient food to
survive the drought.
Among poor peasant respondent sin Gerbi, 17% of these
respondents reported sharing food during the drought.
None of the poor peasant respondents in Ablosh, and none
of the non-peasant respondents in Gerbi
food during the drought.
reported sharing.
Table III. 10
Food Sharing During the Drought as Reported by
Respo~dents irithe Case Study Areas. I
(Number of households)
Gave tood
to others
%
Received
food from
others
%
Neither gavel
received food
%
Ablosh PA
Rich
Middle
Poor
1 6 5 31
5
10
2
100
63
100
Gerbi PA
Rich
Middle
1
2
6
8 4 16
17
16
19
5
2
94
76
83
100
Poor
Non-peasant -
1 Excluding women-headed households
As shown in the following case studies, in all reported
instances of food sharing, the sharing of food was
restricted to sharing between relatives. The form in which
food was shared, however, varied from gi ft s of unprocessed
grain to the sharing of cooked meals and/or other
processed foods, such as in j era.
Among the middle peasant respondents in Gerbi that
reported sharing food during the drought, 2 middle peasant
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respondents (8%) reported sharing food with relatives, and
4 middle peasant respondents (16%) reported receiving
food from relatives. In Ablosh, one middle peasant
and 5 middle peasant respondents
from reIatives. In all
<31 %)
relat ives,
reported
r e.sspcnderi t (6%) reported sharing food with
receiving food
the shared food
of these cases
was in the form of cooked food.
In the case of the three respondents that shared food with
all three of these respondents reported
injera, and sometimes cooked meals, with their
relat ~ves,
sharing
parents when they could. In all of these cases the
.parents were elderly and lived in the village.
Sharing cooked food was not restricted to sharing between
relatives living in the same Village, however. The 9
middle peasant households that reported receiving food
from relatives, received food from relatives living
elsewhere. In all of these cases the households split-
up, with women and children returning to the wife's
natal Village to stay with the wife's parents, while the
men stayed behind. The decisive factor influencing the
decision for these households to split along these gender
lines as reported by respondents was the nature of land
rights which were vested in men, combined with insecurity
of land tenure. In all of these cases these male
respondents reported fear of landholdings being 'taken' by
the PA during their absence as the main reason for staying
behind.
In the case of these women migrants, these women had an
average of 3 children between them, ranging from 1 to 5
children per woman, and these return visits to their natal
villages involved the women walking, with their children,
over long distances and over often difficult terrain. The
reported number of hours' spent walking t a these nat81
Villages by these women and children ranged from 4- to 9
hours' .
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While all of these women respondents
food and shelter from their parents
reported receiving
(thus, the help
received from relatives by these respondent s was not
simply in the form. of food), none of these women
in their natal villages for longer than a month,
stayed
In all
of these cases, these women respondents reported being
forced to return to their own villages because of drought
and food shortages in their natal villages and because
parents were unable to support them, The reported number
of weeks' these women respondents stayed with their
parents before returning with their children to their own
Villages ranged from 2 to 4 weeks' .
Among rich peasant respondents in Gerbi, only one rich
peasant respondent reported sharing food with a relative;
16 rich peasant respondent.s (94%) reported that they
during
shared food,
the famine. In
nor received food from others,
peasant
shared
nei t her-
Ablosh, all 5 rich
respondents <100%) report ed that they neither
food, nor received food tram others, during the famine.
In all cases where rich peasant respondents reported not
sharing food, all of these respondents reported that they
would have shared food with relatives if relatives had
'asked' for help.
In the case of the rich peasant respondent in Gerbi who
reported sharing food during the drought, this respondent
shared rood with a married son who lived in the village.
The respondent reported that he gave the son 3 qtls. of
maize over a three-month period. According to the
respondent, the maize was given to the son as a 'gift',
not a loan.
None of the poor peasant respondents in the study areas
reported sharing food with others during the famine. In
both study areas, all poor peasant respondent s report ed
that they were unable to help anyone but their own house-
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hold. In Ablosh, none of t he poor peasant respondent s
received food from others during the famine, and only one
poor peasant respondent (17%) reported receiving food in
Gel"bi. In the 1at t er t hi s respondent report ed recei ving
12 kgms. of' mei ze from his son-in-law who lived in a
village some two hours' walking distance away. This maize
was also given as a 'gift', not as a loan. However, this
was a one time only 'gift' of food. According to the
res porrderrt , . his son-in-law could not afford to share food
a second time because the son-in-law was 'too poor'.
It has been suggested that families in Ethiopia survive
long periods of hardship because of community support
food (and
which enable poorer
other resources)
cornmuni t Y members 't a sha!-e
with wealthier households
mechanisms
(Rahmato, 1988, and 1992). This argument clearly did rio t .
tit the s1tuation in the areas under study.
None of the rich peasant respondents in either of the
study. areas reported sharing food with poorer community
members outside of the family, and none of the poorer
respondents in the study areas reported receiving food
from wealthier community members outside of the family.
This was despite the fact that in both study areas rich
peasant respondent s all report ed having more than
sufficient food stocks to survive the drought.
I n bot h st udy areas, food sharing was restricted to
sharing between relatives. However, the evidence presented
here also shows that food sharing between relatives was
dependent on the ability of relatives to share and, thus,
indicates the need for caution in assuming that kinship
ties automatically act as a buffer during times of stress
(e. g. Iliffe, 1987; Hyden, 1980, 1983, 1986, and 1987).
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Borrowing and Lending
Table III. 11
Borrowing and Lending in the Study Areas
During the Drought. 1 (Numberof households>
Loaned
Grain
Loaned
Cash
Borrowed
Grain
Borrowed
Cash
% %
Abloosh PA
Rich
1l1iddle
Poor
2 40
6 2 13
Gerbi PA
Rich
Middle
Poor
Non-peasant
2 12 6 35
1 4 3 12
1 Excluding women-headed households
Where it was di f i i cult to find access t, 0 shared resources,
some households resorted to borrowing. None of the
respondents in the study areas had access to formal means
of credit during the drought, and none of the respondents
reported having a bank account or being a member of a
community based savings scheme. In both study areas the
main source of credit during the drought reported by
respondents was 'rich' farmers.
Credit during the drought was in the form of grain or cash
loans. The extent of borrowing and lending in the study
areas during the drought is shown in Table IIr. 11, above.
What the Table shows, first, is that in both study areas
only a small number of respondents had access to credit
during the drought. None of the poor peasant, and none of
159
non-peasant, respondents in the st udy areas had access
tocredi t. On Iy 3 of the middle peasant respondents <19%)
in Ablosh, and only 4 of the middle peasant respondents
(12%) in Gerbi, reported borrowing during the drought.
Of these 7 middle peasant respondents that received credit
during the drought, only one of these respondents reported
receiving an interest free cash loan of ETH. Birr 20 from
a 'friend' This respondent was in Ablosh. The remaining
6 respondents that received credit (86%), received loans
from 'rich farmers' living in the village. As shown in
the following case studies, none of these loans were
Of the 2 respondents in Ablosh that received c red i t : one
of these respondents reported borrowing 2 qtIs. 0 f ma i z e
from a 'rich farmer' and repaying the f armer 3~ qt 1s. OT-
maize. Thus, the interest rate on this loan was 75%. The
-,
second respondent reported receiving a cash loan of ETH.
Birr 75 f rom a 'rich farmer' and repaying the farmer
ETH. Bi rr 130. Thus, the rat e of interest on this loan was
73%.
Of the 4 respondents in Gerbi that received credit, 3 of
these respondents recei ved cash loans, and one respondent
reported borrowing grain. All of these respondents
reported borrowing from' rich farmers' in the village. Of
the 3 respondent s that report ed borrowing cash, one of
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these respondents borrowed ETH. Birr 40, one borrowed ETH.
Birr 50, and one borrowed ETH. Birr 100. The reported
repayments on these loans were, respectively, ETH. Birr
80, ETH. Birr 75, and ETH.Birr 175. Thus, the rates of
int erest on these loans ranged from 50 to 100 per cent.
The one respondent that borrowed grain, reported
borrowing 1~ qtls. of maize from a 'rich farmer' and
repaying the farmer 2~ qtls. of maize. Thus, the rate of
.,
interest on this loan was 67%.
None of the rich peasant respondents in the s. t udy areas
reported borrowing during the drought. However, 10 of the
rich peesant respondents repor~ed giving credit during the
drought. All· at these Loarrss were to non-kin. In Gerbi J 8
r I ch peasant responC!-ents (47%) reported giving credit to
non-kin during the drought. Two of these respondents
reported lending grain, and 6 of these respondents
reported lending cash. In Ablosh, 2 of the rich peasant
respondents (40%) reported making cash loans to non-kin
during the drought.
Despite the fact that only one of the 7 respondents that
reported receiving credit during the drought received an
interest free loan, all of the respondents that reported
receiving credit and paying interest insisted that usury
was prohibited under Islamic law and denied paying
interest. In all of these cases the respondents referred
to the interest paid as a 'gift from Allah'. Similarly.
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the 10 rich peasant respondents that reported giving
credi t during the drought all denied charging int erest.
Rather, all of these respondents referred to the interest
received on these loans as 'a gift provided by Allah'
arranged with the wealthier peasant s.
areas only a very
to credi t during
these loans were
In~erest rates on
These findings show that in both study
small number of respondents had access
the drought. Eighty-six per cent of
loans ranged from 50 to 100 per cent, payable in cash or
kind. The interest rates reported in the case study areas
were much lower than interest rates report ed elsewhere
in Ethiopia Ce. g. Webb, 0993: 41) reports interest rates
of between 50 and 300 per cent for survey sites in Shoa,
Arsi, Sidamo, Gemu Goffa, and Hararghe); nevertheless,
that so few respondents had access to credit during the
drought indicates that the terms of credit . were
prohi bi t i ve. It is also unl ikel y t he t poor peasant
respondents had 'the collateral to enable t hem to access
credit. Hussein (1974), makes this' pcint about "the
Ethiopian famine of the early 1970s. Loans became tighter
as lenders began to demand sureties.
III. 10 EATINGWILDFOODS, ANDREDUCINGFOODCONSUMPTION
Eating Wild Foods.
In both study areas eating wild foods during the drought
was common among poor and middle peesan1:. respondents.
Among the wi1d foods consumed by respondent s in the
case study areas were , a type of 'wild cabbage' which
was boiled and made into a type of broth; and the
, frui ts' (berries) of a plant known locally as 'Aluma'.
The • fruits' of the 'Aluma' plant had first to be dried
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bef ore being ground and made i nt 0 a type of bread. Other
wild foods reported by respondents were the seeds of
a plant known locally as 'Asenameeka', and the 'fruits'
(berries) of the Shola tree. The 'Asenameeka' seeds,
although bitter, have a taste similar to coffee and were
used to make a drink which respondents called' poor man's
coffee' The' frui ts' Cberries) of the Shola tree were
either eaten ~n their raw form as berries or were mashed
into a pulp and used as a thickener for broths. The
gathering and processing
done by w.omen.
of these wild food plants was
however, as we oes cr abed in Chapter II, these wild foods
are ot ten supplementary foods, especially for the poorer
members 01 the community and should not be seen simply
as 'f amin e ' foods ( See al so, FI euret, 1986) . The
ext ent to which these forage foods were consumed by
respondents during the drought and in 'normal' times is
shown in Table III. 12, below. What the Table shows,
first, is that in both study areas all the poor and
middle peasant respondents reported eating wild foods
both during the drought and in , normal' years. None
of the rich peasant respondents in the study areas
reported eating wild foods either during the drought or in
, normal' times.
In both study areas, middle peasant respondents all
reported eating wild foods when food was short during the
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pre-harvest period to supplement dwindling food reserves.
In contrast, poor peasant respondents all reported that
they always ate wild foods as part of their normal diet.
Table III, 12
Eating Wild Food Plants During the Drought and in 'Normal'
Years', by Peasant Stratum, end by Study Ar'ea,1
(Number of Households>
During the
Famine
%
Ablosh Pa
Rich
Middle 16 100
Poor 2 100
Gerbi PA
Rich
Middle 25 100
Poor 6 100
During 'Normal'Years'
Sometimes Always
% %
16 100
2 100
25 100
6 100
1 Excluding women-headed households
Reducing Food Consumgtion
Reducing food consumption during the famine was reported
by respondent s in both study areas, Reductions in food
consumpt i on ranged from reducing the quantity of food
consumed per meal to going without food at all for several
days. Reduct ions in food consumpt ion during the famine,
by peasant stratum, and by study area is shown in Table
III. 13. However, reducing food consumption was often
graduated and intermittent. Thus, the data here refer to
the most extreme reduction in food consumption reported by
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respondent s.
Table III. 13
,Reductions in food consumption during the famine,
by peasant Stratum, and by study area.1
(Number of Households)
Reduced the Reduced no. Went without
quantity of of meals food for more
food per meal per day than one day
% % %
Ablosh Pa
Rich
Middle
Poor
2 13 11 69
Gerbi PA
R1Ch
Middle
Poor
4 16 17 68
2 33
1 Excluding women-headed households
As can be seen from the above Table, in both st udy areas
reducing food consumption during the famine was common
among poor and middle peasant respondent 5, none of the
rich peasant respondents in the study areas reported
reducing their food intake.
The most extreme cases of reduced food consumption were
reported by poor peasant households. In Gerbi, reported
reductions in food consumption among poor peasant
respondents ranged from eating less than 2 meals per day,
1 household (17%), eating less than 1 meal per day, 3
households (50%), and going wi thout food at all f o, more
than 1 day, 2 households (33%). Of the 2 poor peasant
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househol ds t hat went without food, one househol d report ed
eat ing no food at all f or up to 2 days', and one househol d
this method of dealing with food shortage
Again,
clearly
reported eating no food at all for up to 3 days'
represent s severe hardshi p and a lack of al t ernat ives,
rather than 'coping'.
Of those respondents that reported eating less than one
meal a day the range of foods consumed by these
respondents during these times included, plant roots
2 poorand(or berries. In the highland study the
peasant households reported eating less than one meal a
oay .. Both of these households e I so report ed eat ing
berr~es and plant roota at that time.
Red-uctions in food
respondent s ranged
consumption among middle peasant
from reducing the quantity of food
per meal to eating less than one meal a day. In Ablosh, 2
of the 16 middle peasant households reported reducing the
quant it Y of food per meal; 11 households reduced the
number of meals per day; and 3 households consumed less
than 2 meal s per day. Of the 25 middl e peasant households
in Gerbi, 4 of these households reduced the quantity of
food per meal; 17 househol ds reduced the number of meal s
per day, and 4 households
day.
consumed less than 2 meals per
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Consumpt i on of seed stocks was al so common among poor
peasant households. The 2 poor peasant households in the
Gerbi, and the 6 poor peasant households in the highland
study, all reported that they ate their seed stocks during
the drought. All of these households faced the problem of
replacing seed when the 1985 belg rains returned. None of
the respondents reported receiving seed in the form of aid
after the drought, although 2 of these households reported
that they purchased very small amounts of seed with cash
earned from selling some of their food aid ration. Six of
these 8 households reported needing their food aid to eat
and that they had to borrow seed from the , rich'
peasant s.
According to informants, in early 1985, a quintal <100kgs)
of sorghum seed was selling at ETB 200 per quintal, Thus,
to replace seed in a sufficient amount to sow 1 timad
<roughly a quarter of a hectare) would require half-a-
quintal of seed (see Chapter II) and would cost -,around
ETB 100. In bot h st udy areas respondent s report ect that
what aid in the form of seeds was allocated went to the PA
leaders and to their kin.
below. )
(See discussion on Food Aid
III. 11 WOMENANDDROUGHT
Ten of the household samples in Gerbi, and 4 of the
household samples in Ablosh, were headed by women during
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the drought. Of these 14 women, only 2 women, had land.
None of the women owned livestock. The options open to
these women during the drought were limited, as the
following case studies illustrate. First, we describe the
ways in which these women secured their subsistence before
t he drought.
Livelihood strategies before the drought
Of the 4- women in the highland st udy , 2 of these women
were poor peasants, and 2 women were landless. The 2 poor
peasant women, Amna, and RaI ima, were bot h wi dows before
the drought. Bo~h of these women had children living with
them during the drought. Amna had one child, a 5 year
old daughter; and Ralima had 3 children, 2 daughters and
one son, ranging from 3 to 6 years of age. Before the
small gardens surrounding
vegetables and pulses in the
their homesteads. At the
drought, these 2 women grew
beginning o f t he drought year (i. e. 1984) Amna had 1 qt 1.
of pulses from the previous year1s harvest; Ralima had 50
kgs. of pulses from the previous year's harvest. Both of
the women also brewed beer (Tala) which they sold in the
village and in local markets. The two women financed the
making of beer by selling part of their crop. During the
drought neither of the women could afford to finance the
making of • Tal a I due tot he
fall in demand for beer.
high grain prices and the
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The 2 landless women in the highland study, were both
divorcees. One of these women, Fatima, had one child
living with her during the drought, a daughter, about 18
months 01 d ; t he second divorcee, Sophia, an elder1y woman,
1ived alone. Before the drought, Fatima earned her
livelihood by working for wealthier households in the
village either on their farms for a crop share, or
collecting fuel wood and fetching water. She also earned
cash sexual favours. During the drought a few of her
'men friends' continued to visit, but these visits were
infrequent and the men could not afford to pay very much.
Sophia also worked for wealthier households in the Village
before the drought, either on their farms for a crop
share, or collecting fuel wood and fetch1ns water.
In Gerbi,
landless.
drought.
7 of the 10 women-headed households were
All of these 7 women were divorced before the
The average size of these households during the
drought was 3, ranging from i' to 4. The average number of
children these 7 women had between them during the drought
was 1.8, ranging from 0 to 3 children per household.
of these households contained more than one adult.
None
Before the drought, these 7 women all earned their
1ivelihoods by daily wage labouring on the farms of
wealthier households in the village, and by selling fuel
wood. Two of the women also earned income in the village
by plaiting hair.
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Three of these 10 women heads of households were married
at the on-set of the drought and report ed working on
their husbands farms before the drought. During the
drought the husbands of these 3 women all mi grated in
search of work and never returned to the village. Two of
these men went to work on the coffee plantations in the
south-west of the country, and one man went to 'work on the
cotton plantations in the Awash Valley.
All 3 women report ed that they received no remit t ances
from thei t: husbands during the dr ought, and 2 of the
women reported learning after the drought tha~ their
husbands had remarr~ea. The third woman r eport ed that she
didn't know what had happened 'toher husband. The number
of children these 3 women had living with them during the
drought averaged 2, ranging from 1 to 3 children per
woman.
,
Responses
In both study areas, all of these women respondents
reported fuel wood sales as their main source of income
during the drought. The low market price and the high
price of grain meant that the women had to work
intensively in an attempt to secure their subsistence. Of
these 14 women, 13 women reported collecting 2 bundles
of fuel wood per day! And, none of the women had access
to a pack animal.
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One of the woman, in Ablosh, Sophia, an elderly divorcee,
reported that she could only collect one bundle per day
because she was too 'old and tired'. The income earned
by these women from fuel wood sal es ranged from 1-4- ETB
per day.
Some of the women, 3 of the 4- women in Ablosh, and 3 at'
the 10 women in Gerbbi, reported that ..hey sometimes
earned dur~3. n8 the drought, mainly , injera' , by
collecting fuel wood and fetching water for wealthier
households in the village .
On I y one of t. he 4-
di vorcee, and only
. women in Ablosh, Sophae , the elder-ly
3 of the 10 women in Garbi, reported
drought.
food from a relative in the village during the
Three of the 10 women in the lowland study
rece:t.v:t.ng
reported that thei I" relat i ves were 'too poor'
food with them during the drought.
to share
All of the 4- women respondents in Ablosh, and all of the
10 women respondent s in Gerbi, reported eating wild
plants during the drought. The 2 peasant women in the
highland study, Amna, and Ralima, also reported eating
As with the poorthei r seed st ock duri ng t he drought.
mal e peasant respondent s di scussed above, these women also
reported that they were able to buy a small amount of seed
by selling some of their food aid ration.
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Cutting back on consumption during the drought was
reported by all 4 women in Ablosh, and by all 10 women
in Gerbi. Three of the 4 women in AbLoeh, and all of the
10 women in the lowland study reported cutting back to one
meal per day. Two of the women in Ablosh, and 7 of the
women in Gerbi reported going without food themselves for
up to 2 to 3
chi Idren.
days so as to be able to feed their
The
had very much in
commonly reported
the way of assets toNone of these women
sell. most assets sold
were
household assets, followed by wood from houses. Two of
the 4 women in Ablosh. and 9 of the 10 women .an Gero1,
reported selling water carriers, cooking pot, and coffee
pots. The 1ass of these asset s meant t he 1ass tot hese
women of their means of consumption. For the 2 peasant
women in Ablosh, the sale of these assets also meant the
loss of their future means of production, as these pots
were also essenti~l for brewing beer. One of the women
in Ablosh, and 8 of the women in Gerbi,
selling the wood from their houses.
also reported
Zumra, one of the 10 women respondents in Gerbi also
reported selling one of the two dresses she owned. This
dress was her , good' dress which she only wore for
weddings and other fest i ve occasions. Aft er selling the
she stopped going to weddings because she was 'too
ashamed' .
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These women and their children were among those to be
found
Irish NGO) in
feeding shel t er
1at e October,
set up
early
by CONCERN (an
November, 1984.
in Harbu
Tragically, one of the women in Ablosh, Fatima, reported
that her 18 month old daughter died, and a further 3 women
in Gerbi, also reported child deaths during the famine.
Two of these women had two children and each woman
reported that one of their two children died. The third
woman report that both of her two children died. In all
of the cases the children died while in the feeding centre
in Harbu.
Sevel- al studies on famine in Africa present evidence oi
an increase in the breakdown of marriages during famines.
Vaughan (1987: 34) , for instance, reports that. some
matrilineal Malawians called 1949, the famine year many
husbands left home, the year of I many di vorces' .
Pankhurst (1984), makes the same point about the increased
abandonment of women during the Gre~t Ethiopian Famine of
1892. In contrast, Rahmato <1987, and 1992;) argues
that there is no evidence to support claims of marital
breakdowns in Wallo during the famine of 1984-85.
The
did
findings presented here
break down in Wallo
clearly show t ha t marri ages
during the 1984-85 famine.
However, whether or not marital breakdowns increased in
the case study areas during the drought is di fficul t to
ascertain, partly because of the smallness of the sample,
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and part ly because of the high frequency of divorce in
normal times.
Nevertheless, as we discussed in Chapter
poverty and thus vulnerability of these
II, the general
divorced women
heads of households needs to be seen within the context of
the nature of the prevailing gender relations within
marriage and the gender property rights on divorce.
I I 1. 12 FOODAI D
Food aid in the form of external rations and, as we have
seen, t. a Cl. 1esser ex t ent FFW opport uni ties, were of
crucial importance to most of,the villagers, and there is
no doubt that it saved many lives. However, the general
poliCY of Making PA chalrmen responslble 10r ~he selectl0n
process mean~ that although many people registered for
food aid were clearly in need, many were not.
The tendency, moreover, was double registerlng. In both
study areas, all of the respondents reported that they
were regist,ered with both the RRC and CONCERN. and, as
discussed above, 4 of the respondents were engaged in FFW
projects with World Vision; 2 of these respondents were
also employed in the Ministry of Agriculture conservation
project.
Crucially, a complaint voiced by informants in both study
areas was that people were forced to give a share of their
ration to the PA leaders if they were to be included in
the registration. One woman informant in Gerbi, for
example, r-epor t.ed that she had to gi ve up hal f of her
rat ion. The borrowing of chi 1dren from poorer households
in order to be able to register for food aid was reported
as common in both study areas,
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Food aid distributions continued throughout the first half
of 1985 and,
the benefits
as we have seen, for some of t.he respondents
of food aid extended beyond immediate food
thereby
drought.
replace
the case for those households described
abl e to buy small amounts of seeds from
selling some of their food ration and
some of their s8eds consumed during the
needs. Thi s was
above who were
cash earned by
111.13 RESETTLEMENT
An estimated 376,298 ,Wolloans (Si vini, 1986) were
on the actual number
during the
during the
I, ) WhiIe
of people
'Derg's' resettlement
we have no figures
campaign
of the country
December 1985
<See Chept'er
r es et tIed in the sout h-west
period November 1984 to end
resettled from the case study areas throu3hou~ this
period, respondents in both study areas reperted that
, many I peopl e reset t 1ed dur ing t he dr-ought. I n bot h
study areas, the PA' committee \.-Vas responsible for the
respondents
I br Lbe' the
of resettlers and a frequent complaint made by
in both stud)' areas was that people had to
PA leaders, in order te avoid resettlement.
recruitment
The same complaints were made concerning conscription for
the' army,
WhiIe the evi denee present ed her e provi des no insight s
into the number of people that resettled voluntarily or
otherwise dur f.ng the drought from the case study areas,
our findings from the study areas do confirm claims that
not all resettlers resettled voluntarily.
In Gerbi, 4 respondents
of Kaffa
were l-eset tIed in the south-
western region during J'anuary 1985.
going voluntarily,
forcibly 'taken by
Two of
these respondents reported
respondent s reported being
while waiting for a food
and two
soldiers'
aid ration at a food aid
distribution centre in Her bu, Cl small roadside town,
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Both of the respondents that reported
the pr e+dr ough t
resettling
period. Thevol untar i 1Y, were landless in
promise of 'land and oxan ' in the new settlement areas was
reported by these respondents as the reason for
resettling. In both of these cases, only the husband arid
wife went to the ne w settlements, both. respondents
reported leaving their children with relatives with the
intention of returning for- the children when they were
settled.
The 2 respondents that reported being forcibly' taken by
soldiers' while waiting for their food aid rations were
both middle peasant respondents. In both of these cases
the respondents were married men with children, but the
men had gone alone to collect the food aid rations. The
wives of these two respondents both reported that it was
impossible to find out where their husbands had been taken
to, 'no one' would tell them 'anyt hing' .
In the highland study,
forcibly resettled.
the relatives of 2 respondents were
One of these r-3spondent s report ed
that his father, aieng ("Ji.th 'many' other men, was' taken
by sol diel-s' whi 1e at t ending a funeral. The second
respondent r e por t ed that his father was 'taken by
soldiers' whI Le waiting at a food distribution centre in
Kerm. sse town. In both of these cases the men were sent to
Illubabor in the south-west of the country.
III. 14 CONCLUSIONS ON PEOPLES ACTIONS DURING THE DROUGHT
AND THE OUTCOME OF THOSE ACTIONS
This chapter discussed the actions that people took, and
the outcome of those actions. during the drought and
famine of the rnid-1980s. We descr-ibed the ways 1n which
the different types and amounts of resources facing
people to begin with shaped their options and put people
in different survival camps. At the same time we showed
that the actions that people take places them in wholly
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new and irreversible situations and
options and strategies for survival.
shapes their future
In both s~udy areas, women-headed households were shown to
be the most vulnerable group. These women heads of
households possessed the least assets and were faced with
the least options. Aft er t he loss of human Iife, the most
terrible loss was the massive loss of livestock to the
poor and middle peasant households t hrougn forced animal
sal es. These animal sal es represented the Iass tot hese
households of their future means of survival.
After the drought these households had no oxen and also
lacked other types of animals. Thus, these households not
on1 y Iacked draught ani mals t or pLoughi ng, they al so had
no animals for sales, dairy products, and for transport.
In other words, these households found themselves in
wholly new and ir,evisible situations which shaped thel.X-
options for post-drought recovery and their future
strategl.es for survi val. That not ell of these
households were eble to rebuild ~heir berds af ter the
drought is discussed in Chapter II.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
INTROD UCTI ON
The focus of our research was ta seek answers ta the
following questions: Whet were the effects of the array
of forces at work on society on people's strategies for
survival? What strategies did people pursue during the
drought and famine of 1984/5, What was the end result of
those actions, and what were the consequences for
people's
feasible
ability to recover? And, finally, "what
opportunities exist for changing
of people
a situation
where inordinat ely
(J ayawardena, 1990:
numbers go hungry?"large
vii) In this concluding chapter we
first summarize our findings in the case study areas and
then focus on this policy question,
IV, 1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IN THE CASE STUDY AREAS
Contrary to the popular notion held by people like
Dessal egn Rahmato, <1984, 1988, 1991, 1992) for inst ance
_ the 1975 Land Reform did not equalize resources/incomes
within the rural communities researched.
di f f erent iat ion wi thin rural communi tI es.
There is still
Our detailed
discussion in Chapter II on resource distribu tion
clearly showed that the degree of differentiation in the
study areas was significant, The main source of
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di fferent ion, moreover, was not land but the ownership
and use of animals. The distribution of animals, and
oxen, in particular was shown to be highly skewed. Also,
most of those households without oxen, or with one ox,
were also wi thout other types of animals. Thus, these
households not only lacked draught animals for ploughing,
they also had no animals for sales, dairy product.s, and
for transport.
Further, those peasants wi thout oxen were dependent on
richer peasants for their
payments - excepting for
equally limited resources
access to oxen. These rental
ox sharing between people with
were in kind <grains) or in
labour. These payments in kind significantly redu.ced the
amount of food available to the poor peasant household,
while payments in labour could limit the amount of labour
available to the poor peasant houshold at crucial times
of the agricultural cycle
harvest. The tendency for
and negatively affect his
oxen owners, moreover,
naturally, to ensure that their own lands are ploughed on
time. This delay could mean that the poor peasant> s land
is not ploughed on time, delay the timing of planting,
reduce the amount of land cultivated,
affect his harvest.
and negatively
This unequal distribution of animals, and of oxen in
part i c uLar, enables the richer households to become
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richer and makes it difficult for the poorer households
to I take-off' from their poverty.
As our discussion, in Chapter II, on land distribution
also showed, Rahmato' s assumed equalisation of
landholdings in rural areas did not fit the sitution in
the st udy areas. Poorer members of the communi t y were
effectively excluded from accessing land as a result of
the PA 1eaders abuse of t hei r st at us· ana control over
land. With the exception of widows, women wer e a1so
excluded from access to land in their own right. For
some househol ds thi s inequal i t Y in the di st ri but i on of
animals and of land was ampllfiea by sho~tage =f la~our.
The point is that differentiation matters. It matt e r s
because the types oi, and amounts of t resources "hat
people have places them in di fferent survi val camps. As
we have seen in Chapt er I I I, di vorced women heads of
households v had few resources other than a few personal
possessions. During the drought, these women also had
few opt ions and were dependent on fuelwood sales which,
during the drought,
activities. These
was one of the least remunerative of
women and their children were among
those to be found in the CONCERNfeeding shelter in
Harbu. Four of these 14 women heads of households also
suffered the loss of their children.
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Chapter III also discussed the massive loss of
1ivestock to poor and middl e peasant households during
the drought through forced animal sales. These
respondents all reported the general shortage of oxen as
the main reason for leaving land idle when the 1985 belg
rains returned. After the drought, these households, not
only had no oxen for ploughing,
for sales, dairy products, and
they also had no animals
transport. That t.hese
households were virtually cleaned out during the drought
was because they had so few animals to begin with.
While the richer peasants also suffered the loss c f
animals these households all had lar-ge, ~!erds to begin
wi tho They also had stored wealth with which to replace
animals after the drought.
by McCann (1987: 256>
This same point Gas been made
"Available evidence strongly suggests that
the distribution of the effects of famine
closely parallels stratification and economic
vulnerability already present in northern
Ethiopia's rural society."
After the drought these poor and middle ?easant
households all faced the problem of how to get back
animals.
smaller
That none of these households had any of the
a.nima2.5, such as goat s, with their faster
reprodutive rates, meant that another type of survival
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st rategy, the repl enishment of herds, was no longer an
option from their own resources/income. Thus, these
households faced delays in rebuilding herds. That some
households had not yet rebuilt their herds since the
drought was discussed in chapter II.
IV.2 POLICY SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE FINDINGS
There is thiS argument that we need to understand t.he
causes of famine if we are to get the right policy.
However, as we have sought to emphasize here, after the
drought and famine people found themselves in wholly new
situations and were faced with a different set ot
opt ions, and unl ess we know the effects of, and the
outcome of. these differ-ent but interacting forces at
work on society then no one policy is likely to be the
right pol icy,
In this new pol icy environment emphasizing recovery,
regenera t i on promot ion,
is for polcies to be
and sustainability - the need
specifically designed to meet
the existing situation facing different categories of
people. New policies will fail if the existing situation
is not taken into account.
The suffering
thousands of
caused by the massive resettlement of
people during the Mengistu regime
demonstrates the terrible and often unintended effects of
182
policies when we don't understand the existing
situation. This policy was justified in terms of the
perceived environmental degradation of the northern
hi ghl ands. The argument was -tha t there is degradat ion of
the environment and that this degradation is irreversible
hence the number of people must be reduced, But this
is not necessarily the case. This is only looking at the
problem in terms of landuse, and not in human t.erms. This
simpl ist ic two-way population/environment carrying
capacity argument fails to consider the existing farming
system and the broader pol~tical economy and the
constraints on farming, or alternative techniques of
farming, are often not consid~red,
Thus, in contrast to this single, and
explanation for' food insecurity
areas, our discussion in Chapter II
often simplistic
in E;;hiopia's rural
indicates that the
more direct causes of 'food insecurity in the study areas
were lack of oxen for ploughing, and other types of
animals, shortage of labour, and lack of alternative
sources of income ta meet food def icit s . However - as we
sought to emphasize in both of the empirical chapters -
in both of the study areas there was a significant degree
of differentiation both within and between the different
household groupings in terms of people's accces to, and
cont rol over, these different resources. Thus, if
policies are to achieve their objectives the
constraints facing individuals and the
specifiC
different
household groupings need to be taken into accou~t.
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FOOTNOTES
The lower figure of 40,000 comes from the estimate of
'total deaths due to famine between 40,000 and
80,000', suggested by Miller and Holt (1975: 171>,
but refers primarily to the earl ier phase of the
f ami ne (i. e. 1972 - 3 ) . For the tot alp e rio d 1972- 5,
Ri vers, Hol t, Seeman, and Bowden (1976: 335)
estimate an 'an excess of a leest 100,000 deaths due
to starvation and associated diseases'. The higher
figure 'of 200,000 represents mortality estimates
presented in Shepherd (1975).
The main studies of the physical geography of
Ethiopia ere Mesfin Wolde Mariam, An Introductory
Geography of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 1970, by the
same aut.hor, An Atlas of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa,
.1985; 0; and G.C. Last, A Geosraphy of Ethiopia.
Addis Ababa, 1963.
3 Et hiopia. Populat ion Census, 1984
A few writers have recently argued that the history
of Ethiopia should begin with the lete 19th century,
implying that the country's history before 1900
refers to Abyssinia and not to Ethiopia. For
instance, Addis Hiwet (1975: 1) notes, "The deep-
seated myth that has for so long enshrined Ethiopia -
both the name and the country - still blurs senuine
historical understanding. Ethiopia's existence as a
, modern st at e' does not as the ideologist s of the
ancient regime cleim - extend be y ond the 19005.. ..
For a view that maintains that the names Ethiopia
and Abyssinia have been used
refer the highland kingdom see
(1969), and John Markakis (974).
inter-changeably to
Margery D. Perham
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s The majority of these conguests took place between
1875 and 1898. For a general description of them see
H.G. Marcus, 1975 The extent of destruction associ-
ated with the conquests varied with the resistance
offered. In Wollega where this was minimal little
destruction occurred, but in Kafa, for inst ance,
which rebelled against paying tribute the destruction
of life and property was great. For details of these
conq ue st e see Perham, 1969: 298-342; and Hiwet, 1975:
4-14
6 Detailed discussions of Ethiopia's complex
holding patterns are found in Markakis, 1974;
1974; Cohen and Weint raub, 1975; Donham,
Pankhurst 1.968; Bri et zeke, 1975; Desal egn
1984; Pankhurst, 1965; Pausewang, 1992.
land-
St ahl,
1985;
Rahmato,
For a det ai 1ed account.
Hoben, Land Tenure
of t.he rist. system see Allan
Among the Am.hara, Chicago:
University of
Mark ak is, 1974,
Weint raub, 1975;
Chicago
and 1977;
and Stahl
Press 1973. See
Cohen
also
'andPankhurst, 1968;
1974.
See, S.F. Nadel, 'Land Tenure on the Sritrean
Plateau', Africa, XV1I!, No.1, Jan. 1946
<alienated land in the south
Grant Orders were
These granted
government land
of the country)
Bet ween 1942 and
proclaimed by
bet ween 20 and
1964 five Land
Hai le Selassie.
40 hect ares of
primarily to members
service and patriots
Italian occupation
of the armed forces, civil
who had fought against the
(1936-1941). Most of these
groups were northerners.
1975: 61.
See Cohen and Weintraub,
185
1 0 Det ai led discussions Haile Selassie'eon
administrative reforms are found in Cohen and
Weintraub, 1974; Stahl, 1974; Schwab, 1972;
and Markak1s, 1974.
1 1 An exception was T1gray province which was ruled by a
nat i ve prince, Res Mangasha Se youm. See Markaki s,
1974: 292.
12 Schwab, 1972: 27-28. For extensive dt s c ue s t one on the
Gojjam revolt see Hoben, 1973; and Schwab, 1971.
1 3 Gilkes,
Table II,
1975: 115j cf. Cohen and Weintraub, 1975,
give figures for tenancy ranging from 39 to
75 percent.
1 4 For further ~etails on
t he Awash Vall ey, see,
1976.
the Afar' and on development in
also, Harbeson, 1978; Flood;
1 5 'I'h.er e are a number of account s of the revol ut ion.
See, in particular, Markakis and Ayele, 1978;
Markakis, 1981; Haliday and Molyneux. 1981j Hiwet,
1975; and 1984j Ottaway, 1978; Clapham. 1988.
lb 'Public Ownership of Rural Land Proclamation',
Negarit Gazeta. Proclamation No.31 of
1975. The land reform is described in full in
Koehn and Koehn, 1977: 3-16.
1 7 Under t he ancien regime, for i net ance, smallhol der,
rural development 'package' projects introduced in
the 1960s were concentrated in the wetter,
t r adt t i anal surpl us producing. regi ons, such as Arsi;
al though, even here, the exist ing 1and-lord tenant
relations prevented poorer peasants from adopting
these innovat i ve technologies (Stahl, 1973; Cohen,
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1976).
rural
After the revolution,
development pol i cy was
the Mengistu regime's
also one of favouring
the wet t er, and traditional surplus producing,
regions in general, and state farms in particular.
For example, up to the mid-1980s, at least, it is
estimated that state farms alone received some 90% of
all agricultural sector resource allocations CGhose,
1985; Griffin and Hay, 1985; Saith, 1985).
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APPENDIX I
ETHIOPIAN FAMINE 1984-85 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Drought and Impendi ng Famine: 1979-December 1983
Belg spring (February-May) rains and main
Kerempt (June-September) rains inadequat e and
untimely in north-eastern province.
~ rains poor.
Large parts of
Gondar, and parts
drought.
Eritrea, Tigre,
of northern Shoa
Wallo and
affected b y
May' ~ million people affected ~y drought con-
ditions Ethiopian government appeals to inter-
national community for assistance.
Kerempt rains inadequate and irregular in
nort hern regions 30 per cent of normal on
eastern escarpment and lowlands of Tigre,
reducing crop yields and culli~S livestock.
Bel(;!'rains poor.
March RRC estimates 12.5 per cep.: of population
affected by drought.
500 per cent of all 1ivestask owned by pastor-
alists in eastern lowlands of Tigre perished.
40,000 Tigreans already migrated from drought-
stricken central highlands to more fertile
west ern regions.
May 1,850,000 people affect ed by drought in th""
northern provinces of Eritrea, Tigre,
and Gondar.
Kerempt rains inadequate
many areas crops destroyed
areas hailstorms destroyed
in KeremRt season.
Drought spreads to southern provinces of
Sidamo and Gemu Goffa, and south-eastern pro-
vinces of Hararghe and Bale.
Wallo
and irregular, in
by pests. In some
standing crops late
World Food Programme put 1982-1983 grain
deficit at 250,000 tons.
8elg rains poor, failing cornpLe t. e.Ly in many
areas. Many northern areas e>~periencing food
shortage.
In Tigre and Eritrea harvests poor for fifth
or sixth season in succession.
April RRC estimate 5,494, 100 people facing food
shortage (3,058,500 droug~t-affected and
1,651,000 war displaced people).
For the affected population of the four pro-
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vinces of Eri trea, Tigre, Wallo and Gondar,
Hancock gi ves a combined figure of 2, 270, 000
for 1983 (Hancock, 1985: 76) .
Joint UN appeal CUNDRO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO)
relief assistance for people from
provinces - limited response.
European Parliament votes to proceed
emergency reIief programme, sat isfied
being used 'correctly and efficiently'.
for
13
with
aid
May Town population of Korem swells to 45,000.
USAID approves CRS request for 838 tons of
food - after 5 months' delay.
July. ~ 400,000 affected by drought in Eritrea,
Tigre, Gondar and Wallo (Hancock, 1985: 76).
Catholic Relief Services request 4,500 tons of
emergency food aid from USAID to expand
Makelle programme - granted within 9 days.
Town population of Korem swells to 102,000.
Kerempt rains down to about half of normal
across country - in many areas no rain at all.
September Sa~e the Children F~nd reop2ns feeding centr~
in Korem TPLF pledges safe passage f or env
civilian relief aid into rebel areas.
October Catholic Relief Services submits request to
USAID for, 16,000 tons of food aid to feed
35,000 families and 14,000 destitutes in Tigre
and Eritrea.
November Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Com-missioner meets British Aid Minister, Timothy
Raison, in London. British alleges misuse of
aid.
Catholic Relief Services predicts 90 per cent
crop failure in Tigre.
late-1983 400 Tigreans a day crossing into Sudan.
REST claims only 5,093 tons of food aid
recei ved from aid agenc ies for ~",holeof 1983 -
sufficient for only 4 per cent of needs.
Claims death toll for 1983 to be 17,924.
December 2,000 children on emergency feeding in Ko rem.
Number of relief centres increased to 120.
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BACKGROUND NOTES
In the northern parts of the country the pattern of
decreasing rains and cop fail.ures began in 1979.
Indicators of impending famine were signalled in Tigre in
early 1981, with evidence of large-scale population
late 1982movements and Iivest ock cull ing report ed. By
early 1983 the cumulative effects of food shortages were
visible over larger parts of the country as thousands of
people began drifting towards the towns and main roads in
search of food. By the end of 1983 thousands of people
had died and hundreds of thousands more had become
displaced.
Warnings of famine condi t ions and impE:::nd:'ng food cri si5
were issued throughout 1980-83 by UN :::.gencies and the
Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission CRRC). An
UNDRO eval uat ion mission vi:.it ed Eth i opaa in 1980 and
again i.n 1982. The UN General Assembly responded to the
findings of both missions with appeals for increased
assistance to Ethiopia. The FAO Global Information and
Early Warning System gave reports on crop shortages in
January, Apri 1 and June 1983, when it report ed widespread
famine condi t ions in Tigre, Eri t rea, Wollo and Gondar.
Several reports detailing the country's food requirements
were prepared by the RRC and submi tt ed to regul er donor
~eetings attended hy representatives of the international
and domestic donor community. In March 1983 Oxfam began
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issuing bulletins on the developing situation, and in
mid-1983 a series of articles on the famine in Ethiopia
appeared in the Washington Post.
International donors' response
The impact of these reports on the international donor
community remained minimal throughout. The major western
donor government s' response was meagre and was cl o s e Ly
bound up with the political wranglings of east-west
relations, and budgetary considerations.
All US and UK economic aid to Ethiopia s:~?ped in 1977 as
a re s uLt; of the country's human rights r-ecord. and the
failure of the government to compensate e>:pulsed US and
UK multinational concerns. From 1982 restrictions were
placed on US emergency food aid to Ethiopia, under TITLE
II of the 'Food for Peace' programme, vzh en USAID refused
to channel food through t~e Government's Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission. Although Title II food aid
continued to be dispensed through US supported relief
agencies operating in the country - the major dispenser
being the Catholic Relief Services contributions were
severely cut in 1981 and 1982 CL e. 43,000 tons in 1980,
24,000 tons in 1981, and 6,000 tons in 1982) 1 and by
October 1983 Ethiopia was to be phased out of the
programme completely.
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USAID's inflexibility on this policy
delays
was sharply
grantingreflected in the extraordinary in
requests for very minimal amounts of emergency food aid
submitted by the CRS in December 1982 and October 1983.
Requests which would normally receive approval within 3
weeks, were delayed for 5 months and 9 months
respectively. The immediate granting of 4,500 tons of
food aid, requested by CRS in July 1983, was a response
to media reporting of the famine conditions in Ethiopia
at that time and did not reflect humanitarian
considerations or any change in policy. Total US ext.ra
emergency food aid for 1983 amounted to only 5,438 tons.
The reduction of relief aid under Title II of PL480 was
closely bound up with US budgetary consideratic,ns, and
was part of the Reagan Administration's overall policy on
food aid to Africa. The politicization of food aid to
Ethiopia was, however, clearly born out in the report of
an investigation of USAID's response to CRS requests
undertaken by the General Accounting Office in 1985.
In its conclusion the report stated that 'the United
States knew that a potentially serious food shortage
situation existed in the northern provinces of Ethiopia
in late 1982'. The 'initial US response was delayed
because of strained relations between the two governments
and several policy and administrative concerns related to
the provisions of relief aid to Ethiopia.2 The latter
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refer to allegations of aid misappropriations which re-
surfaced throughout 1982 and 1983.
Ethiopia's largest aid contribution is the EEC. The EEC
makes no attempt to conceal that economic
policies override humanitarian consi derat ions. In
accordance with policy, the bulk of EEC aid pledged for
1982-1983 took the form of development grants and wns
tied to on-going food for work projects. The only extra
relief aid contributed in 1982 appears to have been the
rather limited donations made through Red Cross
Societ y. These included, 8, 000 ton~ of food and a
consignment of £150,000 worth of French topped ",...,+ r-
",7ithac ash l'5ran t of £ 1.2m. 3
The response from Britain, openly hostile to the Soviet-
backed regime. was completely negative, and there is no
record of any food aid contributions fro~ the Soviet ,bloc
countries during this period.
According to a report in Africa Contemporary Record
(Vol. XVI. 1983-84: 142). the tot.al :-elief aid for 1983
was in excess of $62.4m by the end of the third-quarter,
An estimated 52.8m of additional aid was perceived to be
the minimum requirement for the final quarter if the
worst immediate problems were to be alle\7iated.
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Government Response
Other than appealing for international assistance, there
appears to have been no positive response at all from the
Ethiopian
continued
government. Immediate political concerns
the plight of theto take precedence over
hungry masses and the long-term consequences for recovery
of delayed action. No specific policies were adopted to
mitigate the consequences of drought and food shortages,
and no provisions, financial or material, appear to have
been made to assist the functioning capacity of the RRC.
As evidenced by the large-scale distress migration
meagre became totally dependent
their
food
throughout 1983 peasants were left t= exhaust
r.esources, on
handouts, and ultimately, rehabilitation a ss t s t snc e.
In early 1983 the government claimed that only 1 million
of the total population in need were accessible, and
appealed for new vehicles and help with the
rehabilitation of existing ones. There is no doubt that
relief efforts were constrained by limited transport
resources. Of the 300 trucks available to the RRC, 170
to implement policies
that priorities were
to ease
The government's failure
those constraints affirms
of them were inoperat ional. 4
directed elsewhere. Measures to
ensure the provisions of commercial vehicles to the RRC
were not undert.ek ari and no army vehicles or transport
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aircraft were redeployed from the war effort to the
relief effort.
In the c-onflict areas government actions actively
exacerbated the situation. Continued, and at times t.he
intensification of, hostilities destroyed much needed
crops, depri ved peop Ie of access to market s, and caused
widespread dislocation.
The situation was aggravated by the lack of food aid
entering the rebel areas from the government side. In
Tigre and Eri t rea, up to 85 per cent of the count ryside
i Si under the con t r oI and admi n i st ra tion of the TPLF sod
the EPLF respectively. The majority of the drought
victims in these provinces were loceted in the rebel
areas and b~yond the reach of the cer.tral Ethiopia~
government.
throughout
Howe v e r , the bulk of food 0.1 d dona tions
1983 were channelled through
agencies operating in the government are:J.s.s
Response To Drought In The GuP!""i 1] a Cant roll ed Areas of
Tigre ani EritrQa
In sharp contrast to the inaction of the central Ethiopia
government, measures to mitigate the consequences of
drought were implemented by both the TPLF and EPLF,
together with their respective reli~~ organisations.
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These measures took the form of specific but contrasting
assistance programmes.
In Tigre, REST's programme became t.he organized
mobilization of large-scale population movements from the
drought-belt to the western surplus producing areas. In
agreement reached with the local population, migrants
were to be productively integrated. The policy of
productive integration we s essentially to keep the
migrants non-dependent. Migrants
'family for family' basis and were
were accepted on a
ex pec ted to wor-k in
exchenge f Ql- food. Participation in the local economy
was also enccureged, with t rad i ng ect i v t t i es f ecaLi t e.t ed
through the provision of revolving credit funds-
To facilitate these large-scale movements, REST estab-
lished transit camps all along the migration route.
Between October 1982 and Spring 1983, 400,000 people
migrated from the drought-stricken central highlands to
west ern areas under REST's auspices.
70 per cent of the migrant s were,
According to REST
in accordance wi th
policy, productively integrated. The rest continued
moving westward into Sudan. 6
REST's pol i cy, it was claimed, was prompted by their own
lack of resources and the logistical constraints of
transporting food from Sudan to the central highlands - a
journey that could take up to one month.
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In contrast, ERA's policy was precisely to prevent such
large-scale movements through the provision of relief at
the local level. ERA maintained that massive
displacement would only prolong the process of recovery
and rehabilitation in the drought areas.
Both the TPLF and EPLF gave their support to the relief
efforts. Assistance was provided in the f;:.rmof security,
trucks, the transport at ion of reI ief soads, paramedical
personnel, and the provision of grain from their
respectiv~ agricultural regions.
Continued government offens~ve5, and the u~willingness on
the part of the government to negotiate a truce to enable
food aid to enter the rebel areas from the govel-nment
side, imposed severe constraints on relief efforts.
Resources and transport capacity were very limited, and
the logistics of bringing food overland from Port Sudan
extremely difficult. The TPLF claims that the kidnapping
of the SCF team in April
plight of the starving
1983 was an attempt to bring the
in the rebel areas to the
attention of the donor community. However, there is no
evidence of any private agencies setting-up in these
areas subsequent to these act ions. Aga i n , the TPLF's
offer of 'safe passage' in late 1983 drew a negative
response.
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There is no information on the amount or sources of food
aid channelled through ERA duri~g this period. According
to REST, the amount of external aid received during 1983
met only 4 per cent of the populations needs. 7
WFP/FAO Underestimates
198
gravity of situation end
overe stima tes f00 d st0cks avail ab 1e for dis trib uti 0n in
famine areas: December 1983-September 1984.
February rains fail completely in northern
drought-affected regions. Joint FAO/WFP
mission assesses food needs and logistical
cons trai nt s.
5,000 children registered with SCF in Korem.
March Oxfam estimates 8,000 starv3tion de3ths in
Tigre since October 1983. A furt her 6, 000
children on emergency feeding in Korem.
Menguistu visits Moscow.
RRC calculates 900,000 tons of emergency grain
needed for 1984 for 5.2m people. Appeals for
only 450,000 and request s $50m for hel p wi th
transport.
April 854 dies in Korem relief centre during t.he
month.
May USAI D approves 8, 000 tons of grai n aft er 7
months delay.
2thiopian
Commissioner
Relief
meets
and
British
Rehabilitation
Foreign Office
mid-1984
June
July
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Minister minimal response.
European community responds to March appeal
for 115,000 tons of grain by converting 18,000
tons of project aid to emergency relief.
RRC appeals for 26,000 tons of emergency food
aid through World Food Programme.
REST estimates further 520,000 people have
migrated from drought-belt to western regions,
90 per cent productively integrated. Further
54,000 migrants in 13 reception centres in
Shire and Walkeit district.
REST estimates only 15 per ce~t of drought
victims be reached throug~ governmentcan
channels. Aid distributed in ratio of 3 to 1
in favour of government controlled areas.
Joint FAO/WFP mission report published. Fails
to endorse RRC March est imates. Appeals for
125,000 tons of emergency food aid for 1984.
8,000 children on emergency feeding in Korem.
RRC grain stock down to 8,000 t~r.s.
UN World Food Conference held in Addis Ababa.
USAID approves 8,000 tons of emergency food
aid after 9 months delay.
ERA Spokesman in Khartoum claims externally
supplied food aid meeting only 12 per cent of
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needs.
RRC distributes last of grain.
August T. V. transmitter installed in Makelle in time
for 10th Anniversary celebrations.
400 die in Ko r em feeding centre during the
month.
fAO estimates food gap to be only 50,000 tons
of grain pledged since March appeal only
34,000 tons have arrived.
Kerempt rains cease
normal.
a month earlier than
September 40 a day dying in Korem.
Inauguration of Workers' Party of Ethiopia.
Celebrat ion of lOt h Anni versary of Et hiopian
Revol ut ion.
EEC pledge of 18,000 tons of grain arrive.
18 private agencies in Addis Ababa appeal to
international donor community for emergency
food aid.
Oxfam announces 10,000 tons of grain shipment
to Ethiopia.
late-1984 EPLF and TPLF publicly call for a truce to
allow food aid to reach the starving. EPLF
invites governments and donor agencies to
inspect
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and supply drought affected areas
under its control.
EPLF estimates out of population of between
1. Srn and 2m 350,000 acutely affected (60,000
in displaced persons camps and 8,000 prisoners
of wa,r)
Oxfam estimates 1.4m severely affected ir..
Tigre.
BACKGROUND NOTES
As condition's det eraorat ed t hroughout 1934, the immediate
needs of the starving were pushed further into ~he
background as logistical concerns we,e added to the
political in the ranking of priorities.
Logistical Concerns
In February/March, two assessments were made of the
country's food requirements for 1984-85, one by the RRC,
and the other by a visiting FAOjWFP mission. The brief
of the latter was to assess 'the food supply situation
and the logistics problems related to the mobilization of
food within the country' The conclusions of both
assessments were heavi 1y weight ed
and have been subject to a great
by logist ical factors
deal of criticism (in
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retrospect) for the negative impact they were to have on
the course of the famine throughout 1984.
In its March report, the RRC calculated that 912,000 tons
of emergency grain were needed if starvation was to be
averted in 1984. It then stated that handling such an
amourit woul d be di f f icul t v..1it hit s 1imi t ed resources.
The full requirement figures was reduced by half, and the
RRC launched its appeal for only 456,000 tons. This
figure was then cut yet again by the ::.1\0 mission by
almost three-quarters. Thus , as Gi 11 ( 1986: 44) put 5 it;
'after two bureaucracies had had their say, national
needs of 900,000 tons emerged 55 =. UN-os::-i:ed a ppe aL f or
125,000 tons'.
The missions conclusion were heavily weighted by
logistical constraints, in particular the capacity of the
Ethiopian ports to receive and clear incoming grain. The
mission reckoned that the t ot a I, capacity of both As s e b
and Massawa was no more than 1,000 tons a. day (a
signi ficant underest imat i on as itt urned out) gi ving an
annual import capacity of 365,000 tons. Then, by some
unexplained calculation, it was con~luded that the
country's distribution capacity was limited to 125,000
tons.
The most damaging aspect of the mj~sion' s .eport was that
it governed the outlook of UN headquarters and field
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staff throughout most of 1984.
King, an Addis-based UNDP
An attempt by Dr. Kennet.h
official, to convince the
mission that the logi st ical pr.oblems couLd be overcome,
appears to have fallen on deaf ears. The country's
distribution capacity remained an immutable 125,000 tons.
A further serious error mad~ by the FAOjWFP during early
1984 was to overestimate the stocks available for
distribution in the famine areas. In its report on food
aid del i veries to Afri ca , publ ished in March, the VWP
estimated Ethiopia's' food requirements for 1984 to be
300,000 tons. It then stated that 176,000 tons of food
h ed 9.1 ready been pl edged, that the RRC hel d ~5, 000 tons,
and that t he Et hi opi an AMChad 240, 000 tons in reserve.
I mpl ic it in t he report, t heref are, w~s 't he not. i on that.
there was no need for further food aid.
However, . the report failed to make two important
distinctions. Firstly, no distinction was made between
normal national requirements and emergency reserves in
its treatment of the status of AMC stocks. The report
did note that the government lacked the budgetary
capacity to purch5se the grain and that financial support
would be necessary. Howeve r , exact ly how the starving and
impoverished masses were to gain access to this grain was
not dealt with at all - unless it was assumed that once
in government hands, the grain would be distributed
gratis! Secondly, no distinction was made between project
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and relief aid - in fact of the 176,000 tons pledge, only
7,810 tons were intended for emergency use. a
Again the most damaging aspect of the report was the
influence it was to have on the donor community and the
resident UN and NOO field staff. The report was given
greater credence than the more alarming reports presented
by the RRC. The latter allegedly having undermined its
own credibility by the apparently arb f t r-er y reduction c f
its own requi rement s. As a result, the view that food
ss up pIies,
sufficient
months.
domestically based in the pi pel ine, werE:
for reqUirements, persis"t-=:d for .several
By June the food stocks available tc the RRC fo r
distribution in the famine areas was down to 8,000 tori s.
This was
August.
depleted completely
The FAO continued
by the end of July early
to m=.intain there was
sufficient grain in the country or in the pipeline. In
July the FAO reported that 250,000 tons had been received
or was in the pipeline. On 6 August the RRC claimed that
of 87,000 tons of grain pledged since its Ivt-9.rchappeal
on Ly 34,000 t on e had be:en del ivered. During the same
month the WFP claimed that the gap b e t we en requirements
and commitments was only 50,000 tons. In September the
only grain available for distribution in the famine areas
was 18,000 tons pledged by the EEC in May in response to
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner's follow up to
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his March appeal. 9 The amount fell far short of the
initial request for 115,000 tons of grain, and was not in
fact ext ra aid. The EEC simply agreed to allow 18,000
tons of already pledged project aid to be used for
relief.
It is generally agreed that the NGOs operating in the
country during this period were more responsive and more
flexible than the governments of ths: major donor
count ries. However, t hei r response tot he devel opi ng
crisis was still slow. It was not until Sept ember when
the discrepancies between the FAO/WFP pronouncements :{,-d
the actual food situation were
coordinated ir-,iti:J.ti'i.'8 undert aken. early
Sap l .. rnber, 18 private organiz8tions linked to the
Christian Relief and Development Association (eRDA) dis-
patched a telex to all western donors, governments and UN
agencies, provided an appraisal of the situation and
demanded 'immediate and extraordinary action'.
A further significant initiative was undertaken by Oxfam
in late August early September. Oxfam attempted to
organize a 10,000-20,000 ton grain shipment. This was in
fact extraordinary action on the part of the
organization, its main role in Ethiopia being one of
development not relief. The initiative was prompted
partly in response to the gravi. y of the situation in the
country, and partly to shame western governments into
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T~gre and Eritrea
The information available on developments in the rebel
areas during this period is limited. Ai d was being
channelled thr-ough the relief organization War on '\1,lant
and Chr~st~an Aid (e;_ British charity). There is no
inform=.tion on other sources. However, in July, an ERA
spokesman in Khartou.m claimed that the amount of
e}{ternally.rec~ived aid up to t ns t point, had met only 12
per cent of needs. According to one report, ERA's
monthly requirements were 20,000 tons :f g r s i n but only
2,000 tons a month were available f or distr-ibution.11
Relief ef f or-t s W<2re E>:acerboted by the deterioratins
situation in Sudan. As SU3cneSE: grain Frices es·::slated
ERA arid REST were having to pay £590 per of sorghum.
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Media coverage of famine and international relief
e ffor t s: Oc t . 1984 -Dec. 1985 .
October October 3rd, Ethiopian government declares
drought a priority.
Establishes National Committee for Relief and
Rehabi 1itat ion.
RRC estimates 7,740,000 threatened with food
shortages, 1.5m tons of grain, 94,000 tons of
supplementary food and 27,000 tons of oil
requi~ed for next 12 months.
Appeals for 624,310 tons. 100 a day dying in
Korem relief centre.
1,000 a day dying in northern provinces.
60,000 tons of grain arrives at Port Assab.
Ethiopian government announces plans t.o
reset tle up to 1,500,000 people from drought
affected regions of Wallo, Tigre, and Shoa.
Press restrictions lifted.
British television teams allowed to travel to
f ami ne areas.
October 23rd, BBC main evening news shows film
of famine in Ethiopia.
October 25th, Thames Television transmits
documentary film 'Bitter Harvest'.
War on Want proposes establishment of
November
"
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in t ernat i anal comrnit t ee t a ensure ai d reaches
famine victims in rebel areas.
UN establishes Office of Emergency Operations
in Ethiopia (OEO£).
20 transport and 20 helicoptersplanes
provided by donor governments.
USAID lifts restrictions on relief aid to RRC.
35,000 in Korem relief centre.
110,000 people in Korem registered with RRC
for emergency relief.
FAO crop assessment mission estimat.es grain
deficit. for ige4-1985 to bet .....reen 1.7m and 2m
tons.
Ethiopian government
initiative.
2,000 tons of grain arrives at Port Sudan for
rejects War on Want's.
distribution in EPLF controlled areas most
of it from British farmers." Send a Ton to
Africa campaign War on Want delivers 1,000
tons for distribution by ER.A" furt her 4, 000
tons on its way. Christian Aid contributes
£650,000 worth of aid, mostly in the form of
cash grant s, t a ERA and REST.
ERA spokesman vi si t s Uni t ed St at es. Appeals
for aid forfood 1.5m famineemergency
victims, and calls for pressure on Ethiopian
government for truce to allow food into rebel
December
Januar/
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areas.
20,000 Eritreans crossed into Sudan during
October-November.
UN estimates 500,000 tons of grain pledged
RRC receives 5,651 tons of the 181,4-86 tons of
grain and 15,369 tons of supplementary food
pledged in October.
December 18, Janssen submits assessment report
to donor meet ing in New York. P.ppeals for
1. 2m tons of food aid for 7.7m famine victims
- appeal endorsed.
30,000 tons of food distri:::ute'd during the
mo n t h.
1,500 Tigreans die a day.
1,500 Tigreans crossing into Sudan d~ily,
80,000 have crossed border since October.
UNHCR Official, Poul Hertling claims more t hen
210,000 Ethiopian
during 1984.
refugees entered Sudan
US Select Cornmitt.ee on Hunger put death toll
for 1984 at 300,00. Gill and King give figure
of l m. (Gill, 198?, King, 1985).
Cholera outbreak in Korem.
Total amount of grain delivered since October
February
March
April
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put at 407,689 tons.
Janssen meets with Menguistu to discuss
possibility of distributing aid to rebel areas
_ negative response.
Ethiopian government impounds Australian
relief vessel carrying 6,000 tons of wheat,
and drilling rig destined for Eritrea and
Tigre.
RRC report claims emergency relief aid
reaching only 22 per cent of populat t cn of
Tigre, most of recipients in areas of Makelle.
US Officials in Khartoum d:i..s::·...lsSpossibility
of providing foo~ to E~A a~d RE~~ ~i5 Sudan.
REST distributing 1,500 tons c! grain 8 month.
Aid from voluntary agencies i:1::::1uding$7.25m
to finance grain purchase, and 60 trucks.
Total of' above assistance only .meeting 5 per
cent of REST's needs.
REST estimates 65,000 on the road - 1m stayed
behind, too weak to move. 66,000 Eritrean
refugeeS in Wad Sheni fe camp, Sudan.
few months figures rose to 140,000.
6,000 Ethiopians die a day.
Within a
45,000 tons of grain d i s t r t buv ed 3. 2to
million people.
May
June
Mid-1985
August
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us estimates between and2government
thousand Ethiopians entering Sudan daily.
ICRC alleges deliberate withholding of aid
from rebel areas.
Forced evacuation of refugees from Ibenat
relief camp.
REST organizes repatriation of refugees from
Sudan.
100,000 tons of grain backed up at Port Assab.
Janssen with Menguistu to disCL1SSmeets
transport problems.
Government claims food aid res=hing 7 reill~on..
US Officials claim 90 per cent of relief
reaching those for whom it ,<las int ended.
70,000 Tigrean refugees returned home, 57,000
under REST's auspices.
Janssen meets with donors; set distribution
target at 70,000 tons.
Number of Tigrean refugees in camp south of
Wadi Kowl i I Sudan rose ta ave; 100,000, UD to
22,000 in March.
Janssen reports food aid reacr.ing 80 per cent
of famine victims in Tigre and 70 ~er cent of
famine victims in Eritrea.
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us calls for inquiry to allegations of
deliberate withholding of food from rebel
areas.
US returns to February initiative for food
corridor from Sudan to rebel areas.
USAID supplies 150 10-ton trucks - 75 each to
ERA and REST.
55,000 tons of USAID grain stockpiled in Port
Sudan for distribution by ERA a~d REST.
September 82,000 tons of gra'in distributed during the
mon th.
Janssen estimates aid reaching 'm Feop~e.
REST estimates 3.8m affected by dr~ught.
October 76,000 tons of grain distributed during month.
70,000 still receiving aid at 73 relief camps
throughout country.
Death rate falls to 2,000 a day.
REST estimates 200,000 Tigreans migrated to
Sudan during past 12 mont hs. 400-700
20,000-Eritreans crossing into Sudan daily
30,000 have crossed since August.
November 64,000 tons of grain distributed during month.
Supplementary feeding reaches 30,000.
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December 64,000 tons of grain distributed during the
month.
RRC estimates 5,800,000 will need food aid in
1986 (1,700,000 in Tigre and Er-itrea, and
2, 100,000 in Central Shoa and Wallo).
FAO estimates food aid requirEments for 1985-
1986 to be 900,000 tons.
Janssen estimates 600, 000 tons of food
required for 1986.
BACKGROUNDNOTES
Global rneda a c ov e r ege of f e rr.a n e i!'l
October, prompt ed an unpre::edent ed publ::':: response. .At.
series of fund raising campaigns ve r e :':!itiated 3!"::;
cont inued unabated throughout most of : 935 < e. g. Be::j
Aid, Li ve Ai d, Sport s Ai d, t a name but a few). Within a
few months of the broadc ast, maj or NGOs '..lere report ing
record breaking c on t ri but ions. As pub 1i c pressure was
brought to bear, the major western donor governments were
finally galvanized into action.
By the fir·st week in November 20 aircraft and 30
hel i copt ers, suppl i ed by 7 donor (UK, USA, USSR, FRG,
GDR, Italy and Libya), ",'ere i nvoI 'led in airlifting
suppl ies. During October-December food aid pledged t o
the RRC rose to 181,486 trollS. Contributions from the
Soviet bloc countries in mid-November included 30,000
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tons of grain and transport ai rcraft s. In mid-December
the UN reported that 500,000 tons of grain had been
pledged. For the period December 1984-December 1985 1.2m
tons of grain had been pledged. 12 In November 1984, US
restrictions on food aid to the RRC \olere lifted, with
50,000 tons of grain pledged for 1984-1985. The total US
contribution to the relief effort for 1984-1985 was
450,000
pledged.
tons, approximately one-third of the total
However, the US, and in particular Britain,
were subj ect ed ta a good deal of cri tic ism. The US for
falling short of its usual aid policy of 50 pe, cent, and
Brit.ain for utilising funds designated for development
purposes. The ~nly additional expenditure sanctioned by
the British government ~hroughout the whole emergency was
the Ministry of D~fence contribution o~ f12m towards the
airlift operation.
In early 1985 the Ethiopian government announced a
package of austerity measures to help the relief effort.
These incl uded, a ban on luxury import s, petrol
rationing, and a 'famine levy' all Ethiopians were to
contribute one month's pay,
give lOOkg of grain.
and peasants were each to
The Relief Operation13
In 83.rly November 1984, the UN, belatedly, t ocv, the Lead,
On 6 November, UN veteran, Kurt Janssen, was appointed to
216
head a newly established office for Emergency Operations
in Ethiopia (OEOE). Janssen's brief wss to coordinate
the system of resource mobilization. At the practical
level, this meant ensuring the flow of information among
donors, the RRC, and NGOs, snd to facilitate the
coordination of act i vi ties. .A..s a f:'rst initiative,
Janssen acquir-ed the agreement. of the normally
competitive Geneva-based and Ne w York-based UN :=.gencles
t a make Addi s Ababa the focal point f or fund rei sing
operat ions.
Janssen calculated Ethiopia's food requirements for
December 1984-December 199~ to be 1. 2m ~=~S ~f grain for
an 5.'ffected population of 7. 7rr, (slJ~sequent::'.y increased to
7. 9m). Th i ? :- i g u ref ell 7' a r si'::::>r t ':! ': j; eRR C est i met e
(October 1984) of 1. 5rr. tC;-JS and the FAO estimate
(November 1984) of between 1.7m and 2m tons. Here ag3in
logistics were influential in the un\.]i 11i ngness to
endorse the higher requirement est i mat es. This time
....
~ '"
was nat port capacity (off-take from Assa~ reached 3,000
and at times 4,000 tons a day during 1935), but rather
the limited internal transport resources. However, an
added dimensio:l. was donor at tit udes: • T~ e s k f or more
t han caul d be used wouLd have resu1 t ed ::.n an out cry by
donors .. <Janssen, 1987: 5)
a donor meet ing on 18 De::ember 1985, t he tot 9.1 amount
pledg«i f or the 1984-19~5 ;::>eriod i.-iaS 1,273,000 tons. By
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June 1985, 801,000 tons had been delivered.
1985, 975,000 were received.
By October
According to
effort was
Janssen the rnaj 0 rca ns t raint on the relief
not food availability, but distribution
(Janssen's concept of distribution is :he narrows one of
quant ity. His concern throughout is the amount of food
being distributed and the number of beneficiaries. There
is no critical discussion of the distribution system).
Janssen identifies two main constraining factors: limited
transport resources and the donors'
earmarking their donations.
tendency towards
With regard to transport, the difficulty was one of
clearing the grain from the ports. Shi?s were docked for
up to 9 days throughout most of the year. In May,
congest ion in the port of As sab, the main del ivery point,
reached 101,000 tons. Balancing the off-loading capacity
of Assab would have required deploying 150 long-haul tons
trucks per day. This figure was reached onl)'
infrequently despite constant pressure on the minister of
transport. During the same month, after meeting wit.h
Janssen, Mengistu agreed to supply extra vehicles.
However, .Janssen does not state the quantity, or even if
the agreement was kept.
The issue of increasin3 the off-take out of Assab
continued to be a major cause of friction between donors
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and the Ethiopian government throughout 1985. In Iune it
was estimated that the amount of emergency food aid in
the pipeline exceeded the projected distribution capacity
for the next 7 months by about 270,000 tons14. Although
it was acknowledged that the amount of food in the
pipeline was not sufficient to meet Ethiopia's needs, it
was agreed to postpone any further shipments until a
concomitant increase in distribution cap3cit.y was
p~ovided by either the government or donors.
The' second ma_jor constraining factor, the system of
earmarking, posed several probl ems. The tendency of the
major donors was to earm.3rk given agenc:''?5 and specific
regi oris. At the beginning of the emergen cy the NGO' 5
share of food dist ribut.ion was 5m3-II but gr ev.: st aadi 1y,
and'reached an average of 65 per cent by the last quarter
of 1985. By December 1985 the NCO's share had reached 67
per cent. However. with the exception of the
I nt ernat ional Commi tt ee of t he Red Cross and CARE, bot h
self-sufficient in trucks, the NCOs, in accepting
responsibility for the distribution of grain, had failed
to assure the provision of transport from their donors.
Distribution was impeded until donors could be persuaded
to provide trucks and this took considerable time. This
problem was compounded by the lack of standardization of
the imported trucks, and many were unsuitable. By the
end of 1985 earl y 1986 t he number of truck provi ded by
donors was just over 1,000.
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In extending the system of earmarking to specific
regions, some areas were recei ving a greater proportion
of the food available. This was a particular problem in
those areas serviced by the RRC.
of food available to the RRC
averaging 24,000 tons a month. 15
particularly from this system.
By mid-1985 the amount
for dis t rib uti 0n, was
Wollo province suffered
In mid-1985 the food
requirements of the region were estimated to be 35,000
tons :':I. month. Of the available for distribution by RRC,
Wollo r ece Lved 9,000 tons a month, its supplies for the
last quar~er of 198~ for Wallo.
!-. further, f c r Janssen lc;cc s8,i.:>us, c ons t r-e i n t ",]as the
poor road system making access int ::- the inter:'or
, impossible' Distribution had to take place along the
For many the journey tot he di st ri but ionmain roa,ds.
pOints took several days. However, this was not a
problem for Janssen as , Ethiopian peasants have
traditionally moved long distances in search of food
during drought ..
underst and t ha t
and for them it. was not difficult to
they had to do this again. 1 b Following
this logic, I suppose those too weak to :Tlske the journey
had to starve to death. At the peak of the operation, the
number of distribution points reached 257. Rations were
distributed on a monthly basis on a predetermined day
which was commurif ca t ed to the peasant associations. In
most areas the peasant associations were responsible for
assessing the need for relief aid.
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Airl i ft ing was a furt her component of the di st ri but ion
effort. The airlift operation was initiated in November
1984. By the end of 1984, 27 transport planes and 24
helicopters had been provided by the donor communi t y.
Throughout 1985, 76 aircrafts were employed in the relief
operations and transported up to 15 per cent of the total
food distributed. The planes flew mainly from Assab and
Asmara to airstrips in Tigre and Wallo, and on a lesser
scale to Gondar, and He r-er gbe . Ln February, an air drop
was initiated to transport food to less accessible areas.
This operation was financed by donor so\'ernments w i th
costs shared by the military and civilian budgets.
I~ planning t~e food distribution progr=rr~e Janssen m6je
some dangerous assumpt i OI:S. :: .:):1:: 1u::!ed t het
distribution not have t o rea::h , 7ull speed' durins
the months of December and January. The main 1984-
harvest had been' good' in t wo surplus producing regions
"which meant that some 'food was available on the' market.
but at a much pl-i ce' . Added to which, I the peasants had
set aside small quantities from earlier harvests, a
traditional pract ice ... I 1 7 The cumulat:'ve effects of
drought and the precise mechanisms via which the starving
and impoverished masses were to gain access to the market
did not enter into the calculat ions. Thus, the
distribution of 35,000 tons of food aid c month during
the period De~ember-March was considered , satisfactcry
start', even though the number of benef:'ciaries, 3.2m
amounted to less than
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half of the tot al affected
population of 7.7m. ~anssen calculated the critical
period would come in March-April, before the small
harvest, but t he real crunch would come in Sept ember-
Thus, in April distribution increased to 4-5,000October.
tons a month. In Sept ember, the amount of food
distributed reached a peak of 82,000 tons. In October,
food distribution dropped to 76,000 tons and in November
and December 'when the new harvest was beginning to have
its effect', distribution decreased to an average of
64, jOOO tons a month.
The origin31 distribution tar5e~ had been 100,000 tons 3
mant 1:1 but, 01.;.,1 ng to int er ne I t r e.nsspor t pr-obI ems, t hi s ha d
proved 'impossible to reach'. In Jur:e 19·55, it W3S
dec i ded, by the OEOE and the maj or donors, t a set the
distribution target at 70,000 tons a month. It waS
calculated that 7m people were receiving food aid by mid-
1985. According to Janssen the fact that the targeted
figure of 7.9m was not reached did not mean that the rest
st arved. The 'extended family system', 'traditional in
Ethiopia', would ensure that the food distributed' would
be shared'
The overall relief effort was perceived by Janssen to be
a success. The criteria being: 'the aim of the aid
effort was to save lives and, as was evident bJ the
regular return of registered recipients to dist.ribution
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point s, food distribution kept the people al i ve' 1 8
There is no discussion on those too weak to make the
di stri but ion point 5, the thousands of refugees, and those
excluded from access to food aid for political reasons.
In October 1984, the government announced its
controversial policy to resettle up to 1,500,000 people
from the drought affected regi:::ms of Wallo, Tigre, and
nort hern Shoa, to areas in Wall ega, III ubsbar, Goj jam and
Kaffa in the south-west of the country. The governmen t
justified this actio~ on the grounds that it W3S the only
viable long-term solution to the ecological degradation
~vertaking the ~~ought-prone areas. For many ~hia action
was regarded as an opportunistic move on the part of the
governmen t to depopul at e these provi r.c es for pol itical
and military reasons, rather than any positive responSE
to the developing crisis. The implementation of scheme
alleged forced, rather thanbegan in November. The
vol untary, nature of the programme, together with the
conditions under which the migrants (deportees) were
transport ed tot he reset t1ement areas, was denounced by
western governments and the media for being appalling and
inhumane. The peasant s, many of them already in a
weakened state, were crowded into unpressurised Soviet
planes and trucks for long periods at a time. For those
travelling by road the journey took several days. Many
reportedly never made it. Insufficient preparationE had
been made at the reset tlement si tes and in most areas
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basic services were none existent or very poor. By
January 1986 up to 600,000 people had already been
resettled. In terms of r e L i ef eff art, t he reset t 1ement
scheme generated a great deal of controversy amongst the
donor communi ty. The US, Br it ain and West Germany I were
particularly hostile to the scheme and for several months
maintained an embargo on grain supplies to the
resettlement areas. This policy was relaxed in late 1985
but the amount of food aid entering the resettlement
areas remained minimal.
Information on rehabilitation is very limited.
Ev ecue t ion of the major relief camps began in August
1985.
people
However, in April, between 32,OJO and 38,000
were forcibly eve c ua t ed, reportedly by the
regional poli tical cadres, from I benet (Gond3r) r e I i ef
camp without the provision of any relief supplies, seeds,
and ot her agric ul t urel input s. When t he of f i c i al
ret urnee programme ",las i ni t i at ed, pro-vi s:"ons were gLv eri.
However, gi ven the time lags and delays in del i veries,
agricultural inputs arrived in greater qua~tities only in
t he second hal f of the year.
planting season.
Often too late for the
Aid to Tigre and Eritrea
Lnf or-met zon on the amount and sources of aid channelled
through ERA and REST throughout the relief operation is
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minimal. However, food aid and financial support in
limited amounts was provided by private agencies and
church organisations from contributions received in
response to the media coverage of the famine. Most of
the £620,000 raised by War on Want was channelled through
ERA and REST in the form of food aid. One thousand tons
of grain arri ved at Port Sudan in November 1984, wi t h a
further 4,000 tons in transit. In mid-November, 2,000
tons 'of grai n for use by ERA was del i vered. Most of t hi s
was donated by the British farmers' Send a Ton to Africa
campaign, During the same month, Christian Aid donated
£650,000 of the flm raised to ERA and REST.
mostly in the form of cash gr ent s . 19
This was
During late 1984 and early 1985, f t nenc t e I and material
aid was received by REST from a consort ia 0: voluntary
agencies. There inc I trded , the US backed Mere y Corps
International, and Lutheran World Relief. The Tigrean
Transport Programme (TTP), made up of most I y Benel ux and
Scandinavian NGOs, and the Emergency ReI ief Desk, funded
by european church agencies and Canadian NGOs. By March
1985, the total amount of aid provided via these agencies
included, 60 trucks and $7.2m for food purchases.
During this period REST was distributing 1,500 tons of
grain a month, sufficient for only 5 per cent of the
populat ions needs. 20
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According to one report (Keleman, 1985: 281). the total US
allocation to relief agencies working on the government
side for the period October 1984-November 1985 was $210m.
The amount US funding to agencies providing aid to
guerilla areas for the same period was $20m. The
allocation of British famine relief was i~ the ratio of 4
to 1.
There is no doubt that the majo:'"" v..'est ern donor
governments put their main support behind effortE tc
reach drought victims in Tigrs and Er~~res from the
government side. It was reported that mu~h of the grai~
donat ed by the IJS, and at her gave; nrner,-:"
for. these pr-ovd nce s . but c h e n n e Ll e d t h r oug+.
"";:)l-kingon the government s t oe.
ag~ncies were International Comrni:tee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF)' Howe v e r ,
allegations that food aid was not reacn t ng , or being
deliberately withheld from,
-,
the drought victims in the
rebel area resurfaced throughout the course of the
famine.
In October 1984, War on Want responded to these
allegations with a proposal for the esta=lishment of an
international commission to ensu,e the free and safe
passage of relief into the rebel areas. The proposal
rece~ved the support of 52 voluntary agencies and ex
German Chancellor Willi Brandt agreed ':0 monitor safe
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passage arrangements. The initiative met with negative
response from the Ethiopian government. In November 1984
an ERA representative visited the US to appeal for extra
emergency aid for the estimated 1.5m drought victims, and
call ed on government. to exert pressure on t he Et hi opi an
AbEll!!. in January 1'::10:::;,
Janssen proposed to Mengui st u t ha t convoys of food be
allowed to enter the rebel areas - food convoys travelled
no further than Makelle. There s ponsib iIi t Y for the
convoys was t a be undert eken by .Janssen himsel f of the
ICRC. The inl t iat i v e was again rejected by the
government.
In February 1985, the possibility of a 'food c or r Ld cr '
f r orn Sudan into the rebel areas W:lS discussed by US
officials
President
based
Bush
in Khartoum and visiting
however,
us
the outcome was, I imi ted.
During the same month a report issued by the RRC stated
that food aid was reaching only 32 per cent of the
drought victims in Tigre and that the main recipients
were in the area of Makelle. 21
In May 1985 the deliberate withholding of food from the
needy in the rebel areas was alleged by ICRC. Government
abuse of food aid for conscri pt ion ?urposes was also
reported. According t a the EPLFI some 20, 000 drought
victi~s were conscripted in 1984.
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However, subsequent inquires into th~se allegations
continued to maintain that food aid was reaching those
for whom it was intended. I n August, Janssen report ed
that of the drought victims in Tigre and Eritrea, 80 per
cent and 70 per cent respectively were receiving food
aid. According to Janssen's calculations, 3 total of
1,120,000 people out of an estimated l. Srn needing food
ai d were reached inTi gre. 65 per cer.t of t he r e I i ~f
food was being distributed by NGOs, mainly ICRe and the
Catholic Secretariat. In Eritrea the number reached was
put a just over 600,000 out of an estima~ed 827.000. The
main distributing agency ~eing the IeRe.
These conclusions were drawn f r orr, information :=upplie:: b~'
NGOs and food distribution mo r.dt or a ir. t he government
controlled areas. However, the main area of contention
between REST and Janssen was the population figures upon
whi.ch the es·,timate waS based. Janssen, drawi ng on the
government's latest population census,
the total population of Tigre was 2.4m.
maintained that
R:::ST claimed a
population of Srn in the TPLF controlled areas, and a
drought-affected population of 3.8m. !:>espite official
pronouncements to the effect that aid was reaching those
people whom it was intended, in August 1985, the US
returned to the original crose-border plan mooted in
February. According to one rej:( rt CAfri::an Ccnfj je:-tia.l,
Oct, 1985:), 150 10-ton t r uc k s <75 each to ERA and REST)
were suppl ied for cross-border operat i onss, In August
1985,
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45,000 tons of USAID grain was stockpiled and
awaiting delivery.
An additional channel of, indirect, government aid, was
provided through the refugee camps in Sudan. The number
of Tigrean and Eritrean migrations into Sudan rose
significantly throughout 1985. Information on the actual
number of border crossing is not consiste~t, but it would
appear that the larger number of mfg r e t ions were from
Tigre to Wad Kowli camp in east ern Sudan. During
October-November 1984, 80,000 Tigreans were reported to
have migrated,
cross daily. 22
with an estimated 1,500 continuing to
In March migratio:-1s were occ ur r drrg et :::l
rate of 10,000 a I,.·Jeek.23 However,
source, the number of mdgr ant e in Wad Ko w I i t n March wa~
82,000, by rnid-1985 the number had riser. to 100,000.24
By October 1985 REST had estimated that 200,000 Tigrean~
had entered Sudan since October 1984.25
Migrations from Eritrea were in the direction of Wad
Sherife camp in eastern Sudan. However, t he pat tern 0:
migrations, large numbers over short periods, would
suggest that possibly an - intensification of hostilities
rather than drought prompted
October-November 1984 an
these movement s.
estimated 20,000
During
people
migrated. 26 In March 1985, the number ef Eriireans in
Wad Sherife camp was, according to one + e po r t , 'S6, 000
within a I few months' the number had risen to 14-0,000 -
thousands were
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reportedly trucked south to Girba. 27
During the period August-October 1985 between 20,000 and
30,000 crossed into Wad Sherife. 28
During Apr t 1 and May 1985, the repatri at i on of Tigrean
refugees was implemented by REST.
ret urned home dur.i ng .t he period,
Some 70,000 migrants
of which 57,000 were
assisted by REST. Transit camps h7ere est.ablished all
along the route with no more than a day's distance
between each. Onl y heads of f ami 1 i es, or those abl e to
work the land, \.-Jere repatriat ed. Families were to be
repatriated d ur I ng the next repatriation programme this
p cLd cy was 5dc;:-ted to ene ur e continued pr-o duc t t v t t y =,,-=
at the same time keep the need for relie~ food down to a
minimum. The repatriation ?,ogramme _"'as linked to the
~m-going emergsncy relief and rehabilitation project. in
Tigre. Returnees were provided wit~ rehabilitation
assistance in the form of seeds, tools and oxen.
According to REST the number of people still in need of
emergency food aid in 1986 was 2m. 180,000 families were
targeted for rehabilitation assistance during 1986. 2 9
DEVELOPMENTIN 1986-1987
According to the RRC, an est. t rnet ed 5,800,000 people were
still in need of food aid during 1986-1987, of which
1,700,000 were in the northern provinces of Tigre and
Er it rea, (where, report edl y seeds had not been del i vered
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in time to take advantage of the rains) and 2, 100,000 in
the two provinces of Shoa and Wallo. T~e FAO calculated
the food requirements for 1986 to be 900,000 tons.30 The
RRC put the requi r emerrt s at 1. 3m. 31 785,000 tons of
grain were pledged for 1986, but owing to delays in the
arrival of 1985 pledges there were reportedly, no gaps in
provi si ons. Conditions were said to have improved and
relief shelters were phased out.
Michael Priestly, who, in October 1985, replaced Janssen
as coordinator of the OEOE, launched, in Ms)' an appeal
for assistance for 1986, ?srticularly fo~ transport. The
rai:Js r apcr t ed bee:!
resulting in good crops w:'er-= t he y had been .pLent ed . The
Min i Et r y C' :- .Agr L::U 1 t ure,
NOOs is said to have distributed 25,000 tons of seed and
2 million hand tools in time for the main planting
season. 32 However, although an improvement on 1985, the
amount and distribution of the main rains were
unfavourable in many areas, and ceased early in some
northern areas.
Throughout 1986 the need for r e I ief persi st ed. However,
with the crisis period over, arguments over allocations
resurfaced. According to one r e po r t , CRSt faced with the
need to continue its food projects, had its allocation of
food aid cut lly USAID as it r-sduced its commitment.
However, despite an earlier decision to phase out its
2 2
2 3
2 4-
2 5
2 b
2 7
. 2 8
2 9
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operation by the end of 1986, USAID reportedly remained
in Ethiopia. 33
Footnotes to AQpendix
2
Gill, 1986, p.54, Penrose, 1987, p.148
Gill, ibid, p.60
Gill, ibid, p.78
Afri ca Cont emporary Record, Annual Survey and
Document Vol. XVI 1983-4 p. 142
Wri ght, 1984 , p. 10 1- 105
Wright, i bi d , Russel, 1984 pp. 27-28
Wright, i bi d
Penrose, op. cit. pp. 143-147, Gill op. cit. pp.41-51
Pen r 0 se, i bid, Gill, i bid
Penrose, ibid, Gill, ibid
Penrose, ibid, pp. 153-156
Penrose, ibid, pp. 153-156, Shepherd, 1983, pp. 51-54
This section is based mostly on Janssen 1987
J"anssen, ibid, p.38
Janssen, ibid, p.71
Janssen, ibid, p.46
Janssen, ibid, p.48
Janssen, i bi d, p. 55
Firebrace, 1984, Hancock, 1985
3
4
5
b
7
8
9
1 0
1 1
I 2
1 3
1 4-
1 S
1 b
1 7
1 8
1 9
Z 0 Africa Confidential, March 1985
Keesing's Vol. XXXII, July 1986, p.34-471
Keesing' s Vol. XXXI, February 1985, ? 33383
Keesing's Vol. XXXII, July 1986, p.34473
King, 1986, p. 73
REST, February 1985
Firebrac e, 1984
King, 1986, p. 73
Africa Confidential,
REST, February, 1985
Keesing's Vol. XXXII,
Penrose, 1987 p.158
Keesing's Vol. XXXII,
Penrose, 1987 p. 159
Z I
October 1985
3 0
3 1
3 2
$ S
March 1986, p. 34211
March 1986 p.34211
232
Bibliography to Appendix
Africa Confidential Vol. 26 No. I, 2 .January
"Ethiopia the Death Stakes"
1985
II October, 1985
" March, 1985
Africa Contemporary Record
Annual
Vol. XVI
Survey and
1983-1984:
Document s
142-143.
Drought conditions in Ethiopia,
refugees and relief aid
African Research Bulletin
October 13-November 14- 1984:
7482-7483 Review of EEC's Aid
Effort, the Multinational Airlift
Operations, and Impact of War on
Relief Efforts
.. IVlarch 15-Apr i1 14- 1983, pp. 6796-
6797 Looks at Aid for Ethiopia
for First Quarter of 1983
Darton, M.B. "Resettlement and Repatriation in
the Horn" Africa Report January-
February 1984
Brittan, V. "Free to Die" Guardian 8 February
1985, p. 13
Firebrace, J. 'Food as a Military Aid' New
Statesman 7 December 1985, p.20
Gi 11, P. A Year in the Death of Africa
Paladic London 1986
Hancock, G. The Challenge of Hunger Victor
Gollancz Ltd, London 1985
Janssen, K. M. Harris & A. Penrose.
The Eth i opi an Fam! ne
London 1987
Zed Books
Keleman, P. ,The Politics of Famine' New
1985, p.281-Society 15 November
283
An African Winter Penguin 1986
233
Keesings Vol. XXXII, March 1986, p.34211
FAO assessment of food aid
requi rement s of most act uall y
affected countries for 1986
If Vol. XXXI I, Jul Y 1986, p. 3446 FAO
and OEAO assess-ment of needs and
cereal forecasts
If Vol. XXXI, Febr urary 1985,
p. 33382- 33385 Ethiopi a - Famine
and Relief Operations
" Vo 1. XXXI I, J ul Y
34473 Ethiopia
Relief Operations
i986, p.34471-
Famine and
tl Vol. XXX, AU8us~ 1984, p.30017
'Increasing Severity of Drought'
" Vol. XXIX, SuI Y 1983, p. 32239
'Drought and Famine Conditions'
September 1982-April 1983
Ly c et , A. 'Sit.e
Hungry'
p . 10
t.he Bullet, Help
Times 3: J5nuary
the
19~5.
Pankhurst, R. 'Paying the Price
Times 11 Oct ober-
of Fr eeo om'
REST Ne INS 1et terN o.5 198 5 , p. 10
Russel, E. •Eritrea: The Forgotten Drought'
New African December 1964, p.27
Shepherd, J. I The Pol i tics' of Food
March-April
Aid'
1985,African Report
pp. 51-54
Steele, J. Guerdian 15 October 1985
Vallely, f-'. How the West's Aid keeps a Tyrant
in Pewer Times 29 October 1985,
p. 16
Wrigh t, IC Combat ing Famine;
ionary Strategy
African Political
A Revolunt-
Review of
Economv
Briefings 1984, pp.100-105
War on Want winter 1984/85 Ethiopia Eritrea
Famine
" summer 1983 Famine in the Horn:the facts behind the headlines
234
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Note: Ethiopian authors are listed alphabetically by first
name.
Adanech K1danemariarn & Azeb l'amirat.
"Gender Influences on Women's Health: A Review of the
Ethi opian Si t uat ion", in Tsehai Berhane Selassie
(ed), Gender Issues in Ethiopia. Institute of
Et hi opi an St udi es, Addi s Ababa Uni versi t y. AddLs
Ababa, November 1991
Addis Hiwet
Ethiopia: From Autocracy
.African Political Economy,
1975.
to Revol ut ion, Revi ew of
Occasional Paper, No. I,
Adhana Haile Adhana
"Peasant Response to Famine in
Prepared for International
Environmental Stress and Security,
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,
Ethiopia",
Conference
13-15 Dec"
Paper
on
1958,
Stockholm, Sweden.
Adulis
"The Atlanta Talks",
November, 19C19
.J\ dulis, Vol 1, Nog, Oc t 0b e r -
Alasebu Gebre Selassie
"Select Bibliography, women an Agricultur31 and Rural
Development in Ethiopia", paper prepared t or the
National Workshop en Women in Agricultural
Development, Awasse, 26 June - 2 July, 1983
Alemayehu Bezabih
Agrarian Structure end Social Classes in Ethiopia: An
historical perspective, United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development, Geneva. June, 1981
Alemayehu Lirenso
'Rural Service
performances' ,
No 2, 1985
Cooperatives in Ethiopia:
Northeast African Studies,
tasks
Vol 7,
and
"
"Some Effects of Grain Marketing Policy on the
Production and Consumption of Food Grains in
Ethiopia", Paper Prepared for the Meeting of Inter-
Afri can Groups, Addi s Ababa, Addi s Ababa Uni versi t y,
September, 1984
Villag1zation: Policies and Prospects", in
Z. Peusewen8, Fant. u Cheru, st ef an Brune,
Chol e Ceds.), Et hi oRi a: Opt ions tor Rura 1
ment, Zed Books Ltd., London and New Jersey,
& Eshet u
Develop-
1982
235
Alemneh Dej ene
Peasants, Agrarian Socialism and Rural Development in
Ethiopia,
Westview
Westview Special Studies on Africa,
"
"Peasant s, Environment, Reset t 1emen t" , in
Pausewang, Fant u Cheru, St ef an Brune, Eshet u
<eds.) Ethio2ia: Options for Rural Development,
Books Ltd., London and New Jersey, 1990
Z.
Chole
Zed
Alula Abate
"Peasant Associations and Collective Agricultur·e in
Ethiopia: Promise and Performance", Journal of
African Studies. Vol IX. Nu 3, 1983
" & T. Tesfaye
"Land Reform and Peasant Associa~iotis in Ethl0pia - A
case study or two widely differing Regions", ILO,
World Employment Programme, October, 1979.
" & Fasi 1 G. Kiros
"AgrarJ.an
Developrnen"
Reform in
1986
Refocm, Str-uctural Changes and Rural
in Ethiopia", in A. Gliose (ed) Agrarian
c.ont.emporarv Deve;opins .Countries, ILO,
Araya Redda.
"The Farm ne in Nor t,hern St h i opi a" , Rev:!.sw of Afri con
Polit.ical Economy. No 27/28, 19t\3
Atwood, D. J., & B. Pagano
"Food Needs Assessmeni:: for Ethiopia",
Ababa, 9 February, 1987
USAID/Addis
Bart on, M. S.
"Resettlement and Repatriation in the Horn", Africa
Report, January-February, 1984
Baulch, B.
"Entitlements and
Disasters, March,
the
1987
Wallo Famine of 1982-1985",
Baundendistel, R.
"International Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflict.
Application of the Law Would Prevent Untold
Suffering", Faper ?repared for the Symposium on
Rehabilitating the Ethiopian Economy, Inter-Africa
Group, Addi s Ababa, January, 1992
Bauer, D.
"Land, Leadership and Ligi t imacy among the lndert. a
Tigray of Et hi opi a" I Ph. D di ssert at ion, Uni "'ersi t y of
Rochester, 1972
236
Beckerman, W.
, Economi c Growt hand t he Environment:
Wh 0 seE vir an men t ? I, .l::W~o~rC-:!:l~d:!..-._!,D~e~v~e=-=-l~o~p..:.m~e,,-,!n~t,
Pergamon Press Ltd, 1992
Whose Growth?
Vol 20, No 4,
Beechey, V.
'On patriarchy', Feminist Review, No 3, 1979
Befekadu Degere & Tesfaye Tafesse
"The Marke1:ing and Pricing of Agricultural Products
in Ethiopia", in Z. Pausewang, F'en t u Che,1..\, Stefan
Brune, Eshetu Chole (eds.) Ethiooia: ODtions for
Rur~al Development, Zed Books Ltd., Lorrd ori and New
J er~sey, 1990
Belshaw, D.
"A Solution for the Food Deficit Areas
at fice of the National Commission
PI anning (Ol-.!CCP), Addi s Aba ba , 1988
of Ethiopia",
t m- Central
"
" Et hi 0pia It , ::.I ....D::..!S::<C_.:!:B::..:u::..=1-=1:...:e=t-=i~I.!.1,
St ud i es, Sussex. Vol 21, No.
Ln s t t t ut e
3, 1990
Development
Bener1B, Lourdes.
'Conceptualizing the Le bour- t o rc e . ti-12 unaer-
estimat10n of women's economic 9ctivit:es', 1n
N. Nelson (ed), Afri~an Women in 't~e Development
?rocess, London, Cass, 1981
" & G. Sen.
'Accumulation, reproduction, and women's role
nomic development: Boserup rev.isited', Signs,
No 2, 1981
in eco-
Vol 7,
Bennhol t-Thomsen, V.
'Subsistence production and' extended reproduction'.,
in K. Young, et aI., <ed), Of Marr i age and the
Market: Women's subordination internationally and its
Lessons, London, Routledge and Kegan Psul, 1981
Bernst e i n , H.
'Notes on Capital and Peasantry'
Pol i t j cal Econom)!" Vol 10, 1977
Review of African
Berry, S.
"The Food Crisis and Agrarian Change
Rev i ew Es say" , £.!Ao...!t...,!'rc. :!:i~c:<..!a=.!...nL-::.Swt::..:u~d!....:i._e~sO__2.:R~e:::..!.v..::i-.::e~w,
1984
in
Vol
Africa: A
27, No 2.
Ei swan, A. K.
Climate and Development., Tycooly International Ltd,
Dublin, 1964
81aikie, P.
The Pol it i c al Economy of Soi 1 Erosi on in Devel opi ng
Countries, London, 1985
237
Bondest am, L.
~People and Capitalism in the North-eastern Lowlands
of Et.ha cp r ev , Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol
12, No 3, 1974
Boserup, E.
Woman's Role in Economic Development, London, Allen &
Unwin, 1970
Bowbr a c k , P.
"The Causes
Sen's Theory",
of Famine: A
Food Policy,
Refutation
Vol 11, No 2,
of Professor
1986
Brietzke, P
"Land Ref arm in Revol ut i onary
Modern African Studies. Vol 14,
Et ht op i ev , Journal
No 4, 1976
of
Brown, J. B.
"Soil Conservation, Forestry and Food Aid in
Ethiopia, Some .Experiences and Some Current
Problems", Paper pr'epared for the Sixth International
Soil Conservation Con i er errc e , Addis Aba ba , 1959
OJ-own, L.
"Dr-o ug h t an Seh e La e : Who or What is to Blame?' The
:C:coJ.ogl.st, Vol 3, No 10, 1973
Br-une, S.
"The Agriculture Sector: S;:.ructur3, Pex-formance, and
issues <.1974-1988)", in Z. Pausewang, Fantu Cheru,
Stefan Br-urie , Eshetu Chole (eds.) Eth;opia: Options
for Rural Development, Zed Books Ltd., London and New
Jersey, 1990
Bush, Ray
"Drought
Economy.
and Pamine",
No 33, August,
Review of ,t:.,fri can Political
1985
Bush, Roy
"A Report from Ethiopia: Famine and Revolution in
Africa", Contemporary Marxisirn, Feb. 1985
Campbell, J.
'Land or Peasants? The Dilemma confronting Ethiopian
Resource Conservation', African Affa;rs. Vol 90, No
358, January, 1991: 251-269
Chambers, H.
Rural Develo~rnent. Putt ins the Last First,
London, 1983
Longman,
II R Lorighur e t , & A. Parley (eds)
Seasonal Dimensions to Rural Povert )', Pinter, London,
1981
238
Chayanov, A. V.
The Theor y of Peasant Economy. Homewood, 111i noi s,
1976
Chazan, N., and T. Shaw
Coping with Africa's Food Crisis,
London, 19B8
Christian Relief and Development Association
"Welo Regional Report", Christian
Development Association, Addis Ababa, n.
Lynne Reinner,
Relief
d.
and
Clapham, C.
'Revolutionary
African Affairs,
Socialist Development
Vol 86, No 343, 1987
in' Ethiopia,
"
Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionarv
Ethiopi a, Cambridge Uni ve'rsi ty 'Press, Cambri dge,
1988
"
"State and Revolution in Ethiopia", Review of Afl-ic:.:tD
Pol i tical Economy, Vol 44, 1989
"
noile Se.iossl~· s Gove)-nment, Longman, Lonoon , ~962
Clarke, J'.
Resettlement and Rehabilitation. Etr.iopl;:.1's
5~ainst Fam,ne, Harney & Jones Ltd, Lcnd8n,
Campaign
1986
Clay, J. & B. K. Holcomb.
Politics and the Ethiopian Famine 1984-1985,
Cambridge, Ma.: Cultural Sur~ival, December 1985
Cliffe, L.
'The Effects of War on Two Different Agrarian Systems
in Eritrea', Development and Change, Vol 20, No 3,
1989
"
"Capitalism or Feudalism? The Famine of
Review of African Political Economy. Vol 1,
Ethiopia",
1974
"
'The Conservation issue
African Political Economv,
in Zimbabwe'
Vol 25, 19B!::
Review of
If
A Case Study of Famine: Ethiopia: 1973-74, Draft
Paper, Uni vers i t Y of Leeds, 1976
" & R. Moor s om.
"Rural Glass Formation and Ecological Collapse in
Botswana", Review of African Political Economy, Vol
15/16, 1979
239
" & B. Davidson.
The Long Struggle of Eritreafor Independence and
Constructive Peace, Spol<esman, 1988
.. L, Bondestam, & P. White
Eri t rea, Food and Agri cuI t ural Produc t i on Assessment
Study, Final Report, Centre for Development Studies,
University of Leeds, 1991
Cohen, John
'Foreign involvement in
land tenure policies,
African Studies, Vol 7,
the formulation of Ethiopia's
Part I & Part I I, Nort heast
No 2 & 3, 1981
tt
"E't h f opae : a survey on the existence
peasantry', Journal at Modern African
12, No 4, 1974
of a feudal
St udiesl, Vol
..
"Ef1 ec t s 01 Green Revolution Strategies on Tenants
and ;;3mall-scale Landowners in the Chilalo Region of
E'thaopr a", Journal ot Devel opi ng Areas, 9 Apri I, 1976
\n.llagJ.z6-r.ion in the Arsi re<;<ion of Ethiopia.
Uppsal El: Report prepared by SI [,A. Consul t, ent t a the
E-chio-Swedisn l"i:J..ssion OJ) 'Jillagization in Are i , 1987
" & ~lnls-lvar IS6Ksson
'Food pr oduc t aori stra'tegy debates i n Revolut.ionary
Et naopae ", World Development, Vol 16, No 3, 1985
Cohen, John, M., & D. Weintraub
Land and Peasants in Imperial Ethiopia. The
SocialBackground of Revolution, The Netherlands, Van
Gorcum and Camp., 1975
"
"Analysing thE: Ethiopian Revolution, A
Tale", Journal of Modern African Studies,
Cautionary
15, 1980.
Constable, ~, & D. Belshaw
A Summary of Major Findings and Recommendations from
the Ethiopian Highlands Reclamation Study, Addis
Ababa, Ministry of Agricul ture, Addis Ababa, Land Use
Planning and Regulatory Department/FAO. 1985
Copans, J.
"The Sahelian drought: social sCiences and the
political economy of underdevelopment", in K. Hewitt
c,ed.) Interpretations of Calamity from the viewpoint
of human ecology, The Risks and Hazards Series: I,
Allen and Unwin Inc., London, Boston, and Sidney.
1983
240
Corbett, .J.
"Famine and Household Copang' Stra'Cegies", World
Development, Vol. 16, 1988
CosBins, N.
"No Way to Live. A Study of the
Northeast Range-lands of Ethiopia",
Livestock and Meat Board, 1972
Aiar Clans of
Addis Ababa,
II & Bekele Yemerou
"Still Sleep the the Highlands. A Study of Farm and
Li vest ock Syst ems in t he Cent ral Highl ands of
E'thiopia", Addis Ababa, Livestock and Meat Board,
1974
Cowen, M
II The Commercial i zat i on
Africa after 1945", in
Colonialism and Hunger,
oj Food Produ=tion in East
R. Rotberg <ed), Imoerialism,
Lexington Heath: 1983
Commins, S.,
Africa's
et. aL. , (eds.)
AQ;rari,an Crisis: The Roots of Famine,
Bo u Ld e r , Colorado, Lynne Rel.nner, 1986
Crummey, D.
"Aby es Lnaen Feudalism",
118-137
Past and Pre:=ent. ~9, 1980:
Curtis, D., M, Hubbard,
?reventin~ Famin~,
& A. Shepherd (eds."
Policies anc Prospects for Africa,
Routledge, London, 1988
Cutler, P.
"Famine forecasting: Prices and peasant
Nor t he rn Et hi opi a" Di sast ers, Vol 8, No1,
behaViour
1984
in
..
"The Response to the Drought
in Sudan", Disasters, Vol 19,
of Beja Famine Refugees
No 3, 1988: 45-58
"
"The Political Economy of Famine in
Sudan", Pa pe r Prepared for the
Conference on Environmental Stress and
15 Dec., 1988, Royal Swedish Academy
Stockholm, Sweden.
Ethiopia and
International
Security, 13-
of Sciences,
Daniel Gemachu
"Environment and Mass Povert v"
Cheru, Stefan Brune, Eshetu
Options for Rural Development,
and New .Jersey, 1990
in Z. Pausewang, Fant u
Chol e (eds.) Et hi oRi a:
Zed Books Ltd., London
"
'Environment and development' I in h, Penrose (ed)
Bevond the Famine, Geneva: International Instute for
ReI t e f and Development, 1988
241
Dawit Beleke.
'Peasant Associations
Ethiopia', IDS Bulletin.
Studies, Suese){, Vol 13, No
and Agrarian
Institute of
4, 1982
Reform in
Development
Dawit Wolde Giorgis
Red Tears. War. Famine and
Trenton, N. J., Red Sea Press,
Revolution
1989
in Ethior-ia.
de Waal, A.
Evi 1 Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia.
Africa Watch Report, London, 1991
"
Famine Survival Strategies in Wollo, Tigray and
Eritrea.
1990
Dejene Aredo
liThe Evol ut ion of Rural Development Pol i ctes",
Pausewang, Fantu Cheru, Stefan Brune, Eshetu
(eds.) Et h:i.opi a: Opt ions f or Rural Development,
Books Ltd., London and New Jersey, 1990
A Review of the Literature. " Oxfam, Oxford,
in L..
Chole
Zed
Cessalegn Rahmato.
Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia,
?ress, 1984
Trenton, N.J: Red Sea
"
?amine and Survival Strategies: A Case Study from
Northeast Ethiopia, The Scandinavian Institute of
African Studies, Uppsala, 1991
"
"Peasant Survi val St rategi es in Et hi opi a" I Disast ers.
Vol 12, No 4, 1988
"
"Cooperatives, State Farms
Production", in Z. Pausewang,
Brune, Eshetu Chole Ceds.)
Rural Development, Zed Books
Jersey, 1990
and Smallholder
Fantu Cheru, Stefan
Ethiopia: Options for
Ltd., London and New
"
"Rural vJomen in Ethiopia:
Tsehi Berhane-Salassie
Ethiopia, Institute of
Ababa, November 1991
Problems and Prospects" in
(ed), Gender Tssues in
Ethiopian Studies, Addis
II
"Settlement and Environment in Wollo: Considerations
for Food Security Planning", Institute of Development
Research, Addis Ababa, January, 1992
Dinham B., & C. Hines.
Agribusiness in Africa,
Press, 1984
Trenton, N. J: Africa World
242
Dirks, R.
"Social Response during
Famine", Current Anthropology.
Severe
Vol. 21,
Food Short ages
No.l,1980
and
Donham, D. J & W. James (eds).
The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia; Essays in
Historv and Social Anthropology.
University, 1986
Cambridge, Cambridge
Dreze, J., & A. Sen
Hunger and Public Action.
London, 1989
Oxford University Press,
Edhol~ F., O. Harris & K. Young
'Conceptualising women' Critique of Anthropology,
Vol 3, No 9/10, 1977
Ellis, G.
"The Feudal Paradigm as Cl Hindrance to Understanding
E't h f op r e?' , Journal of Modern African St udies. Vol 4,
No 2, 1976
Eriz e r , ;:,., R. Dr obn ack & S. Alter.
Nei the!'" reast Nor Famine?, Lex i ng-ton Soaks, 1978 .
Es.h e t u .:hole
'The Ethiopian economy'
the Famine. Geneva:
Relief ana Development,
in A. Penrose (ed), Sevond
Internat10nal Institute for
1986
..
"Agriculture and Surplus Extraction: The Ethiopian
Expe r a ence", in Z. Pausewang, Fe nt u Cheru, Stef an
Br un e , Eshetu Chole (eds.) Ethiopia: Options for
Rural Development, Zed Books Lt d., London and New
Jersey, 1990
Ethiopia, Negarit Gazeta (Official Gazette)
Pr oc Lame t t on 31/1975: 'Proclamation to provide for
the public ownership of rural lands' and Proclamation
71/197: 'Peasant aSSOCiations organization and
consolidation proclamation'
E~hiopiat Office of
Commission
PORuletion and Housing Census
Ababa, 1984; and ..Anal yt i cal
Level", 1991
the Population and Hous1ng Census
of C:thiopia, Addis
Report at National
Fantu Cheru
"Options for Rural Development in Ethiopia: The
International Context", in Z. Pausewang, F'antu CherI',
Stefan Br un e , Eshetu Chole Ceds.) ethiopia: Rural
DeveloRment Options, Zed Books Ltd., London and New
Jersey, 1990
243
FAO
"Ethiopian Highland Reclamation Study:
Strategy, Part 3, Working Paper 24,
Agriculture Organisation of the UN, Rome,
Development
Food and
1985
"
"Ethiopian Highland Reclamation Study: Annexes,
Working Paper 24, Food and Agriculture Organisation
of the UN, Rome, 1985
"
"Ethiopian Highland Reclamation Study: Executive
Summary, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN,
Rome, 1985
"
"Ethiopian Highland Reclamation Study, Ethiopia",
Final Report, Food and Agriculture Organisation of
the UN, Rome, 1986, 2 Vols.
"
"A Summary of the Agricultural Ecology of
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the
1987
Ethiopia" ,
UN, Rome,
"lUND?
"Mast er Land Use
Organisa~10n of the
Pr og r amrne, Rome, . 19tH)
Flan", Food an d
UNIUnited Nations
Agiicu:: t. ul~e
Development
Fal"rner', G., ~ J. Wigley.
Climatic Trpnds for Tropical Africa, Climate Research
Unit, University of East Anglia, 1985
Fasil Gebre Kiros.
'Agr'icultural land fragmentation a problem of land
distribution observed in some Ethiopian peasant
associations's, Ethiopian Journal of Deve10cment
Research. Vol 4, 1980
It "An Assessment of the Economic Consequences of
Drought, Crop Failure and Famine in Ethiopia
1973/74-1985/86", paper prepared for the
International Conference on Environmental Stress and
S~curity, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,
Stockhol~ Sweden, 1988
Firebrace, J., & S. Holland.
Never Kneel Down, Drought, Development and Liberation
in Eritrea, Trenton, N. J: Red Sea Press, 1985
Fi tgerald, M.,
"Drought, Famine
Occasional Paper
London, 1980
and Revolution
I, Dept. o f Geo.,
in Ethiopi8",
Uni versi t y of
Friedmann,
"The
H.
Politic8l Economy of Food, The Rise and Fall of
244
the Postwar International Food Order", in M.
& T. Skocpol Ceds.), Marxist Enquiries,
University of Chicago Press, 1982
Buroway
Chicago,
Galloway, G.
'The Mengistu Famine', Spectator, 1 December, 1984
Gamst, F. C.
"The Kind Seal Opened and the Black Horseman Emerged:
An Historic Cultural Ecology of Ethiopian Poverty and
Famine" (Review Art i c1e of J. McCann's, From Povert y
to Famine in Northeast Ethiopia.) Peasant Studies,
Vol 15, No 2 1989
Garcia, R.
Nature Pleads Not Guilty, Pergamon, New York, 1981
Gesrtrell, B.
"Searching
Kar amoj a",
33,191)5
for the 'Roots of
Review of African
Famine' :
Political
The Case
Economy.
of
No
(Tebru Tareke
Ethiovia: Power and Protest!
Pl-ess, 1991
Cambridge University
George, S.
How the Other Half Dies,
Books, 19/6
Bal t imore,' Md. Penguin
Gete-chew Kossa
'A Change in the Role Bnd Status of Pastoral Women In
Two Garri Villages, Southern Ethiopia', in
Tsehai Berhane-Selassie (ed), Gender Issues in
Ethiopia, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis
Ababa, Et. hi opi Cl, November, 1991
Ghose, A. K.
"Transforming Feudal Agriculture: Agrarian Change in
Ethiopia since 1974" special t eue on The Agrarian
Question in Socialist Transition, Iournal of
Development Studies, Vol 22, No 1, October, 1985
Gilkes, P.
The Dving Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in
Ethiopia, London: Fr i edman, 1975
Gill, G.J.
"Bottlenecks in a single-cropping system in Chilalo,
Ethiopia", WOl~ld Development, No 5, Fall, 1977
Gi 11. P.
A Year 'in the Death of Africa. r:'olitics, Bureacra(""~
and The Famine, London: Paladin Books, 1986
245
Glantz, M. (ed.)
'Drought and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa' in M. Glantz c ed », Drought and Famines in
Africa. Cambridge University Press, Cambr1dge, 1987
" (ed)
Drought and Hunger in Africa,
Press, Cambridge, 1987
Cambr i dg e Uni versi t y
Goyder, H., & C. Goyder.
"Case St udies of Famine: Ethiopa",
M. Hubbard & A. Shepherd (eds),
Policies and Prospects for Africa,
in D. C'u r t.d a ,
Prevent ing Famine:
Routledge, 1988
Greenfield, R.D.
Ethiopia:' A New Political Historv, London, 1965
Gr-eenough, P. R.
"Indian Famines and Peasant Victims: The
Benga 1 in 1943 -4 4", i n ~M~o::.;d=e~r_;n!...!--,A:..!...:=s,-=i~a:::!.!..in,--S""-=t.~u~d",,i~e~s,
Pt.2, 1980
Case
Vol.
of
14,
Gregory, S.
"The C.limat 01Qgy of Dro\'.1ght",
7 1, 311, 19b6
Geograo;,v, Vol 1 ,
Cri t tin, K. .
"The Economi c Cr 1si s in Et.hi opi a" in
W. L. Hollist & F. L. Tullis <eds), FersuinQ:" rOOO
SacUl-tty Strates;ies and Obstacles in Africa, Asia.
Latin America and the lVJiddle East, Lynne Reinner,
Boulder, Colorado, 1987
" & R. Hay.
"Problems of
Ethiopia: an
Vol 13, No I,
agricultural developmen~ in
overvi ew" '. J ourna 1 of Peasant
1985
Socialist
St udi es,
Grove, A, T.
"Desertification
Affairs, Vol.73,
in the African
No.291, April,
Envi ronment" ,
1974
African
Guyer, J., & P. Peters
'Introduction' to "Conceptualising the Household:
Issues of Theory and Policy in Africa", Development
and Change, Vol. 18, No.2, April 1987: 197-214
Hai 1u Lemma.
"The Politics of Famine
African Political Economv,
in Ethiopia",
No 33, 1985
Review of
Halliday. F. & M. Molyneux.
The Ethiop1an Revolution, London: Verso, 1981
Hancock, G.
Ethio12ia: The Challenge of Hunger, London: Golancz,
1985
246
Harei de, D.
"Famine or Preparedness?" in Z. Pausewang, Fantu
Ch e r u, Stet an Brune, Eshetu Chole Ceds.) Ethiopia:
Options for Rural Development, Zed Books Ltd., London
e nd New Jersey, 1990
Her-r Ls s , O.
'Households as natural units', in K. Young, C.
Wolkowitz, & R. l'1cCullagh <eds.), Of Marriage and
the Market: Women's subordjnation internationally and
its lessons, London, Rout 1edge and Kagan Paul, 1984
Hay, IvI. & S.
African
Stichter <eds.)
Women Sout h of the Sahara, London: Longman,
1984
Henze, P.
"Behind the Ethiopian
Revolution", Encounter,
Sept ember~-Oct ober, 1986
Famine,
June,
Anatomy of
July/August
El
and
Hewitt, K. (ed, >
Interpretatlons of Calamity from the Viewpoint of
Human Ecology, The
Allen & Unwin Inc. ,
Risk~ and Hazaards Series: :.
London, Bast on, and Sydney. i 9~3
Hoben, A.
Land Tem_H'€; amons- the Amhara of E'thiopiB,
Universi~y of Chicago, 1973
Holm, J. & R.
"Coping
Success" ,
1985
II10l~gan.
wi th Drought in
Jou r n e I of Modern
Botswana: An
Afri can St ud i es"
African
No 23,
Hor-r owt t.z , M, & P. 'Little
"African Pastoralism and
for Drought and Famine",
and Famine in Africa
Poverty: Some Trnp Ld c e t Lorus
in M. Glantz (ed.) Drought
Hurni, Hans
"De8t~adation and Conservation of the Soil Resource in
the Ethiopian Highlands", paper prepared for the
First International Workshop on African Mountains ana
Highlands, Addis Ababa, 1986
"
"Ecological I ssues in the Creat ion of Ferm ne s ir.
Ethiopia", paper prepared r~r the Nat ional Cont erence
on a Disast er Prevent ion and Preparedness Strategy
f or Et hi opia, Addi s Ab a ba, 1988
i-iussein A. <ed>
Reha b. Drought and Fami ne in Et hiopia. London:
Internation African Institu~e. 1976
247
Hyden, G.
No Short Cuts t.o Progress: African Development
Management in Prac1.ice, London: Heinemsnn, 1983
II
Beyond Uiamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an
Uncaptured Peasantrv, London, Heinemann, 1980
ICIHI
Famine A Man-Made Disaster?, A Keport for the
Independent Commission on International Hume.nf t er-aan
Issues, Pan Books, London and Sidney, 1985
ILO
From Crisis 1.0 Sustained Developmen~. P. Prosr amme of
Action, . Report of the International
multi-d:csclplinary programmi'ng mtss a on
ILO, Geneva, 1986, 2 Vols..
Labour Of f ace
to Ethiopia,
IUCN
"Ethiopi a, Landuse Planning _and
Conservation", International
Conservation of Nature and Natural
Report, Giand, 1986
Ns t ur e I Resollrce
Un~on _ for the
Resources, Mission
James, P. C. I,,).
"The "'JOl~ld Bank's Agencia for t rie Cr:l::=:s :lD Agr a c.ui t ue
and Rur eI Development in Arr i ca: An Introduction to
the Debate", African Studies Reviev,;, Vol 27, No 4,
December, 1984
Jansson, K., M. Harris & A.
The Ethiopian Famine,
Penrose c eds. >
London: Zed Books, 1987
"
"The Emergency Relief Operation: an ariss i de view", in
-'Jansson, K., M. Harris & A. Penrose <.eds.)
The Ethiopj_an Famine, London: Zed Books, 1987
Jayawardena, L.,
"Foreword" in J. Dreze & A.
LP~o~l!..:l=-·t,-=i~c~ao.,l!.-E~c~o~nc.:.oL!m~y_~o,,-T,-'_"-,H._,u""n~s..,e= .~r, VoL I,
Oxford, 1990
Sen cedsv ) , The
Clarendon Press,
Kasfir, N.
'Are Afri can peasant s
and Change , Vo1 17, No
self-sufficien~?' ,
2, i 986
Development
Keen, D.
Survi vinS e t, What Cost? Famine. Need-=: Assessment and
Survival Strategies in P.frica. Oxf em, Oxf or d. 1992
King, P.
An African Winter, London: PengUin Books 1986
248
Kloos, H,
I! Development,
of E't h Lo p a e?",
Dr-ought and Famine a n the Awash Valley
African Studies Review, No 4, 1982
"
"Health and Disease in the Least Developed Countries,
wi th an Emphasi s on t he African Dryl ands and a Case
Study of Ethiopian Pastoralists", African Arid Lands
Working Paper, AAL, Depart ment of Spidemi ology and
Bio-St'atistics, University of Calfornia, 1993
Koehn, P.
"Ethiop~a: Famine, Food Production and Changes in the
Legal Order", African Studies Reviet..1, Vol XXII, No 1,
April,' 1979
Lamb, P,J .
. Pe)~sistEmce of Sub-Saharan Dr ough t ". Nature,
2 Sept ember, 19cs2
Lappe, F"
Food
& J,
F:i. rst:
Colli:'1s.
The Mvth of Scar-citv, Lc n d ori: Souvenlr
Press, 19'!?
Last I l}. \.."":.
A Geography 01 i='tluop:i.C, P.d01S Abe be , 1'963
Law)-ence, P. -c ed)
World Recession and the
at African Politicol
London, 1986
Lefort, R.
=Ec.!tuh~i...o~p~i_;a~:,--~A~n!"!_-,".H~'~e:..:.T....:e~t...:i'-.:c:..::a:..;l=--...!.R~e~v...o~l~u~t"-.±.i_;o~n.!..J'L n don; Zed Books ,
1983
Economy and James
Review
Currey,
Food Crisis :.n
Levine, D.
Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Et hiopian
Cui t ure, Chicago; University of Chicago, 1965
Lofchie, [11"
"Political and Economic Origins of African Hunger",
Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, 4, 1975
" & S. K, Commins,
"Food Deficit and Agricultural Policies in
Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies,
No 1, 1982
Tropical
Vol 20,
Longhurst, R.
"Household Food Strategies in Response to Seasonality
and Famine", IDS Bulltill..n... Institute of Development
Studies, Sussex, Vol 17, No 3, 1986
.,
"Cash Crops and Pood SecLlri t y", I nst it ut e of Develop-
ment Studies Bulletin, Vol 19, No 2, April, 1998
249
Love, R.
"Fundi ng the Et hi opi an St. at. e: Who Pays?", Revi ew of
African Political Economy, No.4-4, 1989
Luckham, R., & D. Beleke.
"Foreign Powers and iv1illt.arism in the Hor-n
Africa", Review of African Political Economy, No
September, 1984
of
30,
LuI seged, A.
"The Rol e of
AE\l~i c u I t ur al
USAID/Ethiopia,
State Domain Lands
Development", paper
Sept-Dec., 1973
in Ethiopia's
prepared for
!VIaeKeriz i e, D.'
'Can Ethiopia be Saved?' New Scientist, 24 June, 1987
McCann, J .
•History, drought and reproduction: -d y nernac e 0:';
society and ecology in l.Jo)-theast Et h aopf a ! , 211.
D. Johnson & D. Anderson (eds), 7ne Ecology of
Survival, Boulder, Westv:l.ew, 1988a
"
Ho usseh o I 'd Econolll)l, Demosrsoshv, e rrd t!Je 'Pustl'
ln Northern Et.hiopian h'storv 1916-1935,
Studies Centl-e, Working Pe per No.97, boston,
UnI v . 1984
African
Boston
"
From POVfn-tv to FaTlline in NortheastE1:.niopia: A Rural
His tor v 19 16- 1935• Uni ve r sit Y 0 f Pen n s y1van i aPr e 5 S ,
Philadelphia. 1987
"
"The Social Impact of Famine in Et.h t opaa: households,
oxen a;,d some implications for rehabilitation", in
M. Glantz (ed>, Drousht and Hunger in Africa:
Deny i 11S' Fami ne a Put ur-e, Cambr i dge, 1987
Magi st ad, 1'1. K,
'On 'the Razor's Edge', Africa Re2ort. Vol 32, No 3,
1987
Mamd e ma , 111.
"The Colonial Roots of Famine an Karamoja:
Rej 0 i n der" , ~R..se;:.:.v~iJ::e~w~....:o~r_.LA:!...TL·-.!..r'...:i=-:c=-=a!.i.n..L--,P~o:..:l,-,~~' ~t...:i...:c~a,-,l"--_E,,,-,=c,-,o=,-n.....::o,,-!".!.!.l.;wV,
36, Sept ember 1986
f.~
No
Mar cu s , H,
The Life and Times of Menel ik II, Ox f or d , 1973
Mar K ark is, J .
Ethiopia: Anatomy 01 a Traditional ::olitv, Oxford:
Cl arendon, 1974
250
..
National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa.
African 3tudies Ser1es 55,
Press, 1987
Cambridge University
"
'The Military State in Ethiopia's Path ~o
"Socialism''', Review of African Political Economy,
No 21, 1981
.. & ·N. Ayel e.
Class and Revolution in Ethiopia,
i977
Spokesman Press,
MeilJ.asollX, C.
'Development or
Good Business-:--'
Augus'l-J~oveIOber,
Exploitation: Is
Review of African
t he Sahel Famine
Political Economv,
1974
J~';t?::' lor, J.·w.
'Global Food Balances
DE'velopment., Vo] 6, No 9,
and Food
1968
Security' World
Mesf1D Walas Mar18m
RUI-a1 vulnerabiliiv to Famine in Ethiopie.. 1956-1977,
New Delhi: Va kes Pub La ah e r s , 19<34
"
"Ev h t op i e v a Food Seeur-it.y: Problems and Prospects",
Paper prepared ior the National Workshop on Food
Strategies lor Ethiopia, Alernaya Unt ver s.a t y of
i\gricult.ul-e, .A.lemaya, 8-13 December 1986
'.
An Introductol-y GeoS'r-aphy of Ethiopia,
19?O
Addis Ababa,
e
An Atlas or- Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 1985
l>1or t imor-e, H.
Adapting to Drought: Farmer-s, Famines and Dissertif;-
cation in West Africa, Cambridge Uni ve r e a t y Press,
Cambridge, 1989
Nicholson, S.2.
'Climate, Dr-ough t and Famine in Afr a ce ' in A. Hansen
60 D.C. McMillan, Food in Sub-Saharan Af'rica , Frances
Pinter, London, 1986
O' brien, J.
"Sowing t he Seeds of Famine; The Poli tical Economy of
Food Deficits in the Sudan", Review of African
Political Economy, No 33, 1985
251
O' Keefe, P. & B. Wisner <.ads).
Land-Use and Development,
Special Report, 5, London:
Ln s t t t ut e, 1977
African Envirornental
International African
Ottoway, D. d< M.
Ethiopia:
at t oway.
Empire in Revel u i, ion, Holmes Mei er, New
York, 1976
"
"Soc~al I".,l.asses and
Et h a op t en Rev'oluti'on",
Studies, Vol 14, No 3,
Corporate
Journal
IntE-rests
of Modern
in the
African
1976
Oxfom
Les~ons to be Le er jj ed : Dr 0 Usn t snd Famine in
Ethiowia, OX!' o r d : Oxfam, 191:)6
Fankhul'st, Al ul c. .
"Res,et,tlement.: Foli,CY end Practice", in Z. Pausewang,
Fd.Dt II Cher u, 5t e r cm 5r une , Eshet \J Crro Le (8ds.)
Ethi opi 5: Opt. i OIlS t or RUt~ai DeveloRment, Zed Books
Lt, d., Lor.c or. ono New J er sey, : 990
?anknurst, Helen.
Gender. Dev.=.·loprnent one Id'enti1:v: An Ech10pian Studv,
Zeo Pr ess, London, 1992
Pankhurs1:, Richara.
State and Land
Faculty at Law
Haile Sellassie
in Ethiopian Historv, Addis Ababa:
and Lnss t Ltu t e of 2thiopian StudJ.es,
I University, 1965
"
'Some Factors Depressing t h'e Standal~d
P~asan~s in Traditional Ethiopia'
Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa, Vol 4,
of Li ving of
.Journol of
No 2, 1966 (a)
..
I The Great Ethiopian famine of 1888-1892: a new
asessment', Journ~l of the History cr- Medicine and
Allied Scie.nces, Vol 21, 1966(b)
II
Economic History of Ethiopia. 1800-1935, Addi s Ababa:
Haile Sellass1e I University, 1968
Pankhurst, Rita.
'Senedu Gabru: A Role lv10del for E't h a op I an Women in
Tsehai Berhane-Selasie Gender Issues in Ethiopia,
Institute ~f Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa,
November, 1991
Pausewang, Z.
'Peasants, organisations, markets: ~en
the Land Reform, Derap Working Papers
Michel son Inst it ut e, Bergen, 1986
years
A359,
after
Chr.
252
" & Fantu Che r u, Stefan Brune, Eshetu Chole (eds.)
Ethiopia: RUI~al Development Options, London: Zed
Books, 1991
"
"fvJe}-et Le .Arrashu", in Z.
Stefan 5rune, Eshetu Chole
Development Options, London:
?ausewang,Fantu
(eds.) Ethiopia:
Zed Books, 1991
Cheru,
Rural
If
"The Peasant Perspective", in Z. Pe.usewang, Fantu
Cher u, St ef an Brune, Eshet u Chol e (eds.) Ethi opia:
Rural Development Opt ions, London: Zed Books, 1991
Of
"A New International
in the Third World",
1980
Economic Order for
Sociologia RuraliS,
the Peasant
Vol XX, 1/2,
?enr-ose, A.
D~vond the Farnl.ne, Genobva: Lnt e r rre t aone I
j or Rell.el and Development, Food 1"0l-
Ln t e r rie t r oo e L, 19<.;8
Instl.tute
the H1...Ingry
.,
"Sel or e
Peru-ose
and Aft er fI , i 11 K. Jan nss on, j.1. HClr t- l.S, h
T..!...!..r.._,Je=--_,E=,-,,-t..!..h.._,l.=-.·""O~D,:.,l.=-.·.! !a:.t,.r!._J-LF....\c"". r!.ilJ~·i:..!r",,·• .s;.,e , Ze d Boo k s L 1: d., Lon d on
and New Jersey, 19b/
?etros, J.F.M. & H. Morely.
"The Ethiopian Military State
Involvement in the Horn of Africa",
Political Economv, No 30, 1984
and Soviet-US
Revi'ew of Afl-"i can
Pliny the ~iddle Aged.
'The Lives and
African Studies,
Times
Vol 5,
of
No 3,
the Dergue",
1984
Northeast
Polyakov, G.
"Soviet-Ethiopian Cooperation in Ag r dc uLt ur-e L'", in Z.
PausE!wang, Fent u Cber u, Stefan Brune, Eshetu Chole
(ed!S.) Ethiopia: Options for Rural Development, Zed
Books Ltd. I London and New Jersey, 1990
Pool, D.
"Revol ut i onary Cri si sand Revol ut i one r y Vanguard: The
Er t t.r-e en People's Liberation Front", Review of
Af ri can Pol i t. i cal Economy, No 19, Sep<:ember-December-
198t>
Raikes, P.
Modernising Hunger, J. Currey, London, 198~
Richards, P.
"Ecologogical Change and the Politics of African Land
Use", Att-ican Studies Review, No 26, June 1983
253
ROAPE
"Ethiopia: 15 '{ears On",
Economy, No 44, 1959
Review of African Political
Robert son, A. F.
The Dynamics of Productive Relationships. i\frican
Share Contracts in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge
University ?ress, Cambridge, 1987
r:otberg, R.L.l. (ed)
Imperialism Colonialism
Africa, Lexington Books, Massachuset 1:S, Toront 0, 1983
r'" ~ .-
1"\. n.'--.
Food Supply of the Crop Dependent Population in lq91
Earlv Warnins System l'1eher <Main) Cl- op Season
Svnoptic Report, Relief
Ethi apia, Ad d i.s Ababa,
and Rehabiitation Commission,
February, 199)
II
Eth10Fia: Review of Drought Relief ana Rehabilitation
Activities for the period Decomber 19~4 - August 1985
o.nd I90t. As.su:·.1.ance ~eouirE:rnE:nts, Aoc i s .~bdba,
Oc t o b e r , lSb:>
"
Ethiopia's Decade of
St)~U8ele, Add a s Ababa, 1985
"/UI-iEF-PG.
"A Vu Ln er e.b t Lt t y Profile or-
Relief and Rehabilitation
Eme r genc y Prepar edness
Ababa, Dr e t t., ri , d.
Programme, Sthiopia,
by the
the UN
Addis
Wallo", Prepared
Commission and
Rubensson, S.
"Conflict
Hi st ory:
for the
Se c u r f t, y,
St o c k h o Lm,
and Environmnental Stress in Ethiopian
Looking F01- Cor-relations", Paper Prepared
Conference on Environmnental Stress and
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,
Sweden, 13-15 December, 1986
Rot ber g, R. I, ( ed )
Imperialism, Colonialism and Hunger: East and Central
Africa, Lexington, IvJa.: D. C, Health & Co, 1983
Sai th, A.
"T'h e Distributional Dimensions 01 Revolutionary
Transition in Ethiopia", Special Issue on the
Agr e r f an Question in Socialist TransitJ.on" Journal
of Devel02ment Studies, Vol 22, No 1, October, :985
Sanders, D. W.
"Env~ronmen"al
Impact s: Past,
Conservat ion",
Degradation and Socia-economic
Present and Future Approaches to Soil
Paper presented at the 5th Inter-
254
national Soil Conservation
Thailand, 18-29 January, 1908
Conference, Bankok,
Schwab, P.
Eth~opia: Politics, Economics and Society.
Frances Pdn t e r , 1905
London,
Decision-Making in Ethiopia. A Studv of the Political
Process, C. Hurst & Co, London, 1972
01
"Rebellion in Gojam Province", Canadian Journal of
African Studies, No IV, April, 19"/1
Scott, E. (ed)
Life Before the Drought, Allen & Uriwt n , 1984
Scott., J.
The (vloral EcomOIOV of the Peasant ry, New Haven: Yale
Press, 1976
Seaman, J. & J. Holt.
narreghe und?r DI-ought. A Survey 0,- 'the =:{1 ects or
DroulZht upon Human Nutrition ~n hal-reghe Pro,-,jnce,
Repor~ prepared for the Relief and ~ehabilitat.ion
ComnlJ..ss~on, Addis Ababa: May - June 1974-
"
"J"larkets and Famine x r, the Third World" Internat;onal
J ouina 1 of Di sast et- St ud i es, Ho 4, Lo n oo n , 1980
Sen, A.
Poverty and
Claredon Press, Ox f or d ,
An Essay on Entitlements andFamine.
Depri vat ion, 19_81
Sheperd, J.
The Politics of Starvation, New York:
Endowment for International Peace, 1975
Carnegie
"
"Ethiopia' 6 Famine:
Report, March-April
The Politics of rood Aid",
1985
Africa
Shenton, 8. & M. Watts.
"Capitalism and Hunge, in Northern Ni8er~a", Review
Q.[_ African Political Economv, No 15/15, 1979
Sivini, G.
"Famine and
Afri ca (Rome,
t he Reset t 1ement Program
Anno XLI) !Jo 2, 1986
in Et h t opa e ",
Smi th, G.
"Ethiopia and
Report, No 145,
the Politics
1987
of Famine Relief", 1I1ERIP
255
Smith, N., & P. G'Keefe
~Geography, Marx and
Ant i pode, 12, 1880.
the conc epc nature",
Susman, P., P. O' Keefe. & B. Wisner
"Global disasters, a radical in;:erpretation", in 1<.
Hew'itt (ed.) Interpretations of Calamitv from the
vie'wpoint of human ecolo~ The Risks and Hazards
Series: I, Allen and Unwin Inc., Lendon, Boston, and
Sidney. 1933
Spitz, P.
"Si lent
national
Vi 01 en c e: rami ne and
Social Science Journal,
Inequality",
Vol 30, No 4,
Inter-
1978
St ahl, M.
New Seeds in Old Soil: A st udy of t he Land Ref orm
?rocess in Western Woll esa. Ethiopia 1975-76,
Uppsal a:
i977
Scandanaivian Institute of Afr a c e n Studies,
II
Ethiop:"a: POl itical I.:ont.rsdio"-ti ons :in Aq:ri c u 1t ur' a 1
l->evelopment, Stockholm, Raben & Sjog!-en, 1974
"
"Capturing the
Cooperat i yes: The
Political Economy.
Eth1op~an Pessants through
Cas e 0 f Et hi. 0pia " !..:R"",e::..v~ic...!e=-w~~o:!..!..f__!A2....!..f....!.t-_,J.:!:...·~c a"-!n'-!.
No 44, 19S9
Svenberg, P.
"Food Insecurity in Developing Countries: Causes,
Trends and Policy Options", United Notions Conference
on Trade and Development CUNCTAD), Working Paper,
TD/B/C.1/257, 180cotober, 1984
Swift, J.
HRehabilitation Alternatives for Pastoral Populations
in Sudan and Et hi opi a", Uni versi t y of Sussex, (1'1. d. )
"
"Why Are RUl-al Peopl e Vulnerabl e
Bulletin Institute of Development
Vol 20, No 2, 1989
to F a.mine?" IDS
Studies, Sussex,
Tabat abai, ..n.
"Food Crisis and Development
lnt ernat i anal La.bour Of f ice,
6/WP72, July 1985
in Sub-Saharan
Working Paper:
Africa",
WEP/l0-
Tadesse Tamrat.
Church and State in Ethiopia, Oxford, 1972
Timber I ak e, L.
Africa in Crisis. Tile CEluses. the Cures of Environ-
mental Degradation. London: Earthscan, 1985
256
Transitional Government of £~hiop1a.
Ethiopa's Economic Policy Durins The
Period. An Official Translation,
November , 1991
Transitional
Addis Ababa,
Tsehai Berhane-Selassie
In Search of Ethiopian Women, International Reports:
Women and Soci et y, No 11. London: Change, 1984
" (ed)
Gender Is-ues in Ethiopia: Pr-oceedinss
University Seminar on Gender Issues
Addis Ababa, December 24-25, 1989,
Institute of Ethiop1an Studies,
Un i v er si' t Y , 199 1
of the First
i'n Etn t opi a.
Addi s Ababa,
Addis Aba~a
Turton, O. & P. Turton.
"Spontaneous Resettlement
Example, D~sasters, Vol a,
after Drough t, :
No 3, 1984
An £thiopian
Twose, N.
Cultivating Hunger. A Oxfam Study ot t:"ood. ?ower- ::md
Poverty, Oxfor-d: Oxfam, 1964
"
USAID
IIFinal Oi ses t er Report:
Years 1985 and
The E~hiopian Drousht/Fam~n6,
1986", USAID, Ao d a s Ababa,r1scal
<n. d. )
Vaughan, M.
The Storv of an African Famine: Gender and Faminl'> in
Twent i 8th-Cent ury Mal awi, Cambri dge:
Un Lv er sa ty, 1987
Cambridge
" "Household Units
Malaw", Review of
i985: 35-45
in Historical Process in Southern
African Political Economy, No.34,
Watts, M.
U The Demise of t he Moral
a Sudano-Sahelian Region
in E. Scott, (ed), Lifo
Unwin, 1984
Economy: Food and F'e.rm ne in
in Historical Perspective",
Before tho D:-ought, Allen &
"
"On the poverty of theory: natural n.az a r d s resear-ch
in context", in K. Hewitt <ed.) Tnt.erpretations of
Cal ami t y f ,-om t he vi ewpoi nt of human eeo1ogy, The
R:J.sks and Hazards Series: If Allen and Unwin Inc.,
London, Boston, and Sidney. 1983
Winer, N.
, Agriculture
Dis a s t e 1-S , Vol
and Food Security
19, No 1, 1989
in Ethiopia' ,
257
Winstanley, D.
"African Drought: A Change of Climate?" Weatherwise.
April 1985
Wolpe, H. (ed)
The Articulation of Modes of Production,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980
London:
Workineh Degefu
"Some Aspects of Meteorological Drought in Ethiopia",
in M. Gla,.tz (ed.), Droughts and Famine in Africa.
C6mbri dge Uni v. Press, 1987
" & A Befekadu
"Impact of Weather and
National Meteorological
1986
Climate on Food
Sel-vices Agency,
Produc t ion" ,
Addis Ababa,
Wood, A. P.
"Rur a I developroent and
Ethiopia", African Affairs.
national
Vol 82,
integr6tion
No 329, 1983
in
" "Farmers Responses to Drought in Ethi.opia", in
A. Hussei n, (ed), Rehabi 1it at ion D;ou~ht and Faro'; ne
in Ethic-pie., London, International f.:-,:=an Inst1tu-::E:.
1976
'Natural Resource Management and Rural Development in
Ethiopia' in Z. Pausewang, r- e n t u; Cheru, Stef3n
Br une, Eshet u . Chol e (eds.) I='t hi o;::i a: Opt ions i Ot-
Rural Development, Zed Books Ltd. J London and New
J e.rsey, 1990
WOl-ld Bank
"Ethiopia:
pr-o s pe c t s",
Recent economic developments and
World Be.nk , Washington D. C., 1984
future
II
Po ve r t yond Hunger: I ssues and O?t ions for
Security in Developing Countrie"" World
WaShington D. C., 1986
Food
Bank,
II
"Accelel-eted D'eve Lopmerrt a r,
Agenda for Action, World B6nk,
Sub-Soharan Africa, An
Washinst on D. C., 1981
..
"Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to
Gr owt h . A Long-Term Perspect i ve St u dy!' ,
Washington, D. C., 1989
Sustainable
World Bank,
W'-ight, K.
I' Combe t ing Famlne: A Revol ut i onery Si;.r at. egy" I
of African Polit~cal Economv, Briefings, No 30,
Review
1984
